From the author: My new book by V.R. Keiselman (Dorozhkin) “The Facets of Altruism” has been published, Kiev, 2016, 320 pages (50% of the text “Altruism: the so-called good”, 2010 is posted in this article )My new book by V.R. Keiselman (Dorozhkin) “The Facets of Altruism” has been published, Kyiv, 2016, 320 pages http://www.gnosisbooks.ru/catalog/AI/12308/ CONTENTS Introduction......... ........................................................ ........................................................ .Section 1. Theoretical and methodological study of altruism: ethological and evolutionary psychological approaches1.1. History of the development of views on the concept of altruism..................................1.2. Methodological and theoretical foundations for the study of altruistic personality behavior.................................................... ...............................................1.3. Ethological and evolutionary psychological concepts of altruism.................................................. ........................................................ ....................1.3.1. Study of the development of altruistic behavior in phylogeny. Natural altruism................................................... ...................1.3.2. Modern views on the phenomenon of natural altruism in ethology and evolutionary psychology.................................................. ..........1.4. Natural form of altruistic behavior and aggression...................1.5. Conclusions................................................. ........................................................ ..Section 2. Psychological analysis of altruistic personality behavior2.1. Sociocultural studies of altruism in traditional cultures. The connection between altruistic behavior and social dominance and control.................................................. ...............................................2.2. Introduction to psychological approaches to the study of altruism.........2.3. Altruism as a social phenomenon................................................................. .....2.4. Neurotic aspects of the manifestation of altruism....................................2.5. Personal and transfinite altruism .................................................2.6. Conclusions................................................. ........................................................ .Section 3. Structural biosociopsychological model of altruism 3.1. Structural model of altruism.................................................... .......3.2. Types and types of altruistic behavior...................................3.3. Stages of development of altruism................................................................. ................3.4. Altruism in the structure of basic forms of human interaction.................................................... ........................................................ ........................3.5. Functions of altruism................................................... ................................ 3.6. Conclusions................................................. ........................................................ ...Section 4. Symbolic constitution of altruistic behavior4.1. Symbolic constitution of altruistic behavior......4.1.1. The concept of symbolic constitution in psychology and psychotherapy.................................................... ...........................................4.1.2. Methods of symbolic constitution of altruism in psychotherapy.................................................... ...........................................4.2. Symbolic constitution of various types of altruism in psychotherapy.................................................... ...........................................4.3. Conclusions................................................. ........................................................ ...Conclusions .............................................. ........................................................ ............Conclusion..................................... ........................................................ ...............List of usedliterature........................................................ ......... c.4 c. 13 p. 94 p. 96 c. 177 p. 180 c. 244 p. 248 p. 280c. 286c. 291 SECTION 1. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL RESEARCH OF ALTRUISM: ETHOLOGICAL AND EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES 1.1. History of the development of views on the concept of altruism Defining the concept of “altruism” is a very controversial activity. On the one hand, this is a phenomenon familiar to everyone, which has various manifestations in everyday life: selfless help to another person, teaching and treatment, education and support of the weak, sibling care for each other, parental care, rank unions, self-sacrifice in war and peacetime, men's care for women, patronage and charity, sacrifices to God, paying taxes and “voluntary” contributions to the powerful, etc. - all these are behavioral acts, to one degree or another, filled with altruism. We use the word denoting certain manifestations of altruism in everyday life in everyday communication; in a sense, it has become a common noun and is understandable even to a schoolchild. Altruism in everyday life is associated with a certain morality of behavior, with actions for the benefit of others, with the priority of other people's interests in relation to one's own. On the other hand, there are scientific views on this phenomenon. They concern the origin of altruism, its place among related types and forms of behavior, the feelings of a person performing an altruistic act, the influence of altruism on the behavior of other people, the possible adaptive benefits of altruism, etc. Naturally, scientific views are also based on a number of empirical facts - on those phenomena , the essence of which they are trying to reveal and describe. As can be seen from the first paragraph, in the modern world there are quite a lot of manifestations of altruistic behavior, but even an approximate contact with the listed phenomena indicates the heterogeneity and diversity of the altruism present in them. Moreover, the more we encounter various manifestations of altruistic behavior, the more questions arise. Indeed, have people always acted altruistically? Are there cultures in which altruism or some of its forms was absent? Do animals have altruistic behavior? What is necessary for this type of behavior to occur? Is altruism possible in an “anonymous society” whose members do not recognize or remember each other? Some of these questions seem strange from an everyday point of view. At the same time, if you look at it with an open mind, why should behavior exist that is personally disadvantageous to the person who commits it? And is this behavior really unprofitable? Maybe it's all about the rewards that follow an altruistic act: real or symbolic, internal or external, material or spiritual? Any concept can be defined from a historical and paradigmatic point of view. The first helps to trace the evolution of ideas about the phenomenon being studied; the second systematizes the entire list of approaches that exist today. In this paragraph we will go through these two paths, and in the following text we will reveal each of them in more detail. Let's start with a historical overview. The term “altruism” itself was proposed by the French philosopher, founder of positivism, Auguste Comte (1798–1857) in order to express the principle of life opposite to egoistic relationships. Comte described this principle with the words “revile pour outre”, which means “live for others.” The philosopher believed that, under the influence of altruistic tendencies, society as an integral social organism would develop in the direction of increasing humanization of values. Comte called altruism a “social feeling” and associated it with the gradual “emancipation of the human personality” []. If we study more deeply the dynamics of views on altruism in the 19th century, we will find that it was subjected to significant criticism by Christian theologians precisely because of the “emancipation” that was taking place then personality." Altruism was reproachedin “man-pleasing”, in which God and the obligation to fulfill his commandments are forgotten. Moreover, Christian ethics separated the concepts of “altruism” and “love of one’s neighbor,” significantly limiting what can be considered altruism []. With an altruistic position (in Comte’s understanding), the priority is the Man himself, and with “love for one’s neighbor” we are talking, first of all, about “love for God in one’s neighbor” (Kuraev, []). That is why, from the position of the Christian interpretation, not all manifestations of altruism can be considered godly, while some simply “lead both the altruist himself and the person to whom this act of altruism turns out to be in the direction of free-thinking behavior and sin” (Ethics: encyclopedic dictionary, 2001 [] ). Indeed, not all human needs and interests that can receive altruistic assistance are religiously normative. Some directly fall out of the canonized forms of behavior. O. Comte’s formula “live for others” was revolutionary for the 19th century precisely because it placed the emancipated individual at the forefront. Naturally, Christian theology significantly curtailed this formula and imposed a number of moral restrictions on altruistic behavior, under which altruism was accepted only with significant amendments. Another difficulty that arose with Comte’s introduction of a new concept was the duality of the very interpretation of the mentioned thesis. “Live for others” provides for both a single other and a multiple one - society as a whole or a separate social group. Actually, Comte himself understood altruism in its final meaning []. The contradiction between the “social” and “personally oriented” nature of altruism led to a change in Comte’s original formula towards “live and let live” and, more radically, “live and help others live” (Ethics: an encyclopedic dictionary, 2001 []). The change in the thesis occurred because a person, focusing on the happiness of a larger number of people, can cause some harm to a minority. Following Comte, altruism and the associated behavior of self-sacrifice and co-help were studied by a large number of philosophers (N.A. Berdyaev, J.S. .Mill, V.S. Soloviev, A. Schweitzer, A. Schopenhauer). The common thing that unites their concepts is the consideration of altruism in the context of a broader concept of moral behavior. Thus, in particular, the Orthodox philosopher V.S. Solovyov believed that the basis of an altruistic act cannot be feelings of co-joy or co-pleasure, which have a mixed and uncertain (in a moral sense) character []. Co-helping someone itself also cannot be based on these motives. According to Solovyov, the basis of a moral, altruistic attitude towards others can only be pity and compassion. It is these feelings that underlie the moral-altruistic act (Soloviev, 1996 []). A. Schopenhauer considered benevolence as one of the basic principles of human relationships, in which the good of another is a priority to personal good and should be given exceptional importance []. In particular, Schopenhauer came up with the idea that the very human sympathy of people with each other is based on the experience of the commonality of their own nature, which triggers a mechanism of mutual identification, which also favors altruistic behavior. A. Schweitzer studied combinations of altruism and egoism and came to the conclusion that there are three possible relationships between them: 1) egoism in the consciousness of the individual, as a result of consistent reasoning, turns into altruism; 2) altruism arises in the thinking of society, and then becomes the conviction of individuals; 3) altruism and egoism have always coexisted in human nature []. With the beginning of the 20th century, interest in the study of altruism began to awaken among ethologists, psychoanalysts and psychologists. The attention of ethologists to the study of altruistic behavior was attracted by the works of Charles Darwin [], who, from an evolutionary point of view, described the adaptive significance of altruism for group fitness andnatural selection of groups. Subsequently, Darwin's ideas were developed by such ethologists as Hamilton [], Lorenz [], Trivers [], Wilson [], Dolnik [], Efroimson [] and others. Psychoanalytic scientists were the first to draw attention to the unconscious aspects of altruistic motivation. In particular, they studied the connection between altruistic behavior, feelings of guilt and melancholy (S. Freud), explored the role of psychological defenses that transform the initial egoistic into altruistic motivation (A. Freud), and discovered a connection between altruism and the desire for control and dominance (K. Horney , E. Fromm), etc. At the same time, a separate direction in the development of the theory of altruism was the study of the moral prerequisites for its development in the process of personality ontogenesis. This direction is especially fully represented by Russian and domestic psychologists and scientists (L.N. Antilogova, A.G. Asmolov, I.D. Bekh, L.I. Bozhovich, M.I. Borishevsky, L.P. Vygovskaya, T. P. Gavrilova, B. G. Dodonov, L. P. Zhuravleva, Z. S. Karpenko, V. E. Kim, S. D. Maksimenko, E. E. Nasinovskaya, M. V. Savchin, N. I. Sarjveladze and others). So, in particular, in domestic psychological science, specific altruistic attitudes (N.I. Sarzhveladze), altruistic emotions (L.P. Vygovskaya, T.P. Gavrilova, L.P. Zhuravleva), altruistic orientation of the individual (B.G. .Dodonov), altruistic values ​​(Z.S. Karpenko, S.D. Maksimenko), altruistic motives of activity (V.E. Kim, E.E. Nasinovskaya), etc. Despite quite close attention to various manifestations of the phenomenon of altruism , among scientists from different scientific fields and even from the same field, but belonging to related areas, the understanding of altruism is often so different that it is mutually exclusive. Moreover, all scientific developments in revealing the essence of altruistic behavior are antagonistic and continue to conflict with each other to this day. In particular, philosophical and religious approaches to altruism always associate it with a certain system of moral norms. The majority of Russian psychologists also insist on the need for a moral assessment of an altruistic act. On the other hand, representatives of the ethological trend in science consider altruism to be a natural, evolutionarily stable form of behavior that lies outside modern conventional morality. Moreover, a number of representatives of this trend [] deny the right of Ethics to determine the degree of altruism of a particular act. At the same time, representatives of the deep approach in psychology and psychoanalytically oriented psychologists argue that specific altruistic motivation is completely absent and it makes no sense to consider it in itself, “in its pure form.” A number of social psychologists also speak about the reciprocal, “unselfish” nature of altruistic relationships []. Even the feeling of fear is considered one of the altruistic motivations. When a person voluntarily, preventing possible aggression or relieving his own tension, gives something valuable to some status hierarch, appeases him, then such behavior can also be considered altruistic. It was even given a special name - “forced altruism” (Protopopov, 2002 []). In addition, like any good, even the most disinterested and genuine altruism in large quantities becomes a burden for the one towards whom it is directed. Along with such a contradictory understanding of altruistic behavior in science, the everyday assessment of this form of interaction is also ambiguous. As we established based on the analysis of statements from participants in a large number of therapeutic groups, which we conducted from 1997 to 2011, “being an altruist is not fashionable.” Moreover, in the vast space of psychotherapy, although altruism is declared as one of the therapeutic factors of work in a group (Alexandrov, 1997 []; Yalom, 2001 []), the leader, along with other participants in the group processThey try to identify the egoistic (personally beneficial) motive in any action. The situation is as if altruism always and necessarily needs a motive, and cannot initially be an independent and independent motive. K. Lorenz in his work “The Eight Deadly Sins of Civilized Humanity” (2008 []) writes about this even more radically: “... in the conditions of modern civilized life there is not a single factor that selects in the direction of simple kindness and decency, with the exception of our innate feelings for these values. In the economic competition of Western culture, they are, of course, entitled to a negative selection premium! Fortunately, economic success and the reproduction rate are not necessarily positively correlated” ([], p. 47). Note that in the work of K. Lorentz we are talking about the middle of the 20th century. Currently, the situation has become even more aggravated. All of the above allows us to assert that with regard to the interpretation of the essence of altruistic behavior, its various manifestations and the underlying motivation, a number of paradoxes and discrepancies are revealed. In order to somehow correct them, let’s try to dwell on the definitions of altruism as a scientific concept. In the “Philosophical Dictionary” (1986 []), altruism is understood as a moral principle consisting of serving other people, the willingness to sacrifice personal interests for their benefit. It also states that altruism is the opposite of egoism. Along with this, Soviet philosophical science also proposed an “alternative” to altruism - collectivism, which is defined as “cooperation and mutual assistance with a clear priority of public duty” (ibid. []). In the textbook by D. Myers “Social Psychology” (1998 [] ) several views on altruism are given at once. One of them is that altruism is egoism in reverse, when help is provided even when nothing is offered in return, and nothing is expected. In addition, altruism is understood as “a motive for helping someone that is not consciously associated with one’s own selfish interests” (Myers, 1998 []). Altruism is defined in a fundamentally different way within the psychoanalytic approach. In particular, in A. Freud’s work “The Ego and Defense Mechanisms,” altruism is considered as a special form of psychological defense associated with the neurotic behavior of the subject (Freud, 1999 []). In the Explanatory Dictionary of the Russian Language by S.I. Ozhegova, N.Yu. Shvedova (1992 []) the term “altruism” refers to “the willingness to selflessly act for the benefit of others, regardless of one’s own personal interests” []. It is noteworthy that the very concept of “acting for the benefit of others” needs clarification, since it is not clarified. For example, who is to decide what the other's benefit is, especially when the other himself is unable to accurately understand what constitutes his real interest? In addition, what is beneficial at the moment may turn into a significant evil in the future, and vice versa, the deprivation of some benefits of today has a significant positive impact in the future. This process can be especially well illustrated by the everyday practice of parental education and parental altruism. Indeed, most of the titanic efforts of parents aimed at raising “harmoniously built personalities” of their children are perceived by the latter with resistance known to every parent. Moreover, the question of benefit in such cases is decided exclusively by adults, and the preferences of the children themselves are often not taken into account. There is another difficulty associated with the implementation of behavior under the auspices of “benefit for others.” But what if these “others” themselves are not guided by the counter-principle of altruistic behavior, that is, simply put, they act unfairly, dishonestly, violate the unspoken agreement and grossly “use” altruists? It is a known fact that already in natural conditions (for example, in bats) they applycertain “punitive” sanctions (Ridley, 1995[]). The encyclopedic dictionary of ethics directly states that the principle of altruism should be clarified in such a way that it does not apply to those who deliberately create injustice and evil (Ethics: encyclopedic dictionary, 2001 []). Let us continue to provide definitions of altruism. One of the first domestic methodologists of altruistic behavior, V.P. Efroimson, understands this phenomenon as the innate behavior of an individual, which is personally disadvantageous or even dangerous for her, but benefits other representatives of her or another species (Efroimson, 1971 []). Note that in this view, altruism is defined as an instinctive program that has evolved in biological species as a result of group selection []. Along with these definitions, there are various theories of the origin and maintenance of the altruistic form of behavior in society. Let's look at them in more detail.1. Social theories of altruismWithin the framework of this approach, there are at least two views on the basic mechanisms that regulate the balance of altruistic processes in society. The first view is a consequence of the Rule of Reciprocity, within which altruism is viewed rather as reciprocal behavior built on the principle “you give me - I give you.” The second explains the mechanism of its maintenance through upbringing, teaching and socialization, when the child learns altruism as a social norm. As numerous social experiments have shown (data from Myers, 1998 []), the altruistic “norm of social responsibility” (the desire to help all people) is updated in in the case when the results of previous help were positive (that is, the individual received a response in the form of gratitude or a mutual exchange of help occurred). If the answer was negative, then the individual tries to restrain his own altruistic behavior and the “norm of reciprocity” is actualized (“first you do me good, and only then I do”).2. Personal (psychological) concepts of altruistic behavior This view of the mechanism of “switching on” the processes of altruism connects it with empathy (L.P. Vygovskaya, T.P. Gavrilova, L.P. Zhuravleva, M. Hoffman). Most people, seeing other people’s suffering and torment, react to it with distress. They themselves begin to worry, sympathize with what is happening, identify with the sufferer, etc. Such people experience severe discomfort and strive to alleviate their own condition not by directly regulating it, but by mitigating the negative experiences of others. After this, they also begin to worry less and calm down. Thus, altruism in this case acts as a way for a person to indirectly regulate his mood, leading him to a state of some kind of mental homeostasis. As L.P. Zhuravleva writes: “Empathy contributes to the development of humane relationships and an altruistic style of behavior. Empathic sympathy and empathy acts as a motive in co-help activities” []. Let's give a couple of examples. In the famous experiment of M. Hoffman (Hoffman, 1981 []) it was found that even newborns experience distress. Thus, newborns react to someone else’s crying with a cry and their own tears, while they experience all the physiological changes characteristic of a state of distress. By the way, such a reaction occurs more often in girls than in boys (from which Hoffman concludes that empathy skills in women are better developed than in men). In another series of studies (J. Aronfried, V. Pascal, 1970 []) it was based on the idea that empathy is a means of learning altruistic behavior. In a series of experiments, J. Aronfried and V. Pascal asked the child to choose between “actions for himself” (press a button and get candy) and “actions for another” (light a light bulb and make the experimenter smile). They revealed the following result: a child associates an adult’s smile not with social approval; it is a symbol of emotionala condition that causes similar experiences in the child and stimulates him to altruistic behavior. The study authors suggested that altruistic behavior requires visually perceiving or realizing the emotional value of one's actions. Thus, empathy, as the ability to experience the feelings of another, ensures the assimilation of such behavior. By the way, empathy is already characteristic of primates [Dolnik, Protopopov]. Great apes have highly developed abilities to express emotions and respond to the emotional reactions of other individuals. When studying the social behavior of these animals, it was found that monkeys skillfully interpret social signals that allow them to assess the motivation of others (Brothers, 1990 []). So D. Palmer and L. Palmer in the fundamental book “Evolutionary Psychology” write: “... emotional communication in primates has reached such a level of complexity that empathy has become possible. The ability to empathize significantly stimulates some forms of altruistic behavior" (Palmer, Palmer, 2003 []). It is interesting that supporters of the empathic essence of altruistic behavior also note counter-conditioning: "The state of development of human empathy... provides for... the formation of altruistic qualities of the individual and his readiness to appropriate behavior" [Zhuravleva]. Additionally, we will say that altruism is familiar to any group psychotherapist and is one of the therapeutic factors of working in a group. In the theory of group psychotherapy, it is also believed that it is based on empathy, although a number of authors consider “therapeutic” altruism as a separate phenomenon from empathy (Alexandrov (1997) [], Kociunas (2000) [], Yalom (2000) []). Finally, the personality factor can also include the mechanism of self-reward, which is a consequence of intrapersonal dynamics generated by the interaction of three levels of the psyche (Ego, Super-Ego and Id). An individual who commits an act of altruism experiences moral and ethical satisfaction, which a number of researchers (A. Freud (1999) [], Z. Freud (1998; 1999) [], E. Fromm (1990; 1992) [], K. Horney (1993) []) tend to attribute to selfish behavior (they call it “disguised selfishness”). In other words, “a person commits an altruistic act in order to gain a feeling of moral pleasure or to increase self-esteem; and in this he is selfish” (Myers, 1998[]). A similar idea, albeit from a slightly different methodological position, is expressed by M.V. Savchin: “A person is moral due to his abilities for sympathy, empathy, empathy... A person, in order to be truly happy, must see happiness around him” [] .3. Ethological theories of altruistic behavior An interesting and heuristic approach to altruism is presented in ethology (it is not for nothing that in our work we will repeatedly turn to ethological research). To briefly summarize ethological views, we can say that altruism, according to ethologists [], was formed as a result of group and individual selection and became established as a process that supports any living system in some integrity. Roughly speaking, along with sexual behavior, altruism is a mechanism of attraction, bringing individuals together (by analogy with how aggression is a social force of repulsion). In addition, in ethology the idea of ​​altruism as a “parental feeling” is also popular (Dolnik, 2007 []), which manifests itself in caring for offspring and, more broadly speaking, in providing assistance to any close relatives (Hamilton, 1964; 1978 []).4. Ethical and philosophical theories of altruism This approach is the most famous, but at the same time, tendentious view of altruism. Indeed, as we wrote above, most philosophical and religious theories that explain altruistic behavior ultimately come down to its interpretation from a moral standpoint. There is a feeling that altruism is an ethical concept that depends entirely onthe value system accepted in a particular society. In other words, from the perspective of this approach, within different cultural traditions the same behavioral patterns can either be considered manifestations of altruism, or are not considered altruistic acts at all. The interpretation of altruism from a moral point of view not only dictates strict requirements for the unselfishness of one’s own behavior, but also requires a certain self-denial. “Moral activity involves not only the struggle against all selfishness, sensuality, calculation for personal gain and prosperity, but also complete self-denial of animal nature, that is, a person’s readiness not only to experience all kinds of suffering associated with the limitation of his animal nature, but also, if necessary - to complete readiness to sacrifice even one’s life in the name of the highest spiritual good” ([] Grotto, pp. 13-16). Such a rigid position leads to the fact that a number of acts of helping behavior do not fall under the category of altruism, although, of course, they are. Because of this, there is an impoverishment of the phenomenological series and a loss of the essence of the entire gamut of the phenomenon being studied. Within the framework of the ethical-philosophical approach to altruism, three basic principles are distinguished []: 1) the principle of justice: “Act in such a way that the interest of another person does not become a means for you to achieve your own goals”; 2) the principle of respect: “In your actions, do not infringe on the interests and rights of another person”; 3) the principle of complicity: “Act in such a way that the interest of another person becomes the goal of your action.” The relative relativism of cultures is to some extent overcome by Kant’s the thesis about the existence of a categorical imperative, which the philosopher himself called the moral law. I. Kant said that there are certain stable moral maxima that remain unshakable in any culture. This point of view allows us to consider the altruistic attitude as one of the fundamental foundations of universal human morality. It is interesting that a similar idea, only from different grounds, is developed in the ethological direction. Within the framework of this approach, they have long been talking about the “primordial morality” of animals (Dolnik, 2007 []; Lorenz, 2008 []; Wright, 1994 []), which formed the basis of human ethics. The ethological point of view allows us to understand altruism not as a moral formation, which is always conventional and characterized by significant relativity, but as a given that precedes any culture and appeared long before its emergence. However, we repeat once again, it cannot be denied that, analyzing this or that act of altruism , we constantly strive to give him a moral assessment. And first of all, this relates to the self-assessment of our behavior. We are so designed that we are always under the supervision of our own conscience, which either gnaws at us or encourages us. Along with the presented systematization of approaches to altruism, we also present the typology of Rushton and Sorrentino (1981 []): 1) altruism based on genetic relatedness, which has as its goal the preservation of some common genes; 2) altruistic behavior, which a person learns in the process of moral education and cognitive development; 3) moral behavior, which is learned in the process of socialization and assimilation of the experience of others (through observation and imitation); 4) altruism as prudent behavior, acceptance of the rules of the game, within the framework of which help can encourage reciprocal help from partners. Nowadays, the topic of altruistic interaction is beginning to attract more and more attention. There are many reasons for this. On the one hand, there is a global increase in aggressiveness, both personal, caused by the continuous stress in which most people have been living lately, and intergroup. On the other hand, this is the overpopulation of the globe, forcing us to look for alternative ways of interaction between people, nations and countries []. On the third hand, this is the massive spread of chronic alcoholism, drug addiction and depression among a number of ethnic groups and entire nations.various methods of suicidal behavior (Gilburd, 2000 []; Meninger, 2001 []). By the way, the latter phenomena are also nothing more than one of the variants of natural altruism, which makes it possible to preserve a resource in a situation of its shortage generated by global overpopulation of the globe. Moreover, in this case we are talking about the negative impact of altruism, which also needs to be studied. To the above, we add that the growth of egoistic tendencies, which is becoming more and more obvious in our time, is also of significant interest []. Modern morality, conditioned by the agony of a culture of overconsumption, has placed selfishness at the forefront. Egocentrism has become the norm, it evokes sympathy, people strive for it, it is a goal and a means of achieving other goals. Moreover, in our psychotherapeutic practice, we often observe a significant gap between the Ego and the Id, not only in individuals, but also in entire subcultures (for example, the Emo and Goth youth subcultures). Egoism makes the Ego “too autonomous,” hypertrophied, closed in on itself, due to which the “shots” and intrusions of the unconscious begin to be excessive. The irritability thresholds of such people are too high; in order to get at least some sensations, they need excessive stimuli. Altruistic behavior in this case is also perverted. It begins to be negative in nature and manifests itself in the form of self-destruction (which is identical to the renunciation of such people’s own claims to the resource) or becomes excessive (which ultimately maladjusts the recipient of altruistic acts). Moreover, as we have established [], altruism, which does not manifest itself in direct helping and coalition behavior, begins to oppress a person and act destructively on him. As it turns out, this also has a deep evolutionary meaning. In the history of evolution, it was precisely those groups in which there was a place for “true” altruism that survived, and communities consisting of egoists perished [Ephroim]. Thus, there are at least four conceptual approaches to understanding altruistic behavior. These approaches can be differentiated by what they focus on when studying altruism. The social and ethological approaches contain the principle of evolutionism. Within the framework of the socio-psychological concept, archaic forms of altruistic behavior in various traditional cultures are analyzed, social prototypes of altruism are studied, social norms that are favorable to the assimilation of the rules of co-help are examined, and the processes of internalization of altruistic schemes in the process of ontogenesis are considered. The ethological view is more aimed at identifying the ancestral forms of altruism in phylogenesis, a comparative study of various altruistic schemes in humans and animals, and at determining instinctive, inherited patterns of altruistic behavior in humans. The area of ​​​​intersection of psychological and ethical-philosophical approaches lies in the mandatory consideration of the personality of the person committing this or that another altruistic act. Within the framework of the psychological approach, the emphasis is on the subjective picture of an altruistic act, the experiences and emotions of the altruist are explored, specific altruistic attitudes and the mechanisms that provide motivation and altruistic behavior itself are studied. The ethical-philosophical approach considers the altruistic act from the perspective of the broader social context within which it is performed. In line with this understanding, the axiological side of altruism is studied, its moral support is examined in relation to more global human norms. 1.2. Methodological and theoretical foundations for the study of altruistic behavior of an individual Any psychological concept, any theoretical construction is based on the methodology that underlies them. And if the theory “is a generalization of disparate empirical data into a certain paradigm [] (Maksimenko, Genesis of the Personality), then the very method of this generalization, the level andthe depth of the analysis of empirical data is largely determined by the methodological tools used [Lomov]. The previous paragraph shows that, despite the multifaceted coverage of the phenomenon being studied, the current state of altruism research is characterized by significant inconsistency in its understanding, a lack of integrity in the perception of this phenomenon and the presence of a large number heterogeneous data regarding specific manifestations of altruism. We see that this situation has arisen due to the following reasons: Classical concepts of altruism consider it either as a biological phenomenon of an instinctive nature and inherited (ethological approach), or as a cultural and social phenomenon that has its roots into a broader plane of moral behavior (philosophical, religious and part of social theories of the origin of altruism), or as a psychological phenomenon associated with the orientation of the individual, attitudes, the characteristics of experienced emotions and the specifics of the relationship of mental authorities with each other (psychological and psychoanalytic views on altruism). We are convinced that altruism is a biosociopsychological phenomenon that requires an interdisciplinary approach to study it. We are not the only ones in considering systemic psychological phenomena as biosociopsychological, and certainly not pioneers. The first who began to talk about the existence of biosociopsychological phenomena (biosociocultural in his terminology) was S.D. Maksimenko. It was he who defined need as the unit of analysis of the psyche. “We consider need as the initial, all-encompassing tense state of a bio-social being, which directs its activity - life” []. It is need, according to Maksimenko, that underlies everything mental: “Carrying out a logical-psychological analysis made it possible to identify this initial contradictory “unit”, which underlies both the biological and social existence of a person...” []. Altruism, as a socio-psychic phenomenon, also is the embodiment of need. That is why, within the framework of the ethological approach, highlighting the innate and inherited component of altruistic behavior does not in any way contradict its psychological understanding. Moreover, it reveals, clarifies and, ultimately, enriches it. As Maksimenko writes: “... a person does not have a single instinct, craving, need that would be of an exclusively natural nature. By their nature, by content, by the method of manifestation and means of achievement, by the characteristics of experience (as represented in consciousness), all intentions are exclusively human, growing on a single biosocial carrier - need" []. The above arguments allow us to apply an interdisciplinary approach to research the biosociopsychological nature of altruism, as well as freely operate with concepts disclosed in related scientific fields, such as ethology, sociobiology, and evolutionary psychology. That is why in the text of the work we use such concepts as instinct, evolutionarily stable strategy of behavior, etc. In addition to the above, the noted comments determined our choice as one of the initial methodology of the ethological approach. Moreover, by analyzing works on ethology, evolutionary psychology and ethnography, we decided to begin building the author’s concept of altruism. By the way, we note that the consideration of psychological phenomena as biosociopsychological is already firmly established in Russian psychological science. For example, as part of the study of the phenomenon of empathy, adjacent to altruism, it is also studied as “a phenomenon that has a biosociocultural nature” [] (Zhuravlyova). One of the most significant difficulties in the field of altruism research has become the aspect associated with the search and definition of specific altruistic motivation. In this matter, achieving common ground between different concepts of altruism is even more difficult than in the previous one. For example, domesticpsychologists recognize the presence of specific altruistic motives that exist in opposition to egoistic motivation (see the works of L.N. Antilogova, I.D. Bekh, M.I. Borishevsky, B.G. Dodonov, Z.S. Karpenko, V. E. Kim, S. D. Maksimenko, E. E. Nasinovskaya, M. V. Savchina, N. I. Sarzhveladze, etc.). A number of representatives of depth psychology and psychoanalysis are convinced that any altruistic motive is based on an egoistic impulse “subject to reversal,” and there is no altruistic motivation “in its pure form” (A. Freud [], Z. Freud [], K. Horney []). Some representatives of ethology also agree with these views (Trivers [], Dolnik [], Protopopov []). “Scratch any altruistic act - you will definitely see both mercantile and selfless colors in it. Moreover, both of them can be expressed in such diverse forms and quantities that it makes no sense to talk about any unambiguity in this matter...” Protopopov []. On the other hand, among the apologists of psychoanalysis there are those who are convinced that a specific altruistic position of the subject still exists, and it is in no way connected with his egoism (M. Klein [], E. Fromm [], C. Jung [ ]). Also, some ethologists recognize the presence of selfless motivation (Hamilton [], Lorenz [], Efroimson []). At the same time, most philosophical and religious understandings of altruism consider the latter to be exclusively selfless behavior, which is not based on even a hint of any personal gain. However, other theories (for example, the concept of “disguised selfishness” []) even in self-reward (increased self-esteem from helping others, increased self-esteem, increased self-confidence, pride in oneself) and in self-soothing (reduced internal anxiety, getting rid of feelings guilt) see the hidden benefit associated with the reduction of dynamic tension between the Ego and the Superego. Thus, when comparing the listed concepts of altruism, we are not just faced with significant differences in views on the underlying motivation, but we discover a position that generally rejects the existence of any specific motivation for this type of activity. The described contradictions, in our opinion, are associated with the initially incorrect positioning of altruistic motivation. It must be opposed not to egoistic aspirations, but to the aggressive impulses of the subject. At the same time, both motivations are in the service of the psyche and come from it. And since the personification of the psyche is the Ego of the subject, we can say that altruism and aggression are selfish aspects of behavior, since they always influence one or another change in the subjectivity of the individual, the transformation of the Ego. Altruism in this sense reflects a deeper layer of the non-erotic component of love desires; aggression personifies the Thanatos instinct and the desire for destruction. Or, as A. Schweitzer says: “Good is what saves and improves life; evil is that which destroys him or prevents him and his free, spontaneous self-manifestation” []. The opposition of altruism to aggression, as an antagonistic process, is the central tenet of our concept. With this opposition, all contradictions associated with the difficulties of studying specific altruistic motivation are removed. Firstly, the elimination of egoism from oppositional tendencies makes the search for an egoistic component in altruistic behavior pointless. More precisely, to one degree or another, it is always present in it, but its detection should not affect the assessment of the degree of altruism of an act. On the other hand, the presence of aggressive motivation or other manifestations of aggression in an altruistic act actually radically changes the perception of such “selfless help.” In this case, it becomes possible to talk about aggression in the form of altruism. On the other hand, continuing the above reasoning, we find a high degree of altruism in some aggressiveactions. Here we are already talking about altruistic behavior in the form of aggression. Finally, the highest manifestations of altruism can be considered those when altruistic behavior is a consequence of altruistic motivation. We call such manifestations truly selfless behavior. Secondly, eliminating egoism from the consideration of an altruistic strategy of behavior opens up an even deeper layer of understanding of altruism. In order to identify it, we will again use the analogy with aggression. Psychological analysis of aggression has long discovered that its objects can be both external and internal. In the first case we are talking about hetero-aggression, in the second – about auto-aggression []. It's the same with altruism. It can be directed at an external Object - another (Alter-ism), or it can be oriented towards internal objects, in the system of which the central place is occupied by the internal Other, or one’s own Ego (Ego-ism). From our reasoning it turns out that egoism is not “altruism in reverse”, but a special type of orientation of altruistic behavior. Our justification is significantly specified by the typology of socially significant activities of J. Reikovsky, within which he identifies 6 gradations of altruism []: 1) altruistic behavior presupposes undivided dedication, self-sacrifice, renunciation of one’s own interests in favor of other people; 2) helping behavior means taking into account the needs and problems of another person and facilitating their successful resolution, and the difficulties of others may somewhat push aside the subject’s own interests; 3) cooperative behavior combines respect for one’s own and other people's interests for mutual benefit; 4) ipsocentric behavior has the goal of self-preservation, while remaining indifferent to the social environment - without bringing benefit, but without harm to others; 5) selfish behavior, as the name implies, is noted in those cases when a person strives to observe primarily his own interests, rejecting or infringing on the interests of others; 6) and, finally, in those cases when the subject uses others as a means of achieving his own goals and objectives, we speak of exploitative behavior or aggression. Note that Reikowski considers extreme aggression the degree of self-directed altruism (pronounced egoism). In other words, he, like us, introduces an aggressive component into the context of considering altruism. It is interesting that the opposition of altruism to aggression, and not to egoism (as is traditionally accepted), has long been present in the ethological direction []. Here, altruism and aggression are positioned as multidirectional social processes with opposing goals; they are correlated as forces of attraction and repulsion, which can only be understood in relation to each other []. This position of ethological science additionally determined the use of its methodology in the text of our work. The conceptual opposition of altruism and aggression allows us to consider them as two processes transforming into each other. Excessive altruism, indeed, becomes aggression in relation to the one to whom it is directed, and extreme manifestations of aggressiveness, which act as an external representative of auto-aggression, are ultimately an altruistic way of leaving the world. The above reveals the ambivalent nature of altruism and aggression and reveals the fact that in any unselfish behavior in a reduced form there is a charge of aggression, and an aggressive act contains a hidden component of altruism. The importance of analyzing aggression for a more holistic understanding of altruism led to repeated reference in the text of our work to the types and functions of the subject’s aggressiveness. By the way, we note that similar ideas were expressed by S. Freud in relation to the “aggression-love” pair []. Z. Freud correlated them as a “pair of opposites” that have an ambivalent nature. Let us emphasize that in our case we are considering the variant of non-erotic love represented by altruism. Putting aggressive behavior into contextThe study of altruism obliges us to study other evolutionarily stable types of human activity and analyze their relationship with altruistic phenomena. Traditionally, evolutionarily stable strategies, in addition to altruism and aggression, include cooperative, hierarchical, sexual and some other types of behavior []. In the text of our work, we will consider all of the listed concepts and correlate them according to their main functions. Another obstacle to the systematic study of altruistic behavior is the tendentious evaluative view inherent in a number of philosophical, religious and psychological concepts of altruism, which forms its perception as an “exclusively positive act “Indeed, does altruism always bring good or can it cause certain evil in relation to the one to whom it is directed? In the previous paragraph, we encountered altruistic behavior as disguised aggression and discovered the negative impact of excessive altruism. But these are rather manifestations of pseudo-altruism, and they may object to us that true altruism cannot be negative. This thesis, in our opinion, significantly impoverishes the phenomenal range of selfless help and removes entire layers of altruistic behavior from scientific consideration. One of the main provisions of our concept is that in most cases a specific altruistic act acts as an ambivalent polyethical phenomenon that is far from being cannot always be unambiguously determined from the position of fixed morality. Similar ideas are expressed by L.P. Zhuravleva regarding the phenomenon of empathy, adjacent to altruism: “We can state that the empathy process has a bipolar orientation: it develops both towards prosocial and antisocial behavior” []. She also writes there: “In our opinion, considering empathy as a systemic hierarchical formation that can determine both asocial and prosocial behavior will help to approach the solution of the problem of good and evil from a purely psychological point of view.” []. They have written about the polyethical characteristics of mental phenomena and other authors. So E. Fromm distinguishes between “benign” and “malignant” aggression [human destruction]. The ambivalent nature of drives was studied by S. Freud []. T.S. Yatsenko, in relation to aggression, also points out that: “Any person can, using the protective mechanism of rationalization, designate his own attraction to destruction as protective or one that has a constructive/prosocial orientation” [aggression]. In altruism there can also be there is a prosocial or asocial tendency, but, and we want to emphasize this, it does not cease to be an altruistic act. In addition, part of the motives for altruistic behavior is hidden in the unconscious component of its motivation. That is why we insist on a polyethical attitude towards altruism and refrain from the tendency to withdraw into its unambiguous moral assessment. By the way, the example of a “non-ethical” assessment of altruistic behavior again gives us an ethological direction. This point additionally influenced the choice of ethology as one of the main sources of methodological analysis of the problem we are studying. Finally, an important problem on which the degree of disclosure of the essence of altruistic behavior depends is this or that understanding of the personality of the altruist. By personality, we, following S.D. .Maksimenko, we consider “the form of existence of the human psyche, which is an integrity capable of self-development, self-determination, conscious objective activity and self-regulation and has its own unique and inimitable inner world” [] (Genesis). At the same time, we consider an important characteristic of a personality to be its orientation, which can be altruistic []. The formation of the orientation itself in the process of ontogenesis represents “an evolutionary transition, a spiral from a biosocial orientation to an orientation of a higher spiritual level” [] (Genesis n. personal). The last position allows usassert the existence of certain stages in the development of altruism, as a result of which altruistic behavior of a higher order is formed. At the same time, the vector of formation of the altruistic component of the personality passes through three levels: unconscious (biosocial), conscious (personal) and spiritual. We call the last level of development of altruism transfinite (the concept of “transfinite self” was first introduced by V.A. Petrovsky), and we consider it as the highest degree of altruistic attitude of the individual to the world. Thus, we can define for ourselves several theoretical and methodological components, which We will rely in our further work: Altruism is a biosociopsychological phenomenon that requires an interdisciplinary approach to study it. That is why, along with psychological data, we attract data from the field of ethology, evolutionary psychology and ethnography. In addition, we believe that consideration of the innate and inherited components of altruistic behavior does not in any way contradict its psychological understanding. Altruistic motivation should be opposed not to selfish aspirations, but to the aggressive impulses of the subject. The conceptual opposition of altruism and aggression allows us to consider them as two social and internal mental processes that transform into each other. Egoism is not “altruism in reverse,” but a special type of orientation of altruistic behavior, when its object is the subject’s own Ego. Altruistic behavior is always a polyethical phenomenon, often having a bipolar orientation. In other words, the final result of an altruistic act can have both a prosocial and asocial nature. Personal altruism is a systemic phenomenon consisting of three levels: unconscious (biosocial), conscious (personal) and spiritual (transfinite). Only the last level can be considered as the highest degree of an individual’s altruistic attitude towards the world. 1.3. Ethological and evolutionary psychological concepts of altruistic behavior Modern anthropologists and ethologists consider altruism as a fundamental characteristic of a person (Butovskaya, Fainberg, 1992, 1993 []; Butovskaya et al., 1995 []; Dolnik, 2007 []; Pravotorov, 2004 []; Protopopov, 2002 []; Harbach, 1997 []; Hamilton, 1964, 1978, 1981 []; 2005[]). Moreover, they believe that this is an innate behavioral program, standing alongside other instinctive forms of behavior. On this occasion, V.P. Samokhvalov (1993 []) writes: “Even before the beginning of the 1980s. it was believed that the main instincts are sexuality, self-preservation and food instinct, but later it became clear that this is not so: there is a migration instinct, parental, territorial, agonistic instinct (aggression, auto-aggression), systems of exchange and possession, altruism, locomotor instincts, sleep behavior, grouping and only about 20 systems of instinctive (that is, innate behavior), which are the biological basis of any behavior, even such “high” ones as political or religious. In a word, no behavior can exist without an instinctive (biological) basis” []. The biological basis of behavior is studied by ethology - the science of instinctively determined behavior of humans and animals in natural conditions (Labas, Vazhenina, 2007 [], Protopopov, 2002 []), as well as evolutionary psychology - a science that studies the adaptive significance of behavior and explains how certain behavioral patterns developed over time to ensure survival and adapt offspring (Palmer, Palmer, 2003 []). The paradigm of these two sciences helps to understand the adaptive value of altruism in its positive and negative forms. In our further discussions, we will adhere to the basic ideas of ethology and evolutionary psychology, and in particular we will accept the one in which it is stated that ifsome behavior exists steadily in the process of phylogenesis, which means that it is necessary, expedient and has an adaptive value for some life situations that an individual or society as a whole may find themselves in. In a given context, the concept of phylogenetic adaptation (FA) acquires special significance, which, within the framework of the system of ethological concepts, was proposed by I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt. In his opinion, PA can be understood as any stable structure of behavior that contributes to survival and fitness and affects reproductive success (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989 []). According to the scientist, detection of FA is possible if the same forms of behavior: a) can be traced in the evolutionary series of biological models: b) are inherited; c) occur even under conditions of deprivation (in particular in deaf-blind people); d) are observed, although in a modified form, in most cultures; e) are detected in archaic cultures; e) can be traced during maturation in ontogenesis (I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, cited in: Samokhvalov, 1997 []). Even at the first glance at altruistic behavior, it becomes obvious that it meets all the requirements for FA: A. Can be traced in the evolutionary series of biological models. Most ethologists (M.L. Butovskaya, M.A. Deryagina, V.R. Dolnik, A.I. Protopopov, etc.) agree that parental care for offspring is present in all species mammals, and if this statement is not obvious regarding more ancient species and classes, then for mammals this is a scientifically proven fact []. Another fact is that among animals leading a social lifestyle, sharing food with relatives and friends is widespread (Butovskaya, Fainberg, 1993 []; Brown, Mack, 1978 []; Goodall, 1986 []; Perry, Rose, 1994 []; Silk, 1979 []). In addition, herd animals have joint education and protection of offspring (for example, ungulates, most species of birds, primates, etc.). A number of biological species, the organization of which is built on a hierarchical structure, also have such a phenomenon as the formation of coalitions (for example, in almost all species of great apes []). All this is nothing more than various types of altruism, which became a stable form of specific relationships long before the appearance of man himself.B. Inherited S. Milgram's experiments with student volunteers [] demonstrated that the structure of human societies along the “altruism-conformism-egoism” axis is in a percentage ratio of 1:3:1. Moreover, as it turned out thanks to the repeated repetition of this experiment, this ratio is stable for different societies, generations and cultures (quoted from: Pravotorov, 2004 []). The constant percentage of people prone to altruistic behavior indicates that it has an important adaptive meaning and is inherited from generation to generation []. Another argument in favor of the inheritance of altruism is the theory of group selection. Due to inheritance, evolutionary selection and consolidation of the “altouristic” gene in the population occurred: the children of “non-altruists” simply did not survive (Efroimson, 1971 []). Finally, as another argument, we can use F.J. Saloway’s observations of identical twins []. Through comparative statistics, he found that identical twins, even when raised apart, were twice as likely to retain character traits such as empathy than fraternal twins. Based on these and other observations, he concluded that “altruistic tendencies can be inherited, which strongly suggests that they evolved through natural selection” (Saloway, 2003 []).V. It occurs even in conditions of deprivation (in particular, in deaf-blind people). A.I. Meshcheryakov (1974 []) provides facts that completely refute the presence of any social behavior in children with congenital or early acquired blindness and deafness. It also indicates that the need to communicate with other peopleDeaf-blind children do not show this until special training. At the same time, the author makes the assumption that perhaps this need is extinguished by incorrect, incomprehensible to the child, sharp touches and movements when servicing him. “The vagueness and frightening sharpness of contact with an adult, the absence of most sensory sensations, as well as the lack of movement put a deaf-blind child into a state of permanent stress, when most of the basic behavioral programs are suppressed. The child has not developed the needs for social behavior and contact with the outside world, and stress blocks the beginning of their formation” []. It is not surprising, therefore, that along with the atrophy of the orienting need, aggression, sexual behavior, etc., altruism is also suppressed. However, with special pedagogical influence, which leads, among other things, to the removal of stress blockade, all biological behavioral structures are further developed. Among these structures, altruism also finds its place. the same functional load as in children with normal development (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1973, 1979 []). An example of the discovered universals are “raised eyebrows”, “smile”, “scream”, “wrinkled nose”, “movement of the tongue when flirting”, “inviting gaze”, “square mouth and bare clenched teeth” - as the ur-elements of aggression, sexual behavior and behavior of appeasement (one of the forms of altruism).G. It is observed, although in a modified form, in most cultures, revealed in archaic cultures. One of the most studied types of altruism is reciprocal, which underlies the universal “rule of exchange.” In turn, the latter is most vividly realized in the potlatch ritual inherent in any “primitive” culture (C. Lévi-Strauss, 1994 []; B. Malinovsky, 1998 []; M. Mead, 1988 []; M. Moss, 1996 []). Not only ethnographers, but also social psychologists, for example, D. Myers [] and R. Cialdini (1999 []), speak about the universality of the exchange rule. Traced during maturation in ontogenesis, the first manifestations of altruism include the reaction of distress in a newborn in response to the crying of another infant (Hoffman, 1981 []). As the child grows up, altruistic behavior begins to differentiate and increase. For example, in older preschool age, the number of behavioral acts that can be attributed to altruism is comparable to the number of aggressive behavioral reactions and significantly more often exceeds the number of manifestations of sexual behavior (Pavlova, 2008 []). In general, we can say that in the process of ontogenesis there is significant dynamics in the ratio of different types of altruism []. Thus, it becomes clear that altruism belongs to one of the mechanisms of phylogenetic adaptation (FA) and is an innate (at the level of inclination) instinctive program of behavior. At the same time, defining altruism using a certain system of concepts does not mean understanding the phenomenon itself. F.J. Saloway writes that altruism should be recognized as one of the most serious conceptual problems []. “In a world formed as a result of natural selection, cooperation is a mystery, since natural selection is inherently selfish and promotes only those adaptive changes that benefit a particular individual” ([]). How then could altruism arise in the process of evolution? And what served to consolidate this behavioral program in its formation as one of the FAs? In his work “The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection,” Charles Darwin speaks about the possibility of the influence of natural selection on the formation of cooperative behavior (1991 []). For example, the result of natural selection may be such a new development as inducing one individual to risk his life for the sake of another individual, if such behavior benefits everyoneremaining family members. This statement is based on the assumption that members of the same family usually have similar hereditary traits, including a genetic tendency to help each other. To the extent that this group of related individuals, thanks to mutual assistance, will achieve an advantage in reproducing their own kind, so will its descendants contribute to the transmission of the hereditary “altruism gene” to the next generation, which increases reproductive success. Moreover, in this case we do not mean individual advantages, but group ones. The behavior of a population prone to intragroup cooperation gives it advantages over less altruistic populations. In this case we are talking about “natural group selection” (Darwin, 1991 []). D.S. Wilson and E.O. Wilson also write about the importance of group selection in the formation of the phenomenon of altruism. They say that “the case for group selection is too strong to ignore” (cited in [] Egin, 2007). “Groups with a predominant share of altruists tend to achieve greater success than groups with a smaller share, and therefore such groups grow rapidly” (D.S. Wilson, E.O. Wilson, 2007; cited in: [] Egin, 2007). Thus, the tasks of studying the origin of altruism, understanding its essence and contribution to the adaptation of various populations and human societies are very important from the point of view of ethology and evolutionary psychology. Representatives of these directions took different approaches to solving the listed problems, considering altruism either as a mechanism of individual adaptation or as a process of group cooperation. One way or another, among ethologists and evolutionary psychologists there are no scientists who doubt the heritable nature of altruistic behavior. The debate is rather about its functional significance. The pioneers in the field of studying altruism were C. Darwin [], W.D. Hamilton ([] 1964; 1978), R.L. Trivers ([] 1971, 1985), V.P. Efroimson [] and others. Let’s move on to consideration of their concepts and analysis of the contribution of these scientists to the understanding of altruistic behavior. 1.3.1. Study of the development of altruistic behavior in phylogeny. Natural altruism In almost any animal community one can find examples of selfless service from one representative of this community to another. For example, worker bees work literally to death to obtain resources for the colony; and when, while protecting the hive, they sting an uninvited guest, this is tantamount to suicide for them. In many social animals, individuals emit warning sounds when a predator approaches, alerting their relatives, but at the same time risking their own lives. Altruism is expressed not only in behavior that looks disinterested and disadvantageous to the individual himself, but also in acts that are directly harmful to him. At the same time, altruistic behavior always contributes to the well-being of other members of society, or has it as its goal. One of the first natural scientists who paid attention to the biological basis of altruistic behavior was Charles Darwin []. He tried to reconcile the existence of altruistic processes with the basic principles of natural selection and argued, in particular, that manifested altruism is necessary for the survival of other individuals of its species. The scientist also expressed the idea of ​​​​the possibility of cooperation between unrelated individuals. He believed that cooperative behavior could continue as long as the advantages and benefits accruing to cooperating non-relatives remained reciprocal. Finally, he made the assumption of natural selection of a group that behaves among other groups as an individual among individuals. It seemed to him that the behavior of a population prone to intragroup cooperation should give it advantages over less altruistic populations []. At the same time, the statement of empirical facts about the more advantageous position of “altruistic” populations over “non-altruistic” ones does not yet explain the mechanism of spread of the “altruistic” gene, nor does this statement answer the question of howbehavior that maladapts its bearer was consolidated in the process of natural selection. The first to highlight this problem from a scientific rather than a descriptive perspective was W. Hamilton []. He proposed the idea of ​​“net fitness” to explain altruistic behavior. According to Hamilton, the fitness of an individual is not directly reducible to its “reproductive success” (the classic Darwinian formulation). Hamilton expanded this concept and included in it, in addition to the reproductive success of a given individual, also the sum of the effects produced by it on the reproductive success of its closest relatives, and as the relationship weakens, the importance of this component decreases. The paradox associated with the fact that altruism can be found in almost all animal communities is explained by Hamilton with his theory of generic selection (as opposed to natural selection, which was described by Charles Darwin) [1963]. If we translate Hamilton's ideas from biological into psychological language, then we can talk about the following: “ultimately adapted and adapted” will not be the person who has achieved a lot in life, occupied a high social level and from whom a significant number of children have descended, but the one who has the maximum adapts its subsequent generations, thereby taking care of their reproductive, social and personal success. Within the framework of his concept of kin selection, Hamilton showed with mathematical precision that individuals within a species will have the greatest reproductive success if they help their relatives in such a way that the recipient benefits ( recipient) was significantly greater than the cost or damage to the donor (provider of assistance) []. In particular, Hamilton found that for the selection of the altruism gene, the benefit it brings must be at least twice as great as the harm. Moreover, Hamilton understands benefit and harm not from the point of view of the donor himself, but from the position of the population in which this donor is located. Hamilton expressed this with the formula: K must be greater than the inverse r (K > 1/r), where r is the coefficient of relatedness of recipients to the donor, and K is the value that determines the triggering of altruistic behavior (genetic benefit). Since siblings have r = 1/2, genes for altruistic behavior will be selected only when the behavior and circumstances are such that the benefit is more than twice the harm. Ideally, an animal's reproductive success will not be affected if it sacrifices its life to save two of its siblings[]. This can explain many examples of selfless behavior in social animals. “If we have a clear tendency to help our relatives, especially children, it is only because our mind takes pleasure in it, and in the same way it makes us feel guilty when we withhold support from loved ones” ([] Saloway , 2003). Moreover, pleasure and guilt are associated with the implementation of altruistic behavior or deviation from it. The theory of “kin selection” offers a probabilistic explanation of altruistic behavior. According to Hamilton, altruism arose as a mechanism for preserving our own genes in the bodies of people close to us. However, if we belong to too large social groups, such altruistic desires may not be selective enough. When we take risks to help people who are not related to us and may not repay us with help in return, we harm our own fitness. If we can identify people by their accent and dialect as belonging to the same group as us, there is a high probability that we share genes with them, and that they will also help us in response to our actions ([] Palmer, Palmer, 2003).Hamilton's idea of ​​kin selection can easily be turned into an ethical maxim: by saving relatives, we save ourselves (our genome), even if this salvation comes at the cost of our own lives. This is the ultimate meaning of the “totalfitness”, which is responsible for “related” altruism. Among other things, Hamilton’s theory of “kin selection” allows us to better understand the meaning of the existence of various diasporas and communities and why mutual assistance and mutual support are highly developed within such social formations. In this case, ethnic community also presupposes genetic kinship, and therefore facilitates the manifestation of altruistic processes. From his formula (K > 1/r), Hamilton derives numerous hypotheses about social behavior []. Among them there is one that says that the manifestation of altruistic behavior increases with age, and a person achieves true altruism only as a mature person. It is interesting that some of Hamilton’s ideas not only confirm, but also further develop some psychological research. Thus, in the work of A. Sidorova [], using the example of content analysis of blogs of “childfree” women, as well as using a number of psychological techniques, it was statistically reliably determined that the reluctance of such women to have children correlates with extreme degrees of selfishness (either excessively low or extremely high). This allowed us to state the following: the absence or loss of the inclination or ability to bear children always entails extreme values ​​on the “altruism-egoism” scale, which ultimately reflect similar intrapsychic dynamics of such individuals. Hamilton’s theory was confirmed by numerous experiments conducted within the framework of social psychology and sociobiology. In particular, F. Rushton [] established that people have the ability to find and select individuals who are genetically similar to them, even among non-relatives. In the work of Judge and Hrdy [], it was demonstrated that the share of the inheritance left by one of the relatives is directly related to the degree of kinship with him. The theory of kin selection also explains unusual relationships in some societies, where the maternal uncle plays a more significant role in raising children than the mother's husband ([] Mead, 1988; [] Palmer and Palmer, 2003). A biological father passes on 50% of his genes to his children, while uncles and nephews share about 25% of their genes. If paternity is certain, then internal consistency theory suggests that the father, not the uncle, should care for the children. The type of relationship described above can only be observed in cultures where the frequency of adultery is high, and as a result, the problem of paternity is difficult to resolve ([] Palmer, Palmer, 2003). Hamilton's views had a significant influence on all further research on both altruism itself and social behavior generally. However, this theory does not cover all types of altruistic acts. There is a fundamentally different type of altruism, which is observed between different members of society in the absence of any kinship or even species similarity. This type of altruistic behavior was called “reciprocal altruism”, and its main apologist was R.L. Trivers ([] Trivers, 1971). According to Trivers’ concept, individuals, if necessary, help each other, “understanding” that they will also not be refused in subsequent assistance. Cooperation, if it serves mutual benefit, can take place among unrelated and sometimes even different species. “Symbiotic coexistence of different living beings is possible even between representatives of different taxonomic kingdoms. Acts of altruism between a person and a dog, a person and a horse (and “in both directions”), and even between a dog and a horse are quite conceivable and practically observed” ([] Protopopov, 2002). The main thing in Trivers’ theory is that the memory of past—and the resulting ability to distinguish between those who have behaved altruistically or hostilely—requires a developed brain ([] Trivers, 1971). One of the followers of Triversian ideas, Ridley [], put this idea at the forefront of his theoretical constructions. It was Ridley who determined that in all social animals there is a direct correlation between the size of the individual’s neocortex and typicalthe size of a group living together []. Indeed, for mutual altruism to work, group members must recognize each other, remember and evaluate mutual behavior, identify and exclude “cheaters” who receive help but give nothing in return. In order for an animal to carry out all these actions, it must have a sufficiently developed brain, and the larger the group, the higher the social intelligence of each individual individual must be. “The species Homo Sapiens is no exception to this rule: our neocortex is the largest in living nature, and the groups in which we live are also the most numerous” []. The same idea is defended by M. Smith ([] Maynard Smith, 1993). Using a computer simulator, he showed that reciprocal altruism can only develop in those species that are able to distinguish between specific members of their population, since such altruistic behavior contributes to more successful reproduction of these species. The most suitable conditions for this are often in small groups (for example, as in primates or in human societies) ([] Maynard Smith, 1993). At the same time, once it has arisen and been genetically fixed, reciprocal altruistic behavior sometimes requires only signature recognition of a representative of a certain species and its intentions. In this sense, reciprocal altruism is able to differentiate members of a species more subtly than related altruism. It allows you to gradate the population not only using the “relative-non-relative” criterion, but also using the “partnership scale”. Reciprocal altruism is less cruel and, as it were, “more impersonal.” The place of an interaction partner is situational and can be taken by any member of the community, while the places of “relatives” are fixed and occupied by strictly defined members of the group. Reciprocal altruism is evolutionarily much younger than relative altruism. Its emergence provided the emergence of such aspects of behavior as friendship, gratitude, sympathy, trust and mistrust, guilt, dishonesty, hypocrisy and moral aggression, which can also be considered adaptive mechanisms that contribute to the functioning of a highly developed system of altruistic relationships ([] Trivers, 1971). At the same time, reciprocal altruism can only be adaptive if adequate “policing” mechanisms are present. These include moral aggression (by which he means reactive or delayed punishment for violations of norms of reciprocity) in response to non-cooperative behavior, a sense of justice and the ability to identify deceivers ([] Trivers, 1971). Subsequent studies confirmed this in humans. So, in particular, in his experiments, Mealy found that the faces of scammers are remembered much better than the faces of ordinary people presented in photographs (Mealy, 1993; data from: [] Palmer, Palmer, 2003). One of the followers of the idea of ​​mutual altruism, R. Axelrod in the late 1970s. based on Trivers' theory, he came to a paradoxical conclusion: selfish individuals, for the sake of their own selfish good, should strive to be kind, forgiving and non-envious. The conditions under which the reciprocity strategy becomes most beneficial were also identified. These conditions include: high life expectancy, recognition of each other and the possibility of repeated meetings (data from: [] Harbach, 1997). It is interesting that R.L. Trivers himself, among the living conditions conducive to the consolidation of a mutual strategy of behavior, also highlighted similar points. He included these: 1) the presence of a high probability for repeated interaction; 2) the predominance of interaction with a small number of identical individuals (low interaction dispersion); 3) symmetry of relationships in a pair of altruists (when they are able to balance benefits with costs). At the same time, Trivers emphasized the main condition: the presence of long-term relationships in which altruism has time to become mutual ([] Trivers, 1971). Based on his own provisions, Trivers argues that inIn human society, there are universal norms that govern most social interactions. Subsequently, these norms were called “norms of reciprocity” and were analyzed in detail by A. Gouldner ([] Gouldner, 1979). Among these norms, Gouldner identified two main ones: one must help those who have already helped someone; one must not harm those who provide help ([] Gouldner, 1979). According to Gouldner, these interrelated basic norms are contained in any known moral code and form an important element of social stability []. Unlike other founders of altruism research, Trivers considers reciprocal altruism to be a selfish behavior that is inherent in the reciprocal nature of the former. “I give you, you give me” – this is what the most rigid formula of mutual altruism looks like. That reciprocal altruism is a kind of relationship between interacting partners seems to be a very important idea. Being reciprocal, altruism becomes one of the systemic qualities that ensure the integrity of the group. It sets a kind of order for the exchange of services, on the basis of which people can enter into contractual interactions. The presence of mechanisms for monitoring compliance with the rule of reciprocity makes it possible to maintain the norm of reciprocity in working order. It is interesting that Trivers’ mutual altruism is also a mechanism for maintaining the order of dominance. In order to maintain a high position or raise their status, members of society are forced to form strong alliances (which is clearly visible, for example, in primates). Those who are able to form alliances with others other than their kin have a significant advantage over those who can form alliances only with their own kin ([] De Waal, 1982; [] Goodall, 1986). The preservation of an alliance with unrelated tribesmen depends on the degree to which mutual obligations are fulfilled. When studying coalitions and alliances in primates, it was discovered that they had good abilities to understand their reciprocal duties ([] Palmer, Palmer, 2003). As Trivers himself writes ([] 1971; 1985), reciprocity, along with language and the ability to systematize, allowed people to form stable communities that become the basis of culture and civilization. Moreover, the pattern of behavioral reciprocity has gone beyond the “old form of coercion that arose through rigid kin selection.” This thought of Trivers again traces the idea of ​​the evolutionary sequence of the emergence of various types of altruistic behavior, which we talked about just above. Trivers’s merit also lies in the fact that he studied the functions of moral aggression, among which he singled out: a) countering the altruist’s inclination to continue the altruistic action ( in the absence of mutual reciprocal behavior); b) warning the “ungrateful” individual that it is unsafe to behave in this way in the future; c) exclusion of the relevant individuals from communication. A view on altruism that derives it from the theory of group fitness deserves special attention. The first who most fully developed this idea was W.S. Wynne-Edwards ([] Wynne-Edwards, 1962). He viewed group selection as an additional mechanism of evolution and believed that this type of selection promotes the “selfless” behavior of the individual, the good of the group and, in general, the species ([] Wynne-Edwards, 1962). Whinney-Edwards considered one of the important consequences of the group selection mechanism to be the limitation of individual reproductive expansion as a reaction to an excessive increase in population size. The author classified this limitation as one of the varieties of altruism []. V.P. Efroimson offers a special concept of where the priority of group interests to the detriment of personal interests could arise evolutionarily []. He, like Hamilton, bases his idea on the parental instinct of caring for offspring. “Probably no one will dispute that the mother’s (sometimes the father’s) willingness to risk her life to protect the baby is not caused by upbringing, is not acquired, but is natural, embedded inthe nature of the parents. But the parental feeling in animals lasts only for the period during which the cubs need help and protection, and then the parents stop paying attention to the grown children. Obviously, a very complex instinct that acts only insofar as it helps protect the offspring and the prosperity of the species... On the contrary, the absence of hereditary parental instincts excludes the transmission of this defect to the offspring - it simply did not survive without the help of parents and parents deprived of such instincts no longer passed on this defect of theirs "[]. From Efroimson’s point of view, “selfish” parents doom their offspring to extinction, thereby blocking the spread of their own genotype. As A.I. Protopopov writes on the same occasion: “selection, generally speaking, does not support altruists; instead, it shortchanges excessive egoists” []. That is, the gene of egoism is not passed on to subsequent generations, since the offspring of “excessive egoists” simply do not survive. Efroimson explains the fact that altruism “grows” in the process of phylogenesis by the lengthening of the childhood period associated with increasingly complex structures of the brain, and in first of all with its immediate increase. Enlargement of the brain, on the one hand, and upright posture, which resulted in a narrowing of the woman’s pelvis, on the other, created a contradiction, which nature resolved through “premature” birth. Human children are born too immature and unadapted, and they require increased attention and care, and therefore longer parental care. The latter entails increased demands on parents’ altruism, as well as the development of mechanisms of cross-gender altruistic communication []. Zhuravleva notes a similar point in her work when she writes that: “... evolutionary selection left not only the strongest, but also the most empathetic” []. Efroimson places special emphasis on the fact that altruistic behavior and the ethical norms behind it have strong biological foundations created by long-term directed individual and group natural selection. Let's summarize. The first views on altruism associated it either with closely related behavior (W.D. Hamilton , V.P. Efroimson), when each member of the group is subject to the principle of maximizing “aggregate fitness,” or with reciprocal behavior (R.L. Trivers), in which group and, only as a consequence, individual fitness increases. At the same time, mutual behavior developed evolutionarily later than “related” altruism and initially appeared in groups of closely related individuals, becoming its evolutionary continuation. “Kinship” altruism is much more cruel and coercive; often the donor cannot behave differently or must expend more effort to implement an alternative behavioral strategy. Reciprocal behavior is more plastic; it is no longer associated with specific recipients, but allows situational selection of interaction partners. Reciprocal altruism is more understandable from the point of view of immediate benefit, more “self-serving” and “selfish”. The benefits of kin altruism are largely delayed and are associated more with subsequent generations than with the immediate adaptation of the altruist himself. In addition, related altruism entails high costs and sacrifices of adaptive resources. At the same time, both of these types of altruism are of an instinctive nature, are inherited and originate from parental care. That is why we attribute these two types of altruistic behavior to the natural form of altruism (natural altruism), which in the human community is realized in a number of social interactions. As we will see later, kin altruism formed the basis of parental feelings, chivalrous behavior of a man towards a woman, cooperative relationships between relatives, etc. Reciprocal altruism determines the basic social rule of mutual exchange, on which all coalition alliances, various potlatch rituals, mutual assistance betweenstrangers, etc. 1.3.2. Modern views on the phenomenon of natural altruism in ethology and evolutionary psychology Modern research has enriched the understanding of the phenomenon of natural altruism with both new theoretical provisions and a large number of empirical facts confirming the previously created conceptual framework. We emphasize that everything said later in this section relates exclusively to the natural form of altruism; its other forms will be considered in subsequent sections. A.N. Gorban and R.G. Khlebopros [] built a mathematical model of altruism, within which they considered two concepts − “coalitional altruism” and “altruism loop”. Scientists have studied in detail the existing types of cooperative behavior and came to the conclusion that some of the behavioral phenomena of altruism are not described by any of its types that have already been studied. Gorban and Khlebopros included the creation of mutually beneficial associations not between individual members of the group, but between groups similar in species characteristics to such phenomena. As an example, the authors cite colonies of anthills that arise as a result of the exchange of individual ants. It is as a result of such associations that coalition altruism begins to work - mutually beneficial behavior between genetically unrelated groups []. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of coalition altruism for people. Nowadays, most formations between individual small and large social groups, as well as between entire states, are built precisely on the coalition principle. Naturally, coalitional altruism can be correlated with reciprocal helping behavior. The first, like any other type of intergroup interaction, is based on reciprocal relationships, but is not reduced to them, but contains them as a subsystem. Mutual interindividual altruism is included as an element or substructure in coalition processes and implements these processes in specific interindividual interactions. In other words, coalitional altruistic behavior includes reciprocal behavior, is based on it, but is not exhausted by it. That is, it can be considered as an independent type of mutual helping behavior. The second heuristic concept that Gorban and Khlebopros propose is the “loop of altruism.” With this term they describe the phenomenon they discovered, which consists of a cyclical fluctuation in the percentage of altruists in any population. The percentage of altruists gradually grows, reaches a certain maximum, then sharply decreases, literally rolls down to zero, and the whole process begins from the beginning []. The authors suggest that the dynamics of altruism are related to the life cycle of coalitions. At the first stage, when a coalition has just formed, altruistic tendencies between members of the coalition are high and constantly growing, but gradually, as coalition relations develop, the egoistic component of the relationship strengthens, altruism weakens, and the coalition disintegrates. Then a similar process begins when the next coalition is formed, etc. However, Gorban and Khlebopros admit that the altruism loop is only a theoretical model and “it is difficult to say how often it occurs in reality.”[].The existence of the “altruism loop” Many studies refute this. For example, S. Milgram’s experiment, which we have already mentioned, showed that the percentage of altruists is constant and equal to approximately 20% of the population in which social relationships exist. In other words, this percentage neither decreases nor increases. At the same time, scientists belonging to the group of opponents of significant fluctuations in the number of altruists also recognize its possible fluctuations [Pravotorov]. In addition, there is a large body of evidence that supports and fleshes out the altruism loop model. For example, in the psychology of small contact groups it is a known fact that altruistic tendencies are very strong in the first (pseudo-cohesion) and third stages (working phase) of the group’s life, and much less in the second (conflict stage)and the fourth stage (completion of work) ([] Bolshakov, 1996; [] Kociunas, 2000; [] Rudestam, 1990; [] Yalom, 2000). This example clearly reflects the cyclical nature of the development of altruism. We also support the idea that altruism is higher in groups exposed to extreme conditions, unfamiliar environments, and novelty. On the contrary, in a stable situation, egoistic tendencies increase, each individual begins to care about his own well-being. This is in good agreement with the concept of the evolutionary theory of sex by V.A. Geodakyan ([] 1991). This concept states that “in a stable (optimal) environment, when there is no need to change anything, conservative tendencies are strong and evolutionary plasticity is minimal; in a driving (extreme) environment, when it is necessary to increase plasticity, operational tendencies intensify” ([] Geodakyan, 1991). Since men are responsible for operational contact with the external environment, and women are responsible for conservative contact, it is possible to say that the lifestyle in a stable situation occurs predominantly according to the female type, and in an extreme environment it is determined by a male strategy of behavior. If we now remember that the male strategy correlates with greater altruism, and the female strategy with increased egoism [], then this also allows us to assert that in conservative, stable conditions, selfishness of behavior is also higher; and in extreme ones, altruistic tendencies are strong. Moreover, in our opinion, a stable situation in society contributes to a decrease in connections within groups, leads to their disintegration or to a decrease in cohesion; and living conditions with an external threat, fraught with increased danger, cause greater cohesion, strengthen hierarchy and, in general, contribute to the processes of group formation. Indeed, nothing unites a group more than the image of an external - real or symbolic enemy - this common thought has deep evolutionary roots. Then, when it comes to danger and overcoming it, the group becomes a monolithic collective. If we analyze the idea of ​​the “altruism loop” from the positions just described, then we can say that it does not so much reflect the idea of ​​​​a change in the number of “true altruists”, but rather affirms the dynamics of changing the dominant trends in relationships: from the most altruistic to the selfish and back again Another ethological idea regarding altruism was revealed in a series of experiments by M.A. Deryagina and M.L. Butovskaya []. “After immobilization stress (animals were tied up for several hours in such a way that their motor activity was impossible), monkeys experience a disturbance in individual and group behavior. Animals lie in amorphous poses, most of their behavioral programs are disrupted, including comfortable behavior, aggression, friendliness, ranking behavior, no stand postures, etc. Then, rocking, tremors, licking, uncoordinated movements, etc. gradually appear. After the second hour, elements aggressive and friendly behavior are restored, and friendly elements are restored earlier than aggressive ones” (quoted from: [] Samokhvalov, 1993). The results of these experiments show that powerful stress “destroys” most behavioral programs, and when its effect ceases, they begin to gradually recover. Data from clinical psychology suggest that such restoration occurs from phylogenetically earlier formations to later ones. This sequence was proven in numerous experiments, with the help of observations in clinics of patients and those who had suffered shrapnel wounds of the brain of varying degrees of severity, by outstanding Russian psychologists L.S. Vygotsky and A.R. Luria. Also, K. Lorenz writes: “... the most vulnerable, apparently, are the most differentiated and historically young mechanisms” ([] Lorenz, 2008). Thanks to this knowledge, we can understand one significant point, from the point of view of our research. Analysis of experimental dataM.A. Deryagina and M.L. Butovskaya allows us to assume that altruism has phylogenetically more ancient roots than aggression, that is, it is more primary and arose earlier than agonistic behavior. Here we also come to the idea that altruism must have evolutionary ancestral forms and prototypes. Analysis of a number of literary sources [] allows us to assert that all kinds of grouping processes can be attributed to the ancestral form of altruism. For example, Lorenz says that true intra-group aggression is possible only where there is recognition by group members of each other []. Grouping tendencies are phylogenetically the earliest manifestations of the power of altruistic attraction. This can also be stated because in a group any of its members have to restrain a number of their own egoistic tendencies to the detriment of group interests. The group always dominates the individual. And life in a group is the predominance of altruistic processes when they systematically interrupt aggressive drives. Additional arguments in favor of the existence of ancestral forms of natural altruism are provided by scientists from the American Rice University. It was they who discovered that “kin altruism” was acquired by even the simplest microorganisms, and then remained throughout the entire path of evolution []. Using the example of studying suicide amoebas, they concluded that “for hundreds of millions of years in nature, altruists who sacrifice themselves on the orders of genes have not only lived, but survived mainly” (data from: [] Maksimov, 2006). As indirect evidence of what is being discussed At this point, let’s point out another illustration. In a series of ethological experiments we conducted with different groups of people, as a result of which they were subjected to quite strong mental and behavioral stress, it was found that intragroup aggressiveness is blocked by the commonality of experienced states and the unity of the circumstances endured, while altruistic behavior, on the contrary, is enhanced by such joint experiences ( [] Keiselman, 2008). The empirical fact we discovered also confirms the primacy of altruism in relation to aggression. It is interesting that natural altruism can act as a displaced activity when a person, being in a state of anxiety or stress, begins to implement helping behavior. The very concept of “displaced activity” was introduced by N. Tinbergen []. He said that with displaced activity, the energy accumulated within one motivation is discharged in the form of a set of fixed actions (QFA [1]) of another motivation ([] Tinbergen, 1985). D.A. Zhukov identifies aggression, sexual and eating behavior, affiliation, auto- and allogrooming as possible forms of displaced activity []. And if grooming is understood as “a form of friendly, comfortable or pacifying behavior that strengthens the mutual affection of community members” ([] Zhukov, 2007), which relates it to altruism only indirectly; then the dictionary definition of affiliation[2] leaves no doubt that it belongs to one of the manifestations of natural altruism. Since a person gets used to reacting to stress in a stereotypical manner, his displaced activity becomes a complex of fixed actions. “Displaced activity most often takes the form of the most habitual form of behavior for a person” ([] Zhukov, 2007). In our opinion, the 20% of altruists identified by numerous studies within one population are those whose complex of fixed actions is built with a predominance of altruistic behavior. Moreover, it turned out that people who tend to provide help more often themselves begin to receive it significantly more often ([ ] McFarland, 1988; [] Myers). The last point also suggests that, according to the behavioral principle of positive reinforcement, altruists also get used to behaving cooperatively, that is, their behavior is conditionally reinforced. Of particular importance in ethology is the study of the relationship between natural altruism and the rank/status of the altruist. On this occasionThere are several observations at once. The first of these concerns the fact that high-status group members are not inclined to display altruistic tendencies and are less likely to strive for any kind of cooperative behavior []. A similar conclusion can be drawn regarding people. Indeed, it has long been known from the psychology of leadership that leaders are less prone to affiliative behavior, they have a lower desire to join a particular group, they do not strive to adhere to intragroup standards, but, on the contrary, tend to violate them in every possible way ([] Myers, 1998; [] Shackleton, 2003). The second point is that often reciprocal cooperative behavior is used to increase one's own status. “Anubis baboons living in the African savannah “discovered” that a more aggressive and powerful male can be demoted in rank if you find an ally for this matter. If you manage to create an alliance of several males, you can encroach on a superior individual... Usually a herd of baboons forms a hierarchical pyramid based on age. But “youth unions” can change it through a “revolution from below” ([] Dolnik, 2007). Finally, the third point is represented by what status will the altruist himself, who is not prone to aggressive behavior and hierarchical clashes, have? “...in some species of social animals, individuals avoid hierarchical conflicts. And not because they are afraid. It just doesn't seem to be of interest to them. In a group, such individuals occupy neither the highest nor the lowest position. In extreme cases, they can fight back aggression. But usually they don’t get involved in fights, continuing to go about their business. Some even try, and successfully, to reconcile those who are quarreling, hugging both of them... Hierarchical males, including those of the highest rank, can be friends with males who do not like to constantly assert their rank. This means that the latter evaluate their friend’s position in the group as worthy” ([] Dolnik, 2007). What does the situation look like in human society? At one time, such famous altruists as the ancient Greek philosophers-educators (Aristotle, Diogenes, Socrates) communicated on equal terms with the rulers of their time. Jesus Christ became one of the highest hierarchs during his lifetime (judging by the degree of his influence on his contemporary society). In our time, the status of the altruist, and altruism itself, has noticeably fallen. That is why in recent society the most “dark” natural altruistic programs are being implemented, which are the most difficult to recognize and, accordingly, the most difficult to resist. At the end of the review of modern studies of selfless behavior, let us once again dwell on the ethological definition of natural altruism: under altruistic behavior (altruism ) are defined as “behaviors that reduce the adaptability of the initiator of an action while increasing the adaptability of the recipient of the action.” Moreover, altruism can be “fully conscious and rational, or it can be automatic and unconscious, but in any case it is controlled by innate programs” ([Harbach, 1997). And one more thing: “in all cases when we are faced with the willingness of an individual to perform a useful action to the detriment of himself in relation to a representative of his own or another species of animal, we are faced with altruism” ([] Pravotorov, 2004). Among the essential points of these two definitions Note: Natural altruism is instinctive in nature and inherited. At the same time, it represents a readiness, a tendency that generates not an act, but a desire to do something or some non-specific feeling, sensation, mood, which may not be subjectively recognized as a need for an action, but, nevertheless, creates an emotional a mood that influences decision-making []. Natural altruistic behavior always reduces the situational adaptability of the “giver”. At the same time, its final goal is to increase the “aggregate fitness” of the initiator of this behavior. The motivation for altruistic behavior can be either conscious,and have a completely unconscious nature. Let us emphasize that natural altruism underlies any social behavior and is its prerequisite. Another prerequisite for social relations is aggressiveness. We will consider this, as well as the relationship between aggressiveness and altruism in the system of holistic social interaction, in the next paragraph. 1.4. Natural form of altruistic behavior and aggression Aggression is the most important phenomenon, a powerful engine of evolution, one of the central species-preserving processes, which has acquired a negative meaning and catastrophic forms in humans only due to the specific characteristics of the person himself [Lauren]. Today, there are three main approaches to understanding aggressive behavior ( [] Baron, Richardson, 1997): Aggression as instinctive behavior (this includes psychoanalytic and evolutionary approaches). “Non-instinctive” motivational theories of aggression (which are based on the “frustration-aggression” scheme). Cognitive-behavioral models of aggressive behavior (where aggression is considered as acquired behavior, the result of learning). A similar systematization of the concepts of aggression is given by T.S. Yatsenko []: Theories of drives, within the framework of which aggressive actions are determined primarily endogenously, are instinctive in nature and associated with experiences of dissatisfaction (pain, distress) (K. Horney, A. Freud, K. Lorenz, H. Thome). Affective theories that consider affects that are triggered under the influence of situational factors that generate frustration as a “trigger mechanism” for aggression (L. Berkowitz, J. Dollard). According to Dollard's concept, aggression does not arise automatically, but as a result of obstacles to the purposeful actions of the subject, emotional deprivation or failure to achieve the desired state to which the subject was striving. Behavioral theories that focus on the role of social learning, which entails aggression through grievances and disadvantage “I” (A. Bandura and others) Let us give several definitions of aggressive behavior. Aggression is the instinct of fight directed against fellow species ([] Lorenz, 2008). T. S. Yatsenko says that the concept of “aggression” covers a wide variety of actions that “violate the physical or mental integrity of another person (or group of people), cause material losses, interfere with the implementation of his intentions, counteract his interests or lead to their destruction” []. In the Big Psychological Dictionary [] aggression is interpreted as “motivated destructive behavior that contradicts the norms (rules) of coexistence of people in society, harms the objects of attack (animate and inanimate), causes physical harm to people or causes them psychological discomfort (negative experiences, a state of tension, fear, depression, etc. )". It is also important to note that the motivation for an aggressive action means that it is either a form of response to physical and mental discomfort, stress, and frustration; or acts as a means to achieve some significant goal; or aimed at increasing one’s own status through self-affirmation []. Finally, in the Ethological Dictionary of A. Heymer (1977), aggression is understood as “a physical action or threat of one member of a group towards another that limits the freedom or genetic fitness of the latter” []. Aggression is always a “form of social behavior,” which means it is a direct or indirect interaction of at least two representatives of the same species. If we are talking about displaced aggression, then it can, of course, spread to “other objects” that were not originally a source of aggressive motivation (telephone booths, elevators, dogs, children, women, men, elderly or young people, other ethnic groups and etc.), but we should not forget that this aggressive motivation was born in a certain social situation of interaction or communication (like anger at specific othersor on oneself).Aggression is not a homogeneous phenomenon. Today, a significant number of its types and forms are identified, and various typologies of aggressive behavior are constructed. There is a classification of aggression by the type of object to which it is directed (hetero- and auto-aggression), by the reason for its occurrence (reactive and spontaneous), by purposefulness (instrumental and motivational), by the degree of openness of manifestation (direct, indirect, disguised and negativism), by form (verbal, expressive and physical), etc. [Baron, Psi words, Yats]. Psychology also considers different statuses of aggression as a mental state, between which there is a relationship: as personality traits, as a need, as behavioral manifestations [Baron, Psi words, Yats]. On the other hand, since this section is devoted to the ethological view of such social processes as altruism and aggression, we will use the classification of aggressive behavior adopted within the framework of ethology []. The typology of aggression presented here will help us further build a classification of altruism. So, aggression is of the following types: Hierarchical aggression (the goal of this type of behavior is to maintain or increase one’s own or someone else’s social status) Sexual aggression (the goal is to get rid of a sexual competitor) Maternal aggression ( protection of children) Territorial aggression (defense of territory) Critical reaction (the goal is to interrupt the tendency to get closer to a threatening object, or to subjectively get out of the situation, “switch”) Aggression caused by interference (reaction to frustration) It is interesting that this type of aggressive behavior is considered the main in the theory of “frustration-aggression”, the central provisions of which are the following maxima: a) frustration always leads to aggression in some form; b) aggression is always the result of frustration ([] Baron, Richardson, 1997). Aggression towards other people’s children (the goal is to increase the likelihood of survival of one’s own offspring by killing or maladjusting someone else’s). The last type of aggressive behavior is less obvious and requires some specification, which we We will carry it out by turning to the linguistic-semantic analysis of fairy tales. If we consider European and Slavic fairy tales as examples, we can find a rather interesting point in them. In those fairy tales where the figure of the stepmother is present, she is endowed with such semantic definitions as heartless, evil, cold. It is the stepmother who kicks out the child (especially if this child is a girl), as in “Morozko,” loads her with work (“Cinderella,” “Vasilisa the Beautiful”) or seeks to poison her (“The Tale of the Dead Princess and the Seven Knights”). At the same time, it is known from analytical psychology that fairy tales only reflect archetypal scenarios of relationships and tell about the dispositions of the main archetypal figures. V.Ya. Propp [] considers the classical plots of European and Slavic fairy tales as an allegorical transfer of the experience of initiation. He analyzes the main storyline, fairy-tale characters and action sequences from the perspective of the structure of rites of passage. Such rites in archaic cultures crown the juvenile period and consist of symbolic death and transition to the world of adults. Commenting on the special role of the stepmother, Propp writes that women of all traditional peoples were not allowed to directly perform the initiation rite. The point in the fairy tale that is connected with this is that the stepmother never takes the children into the forest herself, but entrusts this to a man - her husband. Why, then, in the fairy tale is it the stepmother who is “evil and heartless”? After all, it does not bring direct suffering to the child. Indeed, if we continue the parallel of the fairy tale plot with the stages of the initiation rite, then physical pain during initiation was always delivered by adult men, not women. What then happens? Does aggression shift to a woman from the figure of a punishing man? Either, due to one of the mechanisms of the unconscious - condensation - another component of her behavior was included in the fairy-tale image of the stepmother, namelydislike for step-children? In the latter case, the stepmother archetype reflects the teenager’s unconscious idea, which is that his own mother would not have done this to him (she would have protected him, saved him, not given him up for initiation, after which, by the way, there was a high mortality rate, etc. .). This means that the archetype of the “evil and heartless stepmother” conveys a series of relationships between adopted children and their stepmothers that repeats from generation to generation. And such “non-close” relationships are clearly inherited and are based on behavior that precedes it evolutionarily and is associated with one of the types of aggression. Redirected aggression is a separate type of aggressive behavior. It is defined by the fact that “any form of behavior triggered by one object is directed, due to the fact that inhibitory stimuli simultaneously emanate from it, to another object, different from the one that triggered this form of behavior” ([] Lorenz, 2008). Lorenz considered aggression to be an independent, inherited and accumulated instinct. “Lorentz's theory of human nature is the idea that, like many animals, we have an internal need to behave aggressively towards our species. He believes that only this can explain the conflicts and wars throughout human history, the irrational behavior of supposedly intelligent beings. Lorenz believes that Freud's theory of the death instinct is an interpretation of precisely this unpleasant fact" ([] Stevenson, 2006). The accumulation of aggression is well known to each of us through the phenomenon of irritation. Lorenz says that with prolonged abstinence from manifestations of aggressive behavior, the threshold for its triggering decreases, and increasingly smaller reasons are sufficient for aggressiveness to burst out []. According to Lorenz, the aggressive instinct (like any other: food, sexual, altruistic) must be satisfied from time to time. Another thing is that the life cycle of each of the listed types of behavior is different, and the time of accumulation of aggression, multiplied by individual differences between people, can have a very different duration. However, even the most “quiet person,” if he endlessly restrains and interrupts his aggressiveness, one “wonderful” day will “explode.” Lorenz associates one of the outputs that formed during the long evolution of various types of behavior with ritually fixed actions (RFD). The meaning of these actions for aggression is in its ritualization, in the redirection and utilization of aggression in certain complexes of movements, which in a reduced, collapsed form reflect the aggressive patterns of behavior that preceded them evolutionarily. Among such RFDs in humans, we can name “friendly bearish” hugs from people we have not seen for a long time (during which bones literally crack), “no less friendly” handshakes and pats on the back of the same color. All these actions have one thing in common: they are ambivalent and combine friendly and aggressive reactions; moreover, they become acts of pacifying behavior. Lorenz does not consider aggression itself to be a negative phenomenon in any way. Those problems with aggression that man, Lorenz, and all subsequent generations of ethologists encountered ([] Dolnik, 2003; [] Stevenson, 2006) are explained by the lack of natural protective reactions in a person that prevent his excessive aggressiveness. “A person’s trouble is not in his aggressiveness, but in his weak moral equipment for aggressiveness” ([] Dolnik, 2007). Then what could be the ways to soften a person’s natural aggressiveness? From our point of view, these paths consist of relying on the protective forces of alternative natural motivational programs, among which altruistic behavior can be given a central place. Moreover, we take into account that instinctive programs do not have direct intersections, in other words, when we satisfy one of them, this does not mean that we saturate the other at the same time. Here we mean something else. Getting used tocertain behavior, forming a mindset for a typical response, we begin to give a similar response primarily to any frustration, conflict or crisis. That is, we form a stereotypical complex of fixed actions, which manifests itself most often in our behavior. In this sense, there will be a significant difference in how we respond to stress - with displaced aggression or altruistic behavior. “Social animals also have special alternative mechanisms that prevent rigidity and selfishness. Altruism can be attributed to this kind of protective properties of the psyche” ([] Pravotorov, 2004). Along with altruism, alternative ways to aggression are sexual behavior [Lyubars], migration [Dol, Samokhval], etc. In addition, empathy, as a mental mechanism for the implementation of altruism, is also considered as one of the ways to limit human aggressiveness [Zhuravl]. There are actual examples in nature that illustrate the interchangeability of aggression and altruism: “Pygmy chimpanzees (bonobos) live in groups and maintain a hierarchy, but spend little time figuring out their rank. They devote most of their time to mutual reassurance and pacification - smiling, hugging, cleaning each other, including “looking for lice” in the head - all this indicates that there are alternative aggression programs to pacifying behavior” ([Dolnik, 2007). Such observations allow Dolnik to talk about a “double” set of patterns of social interaction, which can equally influence the formation of various social structures (including non-hierarchical ones). Now let us dwell on the analysis of the points of intersection and connection between altruistic and aggressive behavior, as well as their mutual transitions. Aggression can act as a reaction that accompanies certain types of altruistic behavior. It is unlikely that anyone will deny that moral punishment is one of the effective means of education in general and teaching altruistic norms of behavior in particular. Trivers also said that altruism can be adaptive only if there are adequate “police” mechanisms, which he included, among other things, moral aggression in response to non-cooperative behavior ([] Trivers, 1971). R. Boyd and P. Richerson also spoke about some types of punishment as a special form of altruism: “...punishment for altruistic purposes can contribute to the spread of such variants of altruistic behavior that would be impossible without the threat of punishment. The phenomenon of altruistic punishment partially forms the basis of moral norms in human society and is based on a complex of innate psychological attitudes” (Boyd, Richerson, 1992; data from: [] Butovskaya, 1998). Another example, when aggression accompanies altruism, illustrates the behavior of a leader in a group, who is panicked by the extreme danger that has arisen. On the one hand, the leader is extremely cruel and despotic, on the other, he acts altruistically, preserving the integrity of the group and the lives of individuals. “Excessive” altruism can be a hidden form of aggression. It is well known from educational psychology and family psychotherapy how widespread the behavior of mothers is, who, for the sake of their children, “don’t finish eating a piece,” “give away the best,” and “throw their whole lives at their feet” (which, by the way, they don’t forget to tell their offspring about), creating a feeling of guilt that children then work off throughout their lives. Moreover, this feeling of guilt is so powerful, and the debt is so “unpayable,” that it allows such mothers to keep their offspring on a “short leash” for as long as possible. Psychotherapy with women who adhere to this strategy makes it possible to identify strong aggressiveness redirected towards the child. Often mothers with such an attitude “would be glad not to do this, but it is stronger than them.” The scenario “I’ll lay down my whole life for you, and... then I’ll blame you” is certainly a defensive strategy. And she has a very plausible excuse: “everything is for the goodown descendant." But as a result, this strategy completely disadapts the woman herself and socially disables her child. Aggressive clashes usually end in an altruistic reaction of reconciliation. According to M.L. Butovskaya, already among primates, most cases of conflicts end in reconciliation between the aggressor and the victim, and reconciliation occurs the more often as higher cognitive abilities in this species ([] Butovskaya, 1998). Reconciliation is used by children starting from the age of 2 ([] Butovskaya, Kozintsev, 1998). Children even have a number of rules for reconciliation, which include, for example, that “the one who initiated the conflict must initiate reconciliation,” or “everyone must protect the victim of aggression.” The basis for reconciliation is the hypothesis of the restoration of social relations, proposed by F. Waal and E. Rosmalen (data from: [] Butovskaya, 1998). According to this hypothesis, in groups of social species, former rivals are “interested” in the speedy restoration of broken ties with a group mate. M.L. Butovskaya also says that the conflicting parties experience significant discomfort from the disruption of social ties and increased social tension. Therefore, along with the hypothesis about the restoration of social relations, she proposes a second hypothesis that considers reconciliation as a way to relieve stress. In any case, these examples clearly show the sequence of activation of altruistic processes that crown an act of aggression with reconciliation (or at least the experience of this reconciliation internally in the form of a feeling of guilt). There is a special type of natural altruism built on processed aggression - forced altruism. The term “forced altruism” was introduced by V.R. Dolnik ([] 2007), and developed by A.I. Protopopov []. At first glance, it is difficult to combine the concepts of “coercion” and “altruism” in a single phrase. There is an ethical framework at work here. Indeed, is it possible to speak of a certain act as altruistic if it is based on inverted aggressive motivation, and the act itself is committed under the pressure of circumstances or another person who has a higher status than the altruist? Perhaps, a person who gave up part of his resource to someone due to fear or internal compulsion is also unlikely to be called an altruist, and if they are, it will be in quotation marks. However, after becoming acquainted with a number of facts of forced altruism, the point of view changes by itself. If a person consciously (albeit under the pressure of internal pressure) “appeases” a stronger and higher-ranking hierarch with his “sacrifices”, than seeks to prevent his anger or form some kind of temporary alliance, then it contributes to the integrity and stability of the group. In fact, with his pacifying behavior, he supports the existence of the hierarchy, and therefore recognizes its dominance and primacy as a structural constituent of the group. A person’s willingness to give up everything he has at his disposal to a higher-status partner is the pressure of the most primitive and ancient forms of natural altruism. When our lower-class ancestor lost a tournament match and then gave up his opportunity to continue his own genotype (but continued to “live and work” for the benefit of the population), he thereby behaved in an altruistic manner. The same thing happens with modern people. Moreover, such “sacrifices” can be exclusively “voluntary”, on one’s own initiative, made sincerely and from the heart. With gifts, we strive to somehow distinguish ourselves, to give ourselves value in the eyes of a “status” person, and when he accepts our gift, it means that we have earned the required attention to ourselves, and we feel joy about this. If we reduce our civilized motivation to an archaic one, then we will be faced with the fact that consideration in our behavior is associated with an attempt either to relieve tension, or with the desire to be noticed, remembered and, ultimately,were more lenient towards us. That is, we voluntarily prevent the anger of a high-status person, we appease him, as we once appeased the highest hierarchs and gods so that they would have mercy on us. And in this “voluntariness” there is quite a lot of coercion. This is how Protopopov describes the origin of forced altruism: “...where could altruism come from? It is unlikely that there will be many objections to the fact that altruism was originally practiced only in relation to close relatives and went back to parental instincts. However, the expansion of altruism beyond the boundaries of immediate relatives, even on the conditions of reciprocity (reciprocity), no longer looks so obvious. And I believe that the mechanism of such an exit is closely related to the hierarchical structure of groups. After all, what is hierarchy if not the constant “self-sacrifice” of the lower classes in favor of the upper ones? And is there much “reciprocity” in such self-sacrifice in the ethical sense of the word? After all, in gratitude for its sacrifice, the individual receives (and even then it is not guaranteed) only deliverance from great suffering! Apparently, it makes sense to talk about the third (after related and reciprocal) type of altruism - forced” []. Among people, forced altruism has existed at all times and under any social system. Initially, the main principle of this type of altruistic behavior was processed aggressiveness, then the right to dominate, then the rule of mutual exchange arose, and in our time all these approaches are in effect. Compulsory altruism is a type of cooperative behavior, and its origin is as natural as the more ethically acceptable forms of selfless help. Aggression and natural altruism are ambivalent forms of behavior. Our fundamental scientific position regarding altruism is that any altruistic act has, among other things, a deep-seated aggressive component, and aggression always carries an altruistic impulse. We associate such a pattern with the ambivalent nature of the psyche itself, which is represented by a number of intrapsychic experiences that are systemically combined with each other, such as love-hate, dominance-submission, separation-dependence, etc. In the context of the aggression-altruism dyad, this looks like this : aggressiveness always gives rise to some oppositional altruistic tendencies, and excessive altruism causes counteraction in the form of increased aggression. These two processes constitute a single dynamic system, which is not only presented as a combination of two differently directed intrapsychic tendencies, but is also realized in interpsychic interaction. Social relationships, like the human psyche, are fundamentally open systems (Lomov, 1984). This means that they are influenced by a number of external and internal factors, which largely determine the dynamics of ongoing processes within the system itself. When any factor triggers an altruistic act, the aggressive component of this process is immediately updated; on the other hand, the moment of triggering aggressive behavior also marks the beginning of an altruistic reaction. At the same time, the processes of altruism and aggression are always in some initial parity - basic equilibrium, which can be defined as the “zero position” of forces in a particular system. Each system has its own “zero position”, and it is its essential characteristic. For example, a person may be very aggressive, and triggering altruistic behavior may only cause a change in the degree of his aggressiveness. This is well illustrated by the phenomenon of group dynamics in a closed therapeutic or training group. If in such a group aggressive behavior arises in one of its members, then oppositional processes of consolidation and cooperative behavior immediately develop, aimed at counteracting the emerging aggression. On the contrary, an excess of altruistic interaction always generatesaggression or conflict (it’s not for nothing that many participants in therapeutic groups talk about “altruistic pressure”). The group strives to maintain a certain balance of power, its usual “zero” position. In this case, the following pattern is observed: the greater the deviation from the “zero position” occurs, the more strongly the processes of aggression-cooperation are activated. Finally, another of our conceptual ideas is that aggression and altruism have a common nature and are not autonomous from each other intra - and interpsychic processes. They represent two modalities of the internal field and group interaction and can easily transform into each other, that is, invert. Under some conditions, altruism can be no less aggressive than aggression itself, and aggressiveness can be no less altruistic than any selfless help. That is, aggression is often only a form of manifestation of an altruistic strategy, and vice versa, some phenomena of altruism implement an aggressive strategy in a hidden form. “In true love there is always hidden ... a charge of latent aggression disguised by the union” ([] Lorenz, 2008). Moreover, a number of experimental examples and actual observations suggest that altruism is a phylogenetically earlier social process. That is why we believe that the instinct of aggression can be considered as emerging from the ancient ancestral forms of altruism. We will turn to examples and evidence of this idea a little later, in subsequent sections, but now let’s summarize some results. 1.5. Conclusions Analysis of the literature, as well as the above considerations, allow us to formulate a number of final conclusions for this section: Altruism is a biosociopsychological phenomenon that requires an interdisciplinary approach to study it. This understanding allows us to consider altruism as a systemic phenomenon consisting of three levels: unconscious (biosocial), conscious (personal) and spiritual (transfinite). At the first level, altruism appears in its natural form, has an instinctive essence and is inherited. The second level is the level of personal altruism. At this level, altruism is a social, moral and ethical formation formed in the process of socialization of an individual into the culture of a particular society. At the same time, this level of development of the phenomenon under study is based on the biological basis of natural altruistic motivation and is a consequence of its cultural processing. Finally, the third level - transfinite altruism - reflects the maximum degree of development of this phenomenon, can only be formed in a spiritually mature person, and acts as the highest level of an individual’s altruistic attitude towards the world. Altruistic motivation is opposed not to selfish aspirations, but to the aggressive impulses of the subject. Moreover, aggression itself, as intraspecific social interaction, evolved evolutionarily from the earliest forms of altruism. The conceptual opposition of natural altruism and aggression allows us to consider them as two ambivalent mental processes that transform into each other, which have a common nature and are not intra- and interpsychic formations autonomous from each other. At the same time, egoistic aspirations are not “altruism in reverse,” but a special type of orientation of altruistic behavior, when its object is the subject’s own Ego. From the point of view of modern ethics and understanding of a particular individual, the influence of not all altruistic programs can be regarded as positive. There are a number of unconscious altruistic tendencies in our psyche that are of an auto-aggressive nature. That is why we consider altruistic behavior as a polyethical phenomenon, often having a bipolar orientation. The final result of an altruistic act can be shifted both towards the prosocial and towards the asocial pole. Altruistic behavior,based basically on natural altruistic motivation, it is divided into genetic, reciprocal, coalition and coercive types. These types of altruism imperatively influence the behavior of the subject and, often, carry not only selfless, but also aggressive impulses. The latter, due to the systematic nature of the altruistic motivation itself, are not always monitored by the altruist himself. Regarding natural altruism, the following provisions can also be formulated: - one of its central functions is support for group formation processes; - throughout the life of an individual society, cyclical fluctuations of altruistic tendencies occur (when altruism, sometimes spreads widely, sometimes fades); - in conditions of global overpopulation of humanity on the Earth, the influence of forced forms of natural altruism increases significantly. These conclusions were formulated based on a number of experimental and empirical facts. First of all, we used material from ethology and evolutionary psychology. Now we will move on to the analysis of higher levels of altruism development, such as personal and transfinite. We will conduct this analysis of altruistic behavior from the positions of ethnography, psychoanalysis, social and general psychology. Under the gaze of these disciplines, the understanding of altruism will expand and take on a slightly different meaning. We hope that we will be able to synthesize all these approaches into a single channel of the ethological and psychological concept of altruism. SECTION 2. PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIOR OF AN PERSON 2.1. Sociocultural studies of altruism in traditional cultures. The connection of altruistic behavior with social dominance and control Ethnographic studies of so-called “primitive peoples” were especially popular in the early twentieth century. Entire institutes were engaged in collecting material, expeditions were sent to hard-to-reach areas, and field research was carried out by dedicated scientists. Among the famous anthropologists and ethnographers one can name such names as F. Boas, K. Lévy-Bruhl, K. Lévy-Strauss, B. Malinovsky, M. Mead, M. Moss, D. Pircio-Biroli, J. Fraser and many other. The geography of ethnographic research was as wide as possible. In particular, the Indian ethnic groups of central, southern and northwestern America, the tribes of Melanesia, Polynesia, Africa and Australia, the peoples of northern Siberia, etc. have been studied. A huge amount of ethnographic and anthropological data has been collected. Their own methodologists and systematizers of traditional cultures also appeared ([] Malinovsky, 1999). However, since we are personally interested in a very specific aspect of sociocultural research, we will turn to the section that is associated with the inclusion of various forms of altruistic behavior in the social context. He was the first to formulate the idea that all physiological needs, methods of satisfying them, as well as instinctive behavior programs are one way or another included in culture and have a social equivalent, was the anthropologist and ethnographer B. Malinovsky ([] 1999). The author of the functional theory of culture studied all social functions and processes from the position of a means of satisfying certain biological needs. He insisted that even if a need can have a physiological origin, then the means and ways of satisfying it in a person will always be social. The main thing is that the person is socialized in a certain society. Since our work is devoted to altruism, the inherited nature of which has already been discussed in the first section, we want to track the social representation of this particular phenomenon. To do this, we will focus on two global phenomena for traditional cultures, based on the universal rule of exchange: a) the potlatch and b) special kinship systems (phratries, lineages and other formations). A) Potlatch The phenomenon of the potlatch, which underlies any rule of exchange, has been known since ancient times , exists in one form or another in every community, and has survived to this day. His research was carried out by F.Boas([] 1940), K. Levi-Strauss ([] 2006; 2007), B. Malinovsky ([] 1998). However, the greatest contribution to the study of this social practice was made by M. Moss in his famous work “Essay on the Gift” []. Potlatch (“gift” in the language of the Nootka Indian tribe) is a peculiar, apparently free and gratuitous ritual of exchanging gifts between people and tribes and other social formations. In the above collective definition, almost every word needs clarification and clarification, and, we would say, not just clarification, but significant specification. Let's start with the fact that a potlatch is not a single exchange, but a system of mutual exchange of gifts, the distinctive feature of which is the growth in the value of subsequent gifts according to the snowball principle. In other words, in a potlatch they respond with a gift for a gift, always increasing the value of the latter. The second important feature of the potlatch is that the gift itself can be anything: food, things, jewelry, money, services, women, children, status and etc. That is, the concept of a gift in a potlatch covers all aspects of social life, and, as it turned out thanks to Moss’s research, this practice also regulates most aspects of social relations. “The potlatch is much more than a legal phenomenon: it is one of those phenomena that we propose to call “total.” It is religious, mythological and shamanic, since the chiefs who participate in it and represent it personify in it the ancestors and gods whose names they bear, whose dances they perform and whose spirits they are in the power of. It is economic, and it is necessary to measure the cost, significance, reasons and consequences of these agreements, huge, even if based on today's European costs. The potlatch is also a socio-morphological phenomenon: a meeting of tribes, clans and families, even nations, imparts nervousness and extreme excitement to it. People fraternize and at the same time remain strangers; they communicate and antagonize each other in gigantic commerce and constant tournament. We do not touch upon the extremely numerous aesthetic phenomena of the potlatch” ([] Moss, 1996). Another key feature of the described social practice is the only “apparently free”, but in fact, the exclusively forced nature of the potlatch (compare with forced altruism). As Moss writes in his study, it is impossible to refuse a gift, and, even more so, it is impossible not to return a gift with a gift. “The potlatch consists of three forced duties: to give, to receive and to repay” []. We will consider the reasons for such an imperative nature of the potlatch very soon, and in order to understand them, we will need to analyze its three components: social character, influence on hierarchy and connection with aggression. Moss explains the social essence of the potlatch by its latent “disinterested” character . The one who accepts gifts, receives service, status or money is in debt to the donor. He becomes unfree in front of him, shackled by unpaid debt and unrequited gifts. The desire to “repay” the debt, to compensate for the original gifts among traditional peoples is so strong that they strive to arrange a reciprocal potlatch, and the sooner and on a larger scale they succeed, the better, in their opinion, it will be. The result is a process of constant exchange of things, thanks to which subgroups of segmented societies of the archaic type are constantly integrated into one another, feeling indebted to each other for everything ([] Moss, 1996). “It must be understood that the Indian who invites all his friends and neighbors to a great potlatch, where at first glance the results of the labor of many years are wasted, has two objects in view which we cannot but recognize as reasonable and worthy of praise. The first goal is to pay off your debts. This is done publicly, with great ceremony and in the manner of a notarial deed. Another goal is to arrange the fruits of your labor in such a way as to obtain the greatest benefit both for yourself and for your children. Those who receive gifts on this holiday,receive them as loans, which they use in their current enterprises, but after a few years they must return them with benefit to the donor or his heir. , demands for compensation and bind society with invisible threads of mutual debt. This is the first, social component of the potlatch. Moreover, Moss himself says that the potlatch creates a shortage of resources associated with the reimbursement of initial gifts. Indeed, if you add up all the mutual obligations, they will cover the entire available resource. It turns out that a potlatch is a life on borrowed time, and if it happened that at one moment everyone suddenly decided to pay their debts, then they simply would not have enough symbols of compensation. “The conditions here are completely analogous to those that prevail in our own society: if we wished to have all our loans repaid, we would find that in reality there is in no way enough money to pay them” []. Isn’t it true that this clearly describes the familiar situation of our current economic crisis, when gold and foreign exchange funds have long ceased to act as the main guarantees, and instead of them, guarantees have appeared, but such conditional and symbolic obligations for payments? The hierarchical component of the described social practice is connected with the fact that that a perfect potlatch increases the status of the person who organized it. A person, as it were, “exalts himself in his status”, grows to the level of one who feeds and gifts everyone else. The potlatch produced shows that its organizer has an excess of resources, which he easily shares, with the help of which... he drives the recipients of his gifts into debt. “The potlatch combines gift, duty and freedom... An unrequited gift humiliates the one who accepted it... Likewise, charity hurts the one to whom it is addressed... The whole force of our morality is aimed at eliminating the unconscious and offensive superiority of the rich "donor"" ([] Moss , 1996).In archaic cultures, there is a figurative understanding of the potlatch as a practice through which the name of the potlatch giver “gets heavier,” and the name of the potlatch recipient “loses in weight.” Moreover, in some traditional cultures the idea of ​​​​the superiority of the giver over the recipient of the gift is so expressed that the latter, after accepting the potlatch, becomes something like a slave. Moreover, this situation lasts until he “redeems his name” with the help of reciprocal compensation. “The Tlingits [3] say that “gifts are placed on the backs of the people who receive them”” [Moss]. This understanding of the potlatch ensures its “forced”, imperative character. The desire to “return gifts” is associated with a symbolic “redemption” of freedom, rediscovering one’s “name” and... an attempt to rise, to stand higher than the previous donor, to “drive” him “into slavery for debts.” Moss describes literal cases where in some traditional communities individuals who could not repay the potlatch lost their rank, ceased to be free people and went to the potlatch organizer to work off the “gifts” given to them in order to wash their discredited name. This explains the compulsory nature of potlatch obligations. A slightly different, but similar explanation of the imperative nature of debt is given by R. Cialdini: “Most of us do not like to be obliged to someone. Obligations depress us, we want to get rid of them as quickly as possible. It is not difficult to understand where the source of this feeling is. Because reciprocal arrangements are vital in human social systems, the very conditions of society make us feel uncomfortable when we are indebted to someone. If we are going to blithely ignore the need to return someone's favor, we make the reciprocity scheme "broken" and greatly reduce the likelihood that our benefactor will do us any favors in the future. Such frivolous behavior does not serve the interests of society. That's why we have been since childhood“trained” to become irritated when under the burden of obligation” ([] Cialdini, 1999). It turns out that by not paying our obligations, we begin to feel like deviants, moral criminals with all the ensuing consequences in the form of remorse and guilt. Interestingly, it is impossible not to accept the potlatch. It is almost impossible to refuse to enter into an endless series of mutual exchanges of gifts. “The obligation to accept is no less compulsory. They have no right to refuse a gift or a potlatch. To act this way means to reveal the fear of having to return, the fear of being “destroyed” by not responding to the gift. In reality, this is precisely what it means to be “destroyed.” This means “losing the weight” of your name, ... admitting defeat in advance” ([] Moss, 1996). The practice of potlatch creates a “society of mutual exchange”, which is tightly bound by the need to accept and give services, gifts, statuses, etc. Moreover, such society is quite quickly stratified according to the possibility/impossibility of organizing and reimbursing a potlatch. On the other hand, the potlatch itself serves one single purpose - to identify equals, establish relationships between them, create contractual alliances, form coalitions and maintain them for as long as possible in such a wasteful, but at the same time humane way. How, then, do the results of a potlatch differ from the consequences of reciprocal or coalitional altruism? Moreover, are there any differences between them at all? Our view is that the potlatch is a cultural representation of such a natural-social phenomenon as reciprocal, coalition or forced altruism. In such a specific social form it is expressed and manifested. Just remember the creation of all kinds of unions, coalitions, etc. Isn’t their formation connected with all kinds of feasts, feasts, exchanges of gifts, gifts, etc.? This is the same potlatch, designed to consolidate the agreements that have arisen, and, if possible, also to amaze (and therefore subordinate/degrade) the partner side with its resources, wealth, power, etc. This is the essence of the potlatch. Now let’s look at the most important characteristic of the described social practice − the aggressive nature of the potlatch. The fact is that the previously mentioned relationships between the parties in the potlatch are best characterized by the expression “struggle of wealth” or “peaceful battle”. Mauss describes it this way: “Some types of potlatch require a person to spend everything he has and keep nothing for himself. He who is to be the richest must be the wildest spender. They burn whole boxes of fish oil, burn houses and a huge number of blankets, break the most expensive copper products, throw them into water bodies in order to suppress and humiliate their opponents. In this way, they ensure advancement up the social ladder not only for themselves, but also for their family” []. Moreover, among the Kwakiutl, one of the Indian tribes, the aggressive nature of the potlatch is even more pronounced. For them, the potlatch is war and they talk about it as a “war dance.” “Just like in war, by arranging a potlatch one can take possession of the masks, names and privileges of the murdered owners... In a war of property, property is killed: either one’s own so that others do not have it, or the property of others, giving them property that they will be obliged to return or not will be able to return” ([] Moss, 1996). The aggressive nature of the potlatch is also supported by its understanding, within the framework of which “accepting a potlatch means accepting a challenge.” Moreover, only those who have confidence in their ability to answer it can accept the challenge. Moreover, one can refuse to participate in a potlatch, but only the highest hierarchs - those who have repeatedly organized potlatch and won it - can allow this. Otherwise, refusal to participate in the potlatch is tantamount to an insult and is fraught with direct aggression or war. This is the essential nature of the potlatch. About the important social function of the potlatchThe example observed by M. Mead among the mountain Arapesh tribe living on the island of New Guinea is also evidenced. Mead describes this tribe as extremely friendly, the relationships in it are devoid of envy, aggression, greed and other vices of a typical human society. Mountain Arapesh cultivate their gardens in related groups, help each other in everything, defend themselves together, they have no hierarchy, they organize holidays together and easily share the food they get among everyone []. What has made it possible for many centuries to maintain such unique greenhouse conditions psychological reserve? Among the mechanisms regulating the relationships of the mountain Arapesh, Mead names a specific upbringing, which strongly ostracizes deviant forms of behavior (aggressive, greedy and proud people are isolated, people stop communicating with them, and sometimes expelled from the tribe), as well as the existence of the social institution of Boignins. It turns out that where direct hostility is prohibited, it is ritualized and finds a way out again in the same conditionally altruistic potlatch: “The essence of the political problem of the Arapesh is how to force a few capable and gifted people to take responsibility and leadership against their will so that every three or four years, and sometimes less often, a truly exciting celebration takes place. It is assumed that no one wants to be a leader, a “big man.” The “big men” must plan, lead the exchange, march important, speak with a loud voice, they must brag about what they have done in the past and what they will do in the future. All this is considered by the Arapesh to be unnatural and difficult behavior, which any normal person would avoid if he could. It is this role that society imposes on some people... The most gifted boys are given special training: from the young men of some other clan, related by kinship through the male line with their clan, a partner is selected for them - boignin. This connection between young men from different clans is built on the basis of mutual obligations to organize holidays and, to some extent, has a hereditary nature. The social institution of the Boignins fosters aggressiveness and encourages the spirit of competition, so rare among the Arapesh. The duty of boignins is to bully each other at every meeting, to ask mockingly whether the partner is going to do something with his life... The relationship of boignins is thereby a training ground for the kind of difficulties that the “big man” will have to face and which ordinary Arapesh consider as undesirable... In the Boignin relationship, all the values ​​of a competitive, calculating social system are clearly encouraged. Boignin never expects insult from another; he himself insults his boignin out of duty. Subsequently, he not only shares with him the excess of his goods, but specially raises pigs and hunts in order to publicly present to his partner the fruits of his labor, deliberately accompanying his gifts with several well-calculated insults about his partner’s inability to repay him in kind ([ ] Mead, 1998).The above example of the Boignin institution further supports the aggressive nature of the potlatch. And since the potlatch is only a cultural form of realization of reciprocal altruism, the latter can also be considered as based on a hostile basis. Let us remember that the potlatch itself is not a simple exchange of gifts. This is a social ritual that cements any coalition, contractual relationship. And the fact that it contains an aggressive component only warns partners about the consequences that may arise if they violate the agreement. Ultimately, the aggressive component of the potlatch makes the reciprocal union itself stronger. This result of the described cultural practice allows us to consider the potlatch not as a haphazard waste of funds, savings and other resources, but as an important cementingcomponent of social relations. Thus, the social function of the potlatch is to ritualize aggression and act as a seal sealing the formation of a new reciprocal or coalition alliance. That is, mutual obligations, in order for them to be strong and responsible, must always include an aggressive component. Here, as before (in paragraph 1.4 of Section 1), attention is drawn to the fact that aggression, in one form or another, in most cases actually accompanies altruistic reciprocal behavior. Let us present another important fact about the potlatch. Does it happen that caring for another is not a desire to improve one’s own status? D. Pirzio-Biroli gives the following example in this regard: “When a tribe wants to help someone and at the same time avoid dependence on themselves, they provide their help anonymously. This custom is common among the Diola "animists" in the Casamance region of Senegal. There, in front of the patient’s hut, they put everything necessary, but they do it late at night, while he is sleeping, so that he does not have to thank anyone later” ([] Pirzio-Biroli, 2001). In conclusion, we emphasize once again that the potlatch itself (even the craziest and wasteful) is never disinterested, it “always holds the hierarchy together” ([] Moss, 1998). B) Special kinship systems (phratries, lineage and other formations) Field research and encyclopedic works by F. Boas [] and K. Levi- Strauss [], B. Malinowski [] and M. Mead [], M. Moss [] and J. Frazer [] convincingly showed that modern society has a much more simplified social organization in comparison with any of the traditional ethnic communities. "Primitive" tribes live in a much more complex order of relationships than any modern Western man. And if our civilization has taken the path of complicating the world of things, hitting scientific and technological progress, then traditional cultures have developed an infinitely complex system of understanding the world in its total participatory integrity. They also understand social connections and relationships based on multi-order kinship systems ([] Mead, 1988; [] Moss, 1996; [] Pircio-Biroli, 2001). In their works, these scientists, among other things, described various archaic forms of the family, which are practically never found in modern Western culture, or are present in a reduced form and do not have a legitimate status. As the basic ancestral forms of marriage relations, special kinship systems are described, namely phratries and lineages, and polygyny, polyandry, group marriage and serial monogamy are identified as the main forms of family. Let us dwell in more detail on the definition of phratries and lineages. The first thing we pay attention to is that both concepts refer to special extended kinship systems that divide society into non-overlapping groups (traditionally two or three). Moss points out that the division of society into phratries is characteristic of Melanesian, Polynesian, Indian and Australian tribes: “Each tribe is divided into two large parts, which we call phratries. Each phratry, in turn, includes a number of clans, that is, groups of individuals bearing the same totem. In principle, the totems of one phratry are not found in another” []. For traditional tribes, such a division does not simply classify people depending on their belonging to one phratry or another, but typologizes the entire world of things and relationships, allowing one to be combined (belonging to similar phratries and classes) and not others to be combined. Similar kinship patterns are present in Africa. Pirzio-Biroli comes to the conclusion that the most common kinship systems among African tribes are the so-called “large families”, which have a lineage or clan structure (patrilineal or matrilineal, depending on who - father or mother - kinship is recognized) [] . In both cases, there is a large number of family units that are somehow related by blood, live in a compact territory and are subordinate to one singlefamily hierarchy. Moreover, “blood relationship” in this case is understood in an expanded sense. Depending on whether the lineage or clan is matrilineal or patrilineal, relatives are considered not only those in whose veins the common maternal or paternal blood flows, but, accordingly, also those who, due to newly created marriages or by chance, joined this “ extended" family. What unites the two given kinship systems and why did we turn to them? One of the common points is that within one phratry, as well as within a lineage, a relatively free circulation of women is sanctioned and legitimate. In the regulated, but nevertheless quite polygamous movement of women relative to men, a number of authors see the reason for the existence of such intricate and complex kinship systems ([Malinovsk], [Mead], [Moss]). Moreover, according to these researchers, the institution of polygamy significantly prevails over monogamy in most traditional human societies. Pirzio-Biroli notes that the prevalence of polygamy is also determined by the polynuclear family structure []. Mead also speaks about this, characterizing the functional expediency of complex related cultures among traditional peoples []. Archaic cultures one way or another allow some freedom of sexual relations, but not promiscuous, as was the case during the sexual revolutions in “our world,” but quite regulated and ritualized polygamy. For example, “...in a number of ethnic groups, men belonging to the same clan could have sexual relations with the wives of each of them. Or, on the contrary, women who returned to stay in their lineage had the right to enter into sexual relations there, without being considered treason against their own husband” [Pirzio]. Among the same archaic peoples, where all these forms of sanctioned polygamy were absent, holidays were allowed, at the end of which everyone had the right to choose a partner for the night [Mead]. In addition, a number of ethnic groups provided for the exchange of wives as one of the highest gifts when concluding important coalition alliances [Moss]. Why did the institution of polygamy exist, so ambiguously interpreted by modern Western society, and why was it integrated into the structure of the archaic family? In our earlier works [Case], we have already written about the altruistic function of legitimate polygamy and the importance of its meaning for traditional communities. Let us present here the most significant conclusion that we made: polygamy reduces intragroup aggressiveness due to the fact that it contributes to a more proportional distribution of women relative to men. Indeed, “...competition for a woman...can lead to globally disastrous consequences (revolutions, terrorism, decline in group morality)” [Mead]. Miller and Kanazawa even more strongly link any social tensions to the “battle for women,” considering the most tense society to be the ethnic groups of the traditional East, where 25% of men usurp 100% of women []. On the other hand, Pirzio-Biroli notes that “in In an archaic society, even the poorest young man can find a woman for himself, for example, by entering into the service of the leader. In this case, the leader gives one of his many wives for him, and the young man undertakes to give his first daughter to the leader, thereby strengthening his connection with a strong patron and at the same time increasing his prestige within the framework of matrimonial circulation” []. Ritualized promiscuity also resolves, to some extent, the tension that arises as a result of the significant divergence between the biological and cultural nature of man himself. In modern Western society, where attitudes towards promiscuity are much more strict and punitive, polygamy has transformed into serial monogamy, in which a significant percentage of people create and destroy more than two civil and official families during their lives[4]. Moreover, it is needless to say that adultery is always a trauma, which often entails a break in relations andthe emergence of single-parent families. “Africa has never known either orphans or widows... In the event of the death/disappearance of a husband, the care of his wife and children falls on his brother or other relatives along the line... A woman was also never left without sexual relations” [Pirzio]. All The above allows us to assert that special kinship systems (phratries and lineages) are a social representative of genetic altruism and provide a “cultural” solution to such an exclusively altruistic task as a freer circulation of women within traditional communities. The absence of harsh usurpation of large numbers of women by individual men also reduces the overall tension in “extended families.” At the same time, the branched structure of lines and clans makes them much more resistant to various kinds of internal shocks. In those conditions in which the nuclear unit of society would have disintegrated long ago, the extended archaic family freely continues to exist. That is, special kinship systems in traditional cultures are a stable social form of realization of natural genetic altruism. The latter is achieved due to the cultural and normative conditions created in society that support the altruistic program of exchange of women, which influences the establishment of branched kinship orders ([] Lévi-Strauss, 1985). Are there other solutions? Nowadays, an alternative institution for family relationships is monogamy. The institution of monogamy also favors the altruistic type of distribution of marriage partners, in which this distribution looks most even, without any significant statistical disproportions. In other words, monogamy forcibly corrects the natural bias of choosing a marriage partner from the class of high demand and ensures attention to everyone else. This achieves one of the most altruistic goals: every reproductively healthy person gets the same partner. At the same time, the institution of monogamy is not a perfect form of solving the problem of the “struggle for women” and today we can already say that in the most severe version this institution did not take place (for example, if only because, according to the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, every two marriages there are from one to one and a half divorces (depending on the year and region)). Nowadays, the monogamous relationship format exists in a softer form of “serial monogamy.” However, it is not optimal from the point of view of satisfying the biological nature of sexual desire. In this sense, traditional cultures with their multi-order kinship systems are far ahead of our society in terms of the stability and integrity of extended families. Moreover, the very format of these families is more consistent with natural human polygamy. To test the last statement, we compiled a special questionnaire that contained seven questions that allowed various options for closed and open answers. The purpose of the questionnaire was to determine the modern ideas of men and women about possible acceptable family forms additional to the existing format. We tested 119 people aged 22 to 57 years. Moreover, our sample consisted of 99 women and 20 men. Among the women, fifty-one at the time of testing were in an official or civil marriage and lived together with their spouse, forty-eight were unmarried (did not have a partner at all, or occasionally dated men, but did not live with any of them). Among the men, ten people were in an official or civil marriage, ten men were out of wedlock at the time of the study. Here we present only the most typical results that we obtained as a result of testing and processing the questionnaire. Table 1 To the question: “Do you have or have you had you have fantasies about cheating on your partner,” the answers were distributed as follows: Do you have or have you had fantasies about cheating on your partner? FFM MARRIAGE (F – 51; M – 10) 80% of married women answered “yes” 80% of married men answered“yes” NOT MARRIED (F – 48; M – 10) 66.7% of unmarried women answered “yes” 100% answered “yes” Table No. 1 shows that differences are observed only in the frequency of occurrence of fantasies about cheating between men and women who are not married. Moreover, these differences have a pronounced statistical significance at the significance level of a=0.01 (to determine the severity of the differences, we used Fisher’s j*-angular transformation). From Table No. 1 it follows that girls who are not married to him are the least likely to fantasize about possible betrayal of their partner. In private conversations, some survey participants agreed that when they are at the stage of occasional meetings with a partner or are in a permanent relationship, but do not live together with their chosen one, thoughts about sexual life on the side practically do not occur to them. For unmarried men, the picture looks different. The vast majority of them have a tendency to fantasize about other women. At the same time, the number of men fantasizing about cheating is decreasing within marriages. 20% of married men have no polygamous fantasies at all. Moreover, according to our sample, this characteristic does not depend on the length of family relationships. However, in all groups of our subjects, fantasies about cheating on one’s partner are significantly more common than the absence of these fantasies (at the significance level a<0.05 - for the group girls, unmarried and at the significance level a<0.01 - for all other categories). Answers to the second question: “If in our culture it were possible to change social norms regarding infidelity, then I would prefer that ...”, we will divide by gender and present in two separate tables. Table 2 For women, the results were distributed as follows: If in our culture it were possible to change social norms regarding infidelity, then I would prefer that ... F (not married )F (married)Sexual/family/love relationships remained as they are now 68% 65.4%For sexual/family/love relationships to remain as they are now, but there was the possibility of occasional sex on the side, not considered this betrayal of your partner (that is, betrayal has become a social norm) 14.9% 7.8% So that the social norm is the possibility of parallel, including long-term relationships with several partners (official polygamy) 6.1% − So that the social norm is the possibility joint sex with other couples/partners (free sexual life in couples/swinging) − 6.3% Your own version 11% 20.5% According to Table No. 2, there are no statistical differences in the distribution of preferences of married women and girls outside of marriage. On the other hand, the greatest interest in this question was provided by the analysis of the “your own version” answers. Women, both outside of marriage and within marriage, expressed the same idea in different words, which can be summarized as follows: “The attitude towards betrayal is a personal matter for specific partners and this relationship is inappropriate to regulate by social norms.” As a result of individual conversations with our subjects, we established that these answer options are a way to express some loyalty to possible variations in the format of family relationships. Table 3 The men’s answers looked like: If in our culture it were possible to change social norms regarding betrayal, then I would preferred that... M (not married) M (married) Sexual/family/love relationships remained as they are now70%80%So that sexual/family/love relationships remained as they are now, but there was the possibility of occasional sex on party who is not considered cheating on his partner (that is, cheating would become a social norm) 30% 10% For the social norm to be the possibility of joint sex with other couples/partners (free sexual life in couples/swinging) − 10% If we compare male answers to this question with women, what is noteworthy is the total absence of “your own version” in the answers.A discussion of this phenomenon with one of the subgroups of our respondents led them to the idea that men “as more socialized subjects, are inclined to be more normative in their behavior.” The latter idea is in good agreement with the psychoanalytic position about a more rigid Superego in men, as well as with data from social psychology, which consists in the fact that men are more focused on maintaining social norms than women. It is also noteworthy that among men there were no one respondent who would choose the answer: “so that the social norm is the possibility of parallel, including long-term relationships with several partners (official polygamy).” Discussing this fact, the men made the following humorous comment: “here you don’t know what to do with one wife; and two or three official spouses, in general, will live out their lives.” Table 4 Another question, designed to minimize social desirability and resistance when answering it, was as follows: “If you lived in a traditional society with an archaic culture for many centuries ago, then you would prefer to live in a society where you are married...” The female group’s answer options were: If you lived in a traditional society with an archaic culture many centuries ago, then you would prefer to live in a society where you are married... F (not married) F (married) Completely monogamous relationships 66.7% 73% Polygamous life, subject to the absolute fidelity of the partner (you are not faithful, but the partner is monogamous) 16.5% 15.4% Official polyandry (one woman is married at the same time for several men) 6.1% 6% Episodic (optional, including ritualized) polygamous life of both (culturally permitted sex on the side, associated with certain events/dates - Ligo; Ivan Kupala Day; analogues of a holiday romance) 10 .7%_Joint sex with couples/partners with whom your couple is in an open relationship (group marriage)−5.6% At the same time, in the women’s group we never encountered such options as: “monogamous life, subject to your loyal relationship to your partner’s infidelity (you are faithful, but your partner is not)”, “official polygyny (one man is married to several women at the same time).” Table 5 Men answered this question as follows: If you lived in a traditional society with an archaic culture for many centuries ago, then you would prefer to live in a society where you are married... M (not married) M (married) Completely monogamous relationships 60% 60% Polygamous life, subject to the absolute fidelity of the partner (you are not faithful, but the partner is monogamous) 20% 20% Official polygyny (one man is married to several women at the same time) − 10% Episodic (optional, including ritualized) polygamous life of both (culturally permitted sex on the side, associated with certain events/dates − Ligo; Ivan Kupala Day; analogues of a holiday romance) 20% 10% Among male responses, the following options did not receive a single choice: “monogamous life, subject to your loyal attitude to your partner’s infidelity (you are faithful, but your partner is not)”, “joint sex with couples/partners with whom your couple is in an open relationship (group marriage)”, “official polyandry (one woman is married to several men at the same time)”. Based on the materials of our research, the following conclusions can be drawn: I. Archaic forms of marriage are to some extent archetypal in relation to modern ideas about possible family formats, thereby filling fantasies with additional options for marriage relationships. II. The most stable form of the modern family is the monogamous and serial-monogamous format, which is confirmed by the statistically significantly more common choice of these institutions of family relations (see the first line in Tables No. 2, No. 3, No. 4, No. 5). III. Most archaic marriage formats are based on a person’s natural inclination towards polygamy and the manifestation of social equivalents of various natural altruistic programs (primarily genetic altruism). It is the combinationpolygamy and various types of natural altruistic behavior led to the formation of family institutions in which polygamy (polygyny and polyandry), group forms of marriage and serial monogamy play a central role. Let us summarize this paragraph. Analysis of ethnographic research allows us to assert that in archaic culture it is possible to trace a number of social equivalents of various instinctive altruistic programs. Among them, the existence of the potlatch and special kinship systems are the most prominent cultural phenomena. Moreover, we can argue that these social equivalents themselves were formed under the influence of altruistic programs. The potlatch is the primary cultural representation of reciprocal, coalitional, and coercive altruism; special kinship systems provide optimal conditions for the overall fitness and reproductive success of each individual, that is, they embody genetic altruism in social relations. It is interesting that such a phenomenon as the exchange of children, which takes its roots from the formation of special kinship systems, also aims to increase overall fitness, that is, the social circulation of the processes of genetic altruism. Mead writes that the ritual of child exchange among traditional peoples is always accompanied by some rationalized reasons behind which lie selfish motives. As a rule, the most common among such motives are ensuring a better future, maximum fitness and increasing the status of one’s own children. As an example, she cites the mountain Arapesh tribe. When the latter notice that their neighbors' tribe is becoming too small and their land is still rich, they invite the neighbors to take their own offspring. “Oh, poor land of Alipinagle, when its inhabitants die, who will take care of the land, who will live there under the trees? We must give them children to adopt so that this land and trees will have people when we die.” This generosity, of course, also has its own practical calculation - to achieve an advantageous position for one’s children []. Thus, the potlatch and special kinship systems, which ensure more adaptive patterns of circulation of children and women in society, are a consequence of the influence of natural altruistic programs on social norms behavior, among which genetic, reciprocal, coalitional and coercive altruism occupy a central place. Moreover, socio-psychological and cultural equivalents of natural altruistic behavior are the prototype and prototype of personal altruism, which is formed in the process of socialization and the subject’s entry into the culture of a particular society. And since these primordial forms are largely based on aggression, dominance, control and are of a coercive nature, we can say that personal altruism is also under pressure from these phenomena. The foregoing allows us to consider personal altruism as a complex, systemic and polyethical phenomenon, based on the multi-order structure of the underlying motivation. 2.2. Introduction to psychological approaches to the study of altruism Psychological approaches to altruism can be classified into three large groups: 1) socio-psychological models of altruistic behavior, considering it as a mechanism regulating mutual exchange and based on universal human norms of behavior (Ageev, [] D. Myers (1998 ), [] R. Cialdini (1999), [] A. Gouldner (1979)); 2) deep psychological understanding of altruism as a mechanism that protects the weak Ego of the subject (D.V. Winnicott [] (1998), M. Klein (1997), A. Freud (1999), Z. Freud (1998; 1999), E. Fromm (1990; 1992), K. Horney (1993), K. G. Jung (1995)); 3) psychological interpretation altruism, expanding the view of this phenomenon from the position of the attitude and orientation of the personality, formed in the process of human activity, and also considering it as a mechanism for the implementation of specificaltruistic emotions and motives in the process of cooperative behavior ([] V.S. Ageev (1990), G.M. Andreeva (1980), L.N. Antilogova (2004), A.G. Asmolov (1986), I.D. .Bekh, L.I.Bozhovich (2008), M.I.Borishevsky, L.P.Vygovskaya, T.P.Gavrilova, B.I.Dodonov (1978), L.P.Zhuravleva, Z.S.Karpenko (2009), V.E. Kim, A.N. Leontyev (1975), S.D. Maksimenko (2007, 2006), E.E. Nasinovskaya, N.N. Obozov (1990), K.K. Platonov (1975), A.V. Petrovsky (1979), M.V. Savchin, N.I. Sarzhveladze (1989). These groups of approaches to understanding altruistic behavior and altruistic motivation significantly enrich each other due to different points of view and various aspects of considering the phenomenon of altruism itself. In the following paragraphs we will consider all these approaches, giving credit to their creators and, if possible, without entering into controversy with their assumptions. Due to the difference in research methods and differences in approaches to the very subject of study, all three directions managed, in our opinion, to “grab” the essential features of altruistic behavior. All we have to do is put them together, which we will allow ourselves to do in the next two sections. In Section 3, we synthesize the main ideas proposed by various psychological schools into a single concept of altruistic personal behavior. Section 4 will be devoted to the psychotherapeutic application of our concept. Here we will only note that we will continue to build our concept on Malinowski’s idea that any natural component of behavior always has its representative in some social or cultural phenomenon or process []. Altruism, as an inherited behavioral program, has a significant number of such “cultivated” representations, allowing it to be realized in various forms of social practice. That is why altruism permeates all areas of interpersonal and intergroup interaction, such as activity and communication. 2.3. Altruism as a social phenomenon In this section we will present mainly foreign theories and experimental studies of altruistic behavior. Their difference from the view of altruism of domestic psychologists is that altruistic processes are studied here mainly in groups of strangers who are in no way united by common interests or joint activities. This approach is significantly vulnerable to criticism, since it considers cooperative and helping behavior in its “pure form,” without regard to the relationships of the interacting people. At the same time, studies of “spontaneous” altruism make it possible to study it in a more refined form than when it is included as one of the components in a comprehensive process of joint activity. Of course, we take into account the criticism of Western approaches given in the works of domestic psychologists [] V.S. Ageev (1990), [] G.M. Andreeva (1980), [] L.N. Antilogova (2004), [] L. I. Bozhovich (2008), [] A. N. Leontyev (1975), [] N. N. Obozov (1990), [] A. V. Petrovsky (1979). At the same time, a number of scientific findings of Western social psychologists allow us to pay attention to them. D. Myers describes three groups of theories of altruistic behavior []: − psychological theories, to which he refers: a) the theory of social exchange; b) the concept of altruism, where providing assistance is seen as disguised selfishness; c) the theory of altruism, built on empathy; - social theories based on universal human norms of reciprocity and responsibility; - evolutionary theories, among which he notes the theories of kinship and reciprocal altruism. Since we devoted the entire first section to evolutionary concepts, we will not repeat pages of this paragraph. Instead, we consider it appropriate to briefly characterize and include in the list proposed by Myers the view of altruism, which was presented within the framework of the domestic theory of activity and communication [5]. Also, as a separate item on this list, we will consider selfless helping behavior from the standpoint of differential psychology,that is, we study the tendency towards altruism as an independent personality trait, or a combination of them, which provides an altruistic form of behavior.I. Psychological concepts of altruism The first among the concepts of this group, Myers calls the theory of social exchange []. He talks about how any altruistic interaction is driven by the “social economy.” “We exchange not only material values ​​and money, but also social values ​​such as love, services, information and status. At the same time, we use a “minimax” strategy, that is, we strive to minimize our own costs and receive the maximum possible reward” []. The projection of this theory into the past makes it easy to see its “cultural” and “evolutionary” predecessors. These are the rules of reciprocity on which the potlatch ritual is built and which, in turn, are themselves based on the reciprocal altruism described by Trivers. At the same time, it is easy to notice the amendments made by the modern culture of consumer society in the theory of social exchange. If in a potlatch the rule of good manners was significant extravagance and generosity, which reliably cemented the relationship with a partner on conditions dependent on the latter, then in the “minimax” strategy we are talking about maximum saving of one’s own resource. In this context, Cialdini's observations are interesting []. On the one hand, he views exchange as a universal social rule that is almost impossible to resist; on the other hand, he talks about scammers who have learned to use the “exchange norm” for their own purposes ([] Cialdini, 1999). The “minimax” strategy is more of a ploy of the rational mind, concerned about its own benefit rather than maintaining social balance. The second in a series of psychological concepts, the theory of altruism considers providing any help as a manifestation of disguised selfishness. Moreover, if in the first case we are talking about cooperative behavior built on mutually beneficial exchange, then in the theory of “disguised egoism” the focus of perception is shifted towards the motivational component of helping behavior, and it itself is practically not considered. Familiarity with this approach creates the feeling that its only purpose was to justify excessive egoism and competition of Western civilization. The main premise of the “theory of egoism” is that behavior cannot be altruistic in principle, it always pursues some benefit and the whole question boils down to to determine which one (this concept significantly intersects with the psychoanalytic view of neurotic manifestations of altruism; the latter will be outlined in paragraph 2.4 of this section). Among the possible benefits of altruism, supporters of this concept name factors that can be conditionally classified into two groups: self-reward and self-soothing []. The first group includes: increased self-esteem from helping others, increased self-esteem, increased self-confidence. The second group can include everything that is associated with reducing internal anxiety and protecting one’s own Ego: getting rid of feelings of guilt, escaping from personal problems and remorse, etc. All of the above motivation, both self-rewarding and self-soothing, can actually take place in this case or other altruistic act. This is logical. If, after helping someone, we experienced frustration, guilt, bitterness, sadness, regret, anger and irritation, we would soon wean ourselves from altruistic relationships. There is nothing wrong with internal self-reward. In addition, the described self-motivation can also occur in openly selfish actions, that is, it does not clearly differentiate these two types of behavior, and therefore does not work as a classifying criterion. In addition, the approach from the side of “disguised egoism” does not at all explain the “exploits of Alexander Matrosov”, which, by the way, are a universal type of behavior for all peoples andcrops For example, during the US war in Vietnam alone, 63 soldiers received awards for shielding their comrades with their own bodies during explosions (Hunt, 1990; data from Myers, 1998). To say about such people that they had selfish motivation is, at a minimum, inappropriate. They did what they did and, most likely, could not have done otherwise. Those fractions of a second that separated visual information from the action itself were clearly not enough for conscious decision-making. In our opinion, the concept of “disguised egoism” is not scientific, but ideological in nature and is a philosophical justification for an egocentric type of behavior. The third approach to altruism considers altruism as a consequence of empathy. Indeed, such a social skill as empathy not only helps to carry out altruistic behavior, but also underlies social intelligence [Kalina]. The contribution of empathy to the implementation of altruistic behavior is also discussed in the works of a number of domestic authors [Zhuravl]. Thanks to empathy, we sympathize with a person, that is, we experience feelings similar to him and, on the basis of this, we empathize with him, that is, we respond complimentarily to his emotions. Empathy is an affective understanding of another; it is not surprising, therefore, that it underlies social behavior. Another thing is that empathy, as a component of social intelligence, can also underlie human manipulation, that is, generate behavior that is very far from altruistic. Empathy is a tool of understanding and the question is how to use it. For example, L.P. Zhuravleva speaks about the possible asocial orientation of empathy []. Empathy is indeed necessary for cooperative behavior, but it is not at all sufficient. If in animals emotion entails a behavioral reaction, then in humans there may be a detailed internal plan between these two components. As evidence of the “empathic” origin of altruism, the previously mentioned example of observation of infants carried out by Hoffman is usually cited. Newborns who are just one day old cry more if they hear other babies crying. In maternity hospitals, as soon as one person begins to cry, a whole chorus of crying voices immediately joins him ([] Hoffman, 1981). It is noteworthy that representatives of another psychological direction in the study of altruism - “egoistic” - even conceptualized empathy in terms of egocentrism. From their point of view, people help those in need not because they empathize with them, but because “they want to get rid of their own negative emotions and discomfort about this” (data from: [] Myers, 1998). Note that altruism based on empathy, a number of philosophers and scientists consider it to be “true” only with significant reservations. For example, V.S. Solovyov points out a number of possible aspects of immoral behavior motivated only by a feeling of compassion ([] 1996). A similar idea is expressed by G.M. Andreeva ([] 1980). Indeed, being motivated solely by empathy, one can, for example, feed and give money to a serial killer who has escaped from a colony. We will indeed act “out of compassion,” of course, altruistically, but foreseeing the possible consequences of any normal person will raise doubts about the correctness of such “altruism.” Supporters of the view of altruism through the prism of empathy associate this social skill with the psychological mechanism of identification. Empathy strengthens identification with the person in need, and we, in fact, no longer help him, but ourselves in someone else’s image ([] Schopenhauer, 1998). Indeed, an in-depth analysis of some altruistic actions allows us to regard them as an attempt to “buy back” one’s own well-being from fate, paying off the unfortunate in the current time. However, an altruistic act does not lose “to the extent of co-help” in any way. If a person sacrifices his life for the sake of "subsequent salvation in heaven", he does not become less of an altruist, but only one whorationalized his own behavior in a religious way. And if it is easier for individual altruists to “do good”, guided by the principle of justice, according to which they will be rewarded for this good later, then such an understanding of cause-and-effect relationships is nothing more than their way of conceptualizing and modeling the world. Their behavior will not be less altruistic. On the other hand, do altruists need to subjectify and explain the motives of their own behavior? To conclude our consideration of “psychological” concepts of altruism, let us recall an experiment with children conducted by scientists at the University of Leipzig. “In the experiment, F. Warneken and M. Tomasello behaved very carelessly. They hung laundry on a line, moved markers or paper balls, but everything fell out of their hands. Trying to pick up the fallen object, the scientists could not reach it (they pretended, of course). One-and-a-half-year-old babies readily crawled to the aid of strangers eight times out of ten, handing them a clothespin, paper ball, or marker from the floor. The children responded precisely to the helplessness of another person who tried, but could not get to the object. If he simply threw a clothespin on the floor, it was served only once out of twenty” ([]Popov, 2006c). From this small example it is clear that even in young children the desire to help arises in response to the helplessness of a partner in social interaction and is motivated by an empathetic response to the state of another. In other words, empathy is a significant motive for altruistic behavior, which, moreover, has a pronounced coercive character.II. Social theories of altruistic behavior This group of theories includes two approaches to altruism, which are united by the concept of social norm. The only difference between these approaches is that, within the first view, altruistic behavior is based on the norm of reciprocity, and within the second view, on the norm of social responsibility. The idea of ​​basing selfless helping behavior on the norm of reciprocity belongs to A. Gouldner ([] Gouldner, 1979 ). He argued that there is a universal code of honor, the basic tenet of which is this: to those who help us, we must provide reciprocal help, and not cause harm. Gouldner also identifies other basic social norms that are contained in the cultural code of any ethnic group: you need to help those who have already helped someone; you cannot harm those who provide help ([] Gouldner, 1979). Gouldner himself was a follower of the ideas reciprocal altruism of Trivers, and based his views on this concept. According to Gouldner, the norm of reciprocity “works” in any social system and in any relationship. In particular, he examines the family system and talks about the importance of equal mutual exchange even in marriage[6]. “Sometimes one spouse gives more than he receives, but after a long time he can hope that a certain balance will be established in the interaction. In all such relationships, receiving without giving anything in return means violating the norm of reciprocity. Reciprocity within social connections helps to accumulate “social capital” - trust, joint actions and connections that are a source of support - everything on which the health of society depends” ([] A. Gouldner; cited in: Myers, 1998). If a person does not have the opportunity to provide a reciprocal service of equal value, then he will be embarrassed to accept initial help, and he may be afraid or unwilling to do so. This is why proud people with a developed sense of self-esteem rarely ask for help. When a person is forced to accept a favor that he cannot adequately respond to, his self-esteem suffers ([] Gouldner). Of course, if our whole life were built on contacts with people who support all accepted social norms of communication, we would live in much more stable world. But, unfortunately, this is not the case. There are also those who easily violate any moral codes, includingnumber, and having a categorical imperative nature. For such people, the basic rule: “we must provide reciprocal help to those who help us, and not cause harm” is also not a law. There are a number of literary works based on the description of such life collisions (see, for example, []), and they only to a small extent reproduce the real state of affairs in the sphere of violation of the reciprocity of relationships. Another altruistic norm, which largely determines selfless help, is norm of social responsibility. It is this norm that underlies altruistic behavior towards socially immature or helpless people - children, the infirm, the disabled, the elderly and all those who are perceived by us as unable to participate in an equal exchange and unable to reciprocate our feelings. Thus, the norm of social responsibility forces us to take care of those who need it for as long as necessary, even when they are not able to thank us ([] Myers, 1998). Note that the norm of social responsibility has a pronounced instinctive nature and is present in many species of mammals leading a group lifestyle []. Let us also recall that a number of ethological scientists believe that the instinct of parental care and caring attitude towards the elderly formed the basis of almost all types of altruistic behavior []. The two listed theories of social norms are based on the fact that selfless provision of help is associated with the existence of certain rules in society . The question of how these rules are reproduced and retransmitted from generation to generation is answered by pedagogy and educational psychology. We will only point out that upbringing, the accumulation of one’s own life experience, training, social learning, identification, etc. create a whole system of mechanisms that ensure the process of socialization - the child’s entry into culture and his mastery of a certain system of norms and values ​​accepted in a given society ([] Bronfenbrenner, 1976).III. An approach to altruism within the framework of the theory of activity mediation. The domestic approach to altruism in all its completeness and diversity will be presented in a separate paragraph (paragraph 2.5 of this section), but here we will list only the main views regarding selfless helping interaction. In Ukrainian and Russian psychological science, the study of altruistic behavior was carried out primarily in line with the problems of cooperation and collectivism ([] Andreeva, 1980; Petrovsky, 1979), in the light of the orientation of the individual ([] Bozhovich, 2008; Platonov, 1975), from the point of view of the study of specific altruistic attitudes of the individual ([] Antilogova, 2004 ; Sarzhveladze, 1989) and from the position of the general emotional orientation of the personality ([] Dodonov, 1978). In addition, in Russian psychology altruistic emotions (L.P. Vygovskaya, T.P. Gavrilova, L.P. Zhuravleva), altruistic values ​​(Z.S. Karpenko, S.D. Maksimenko) and altruistic motives were explicated and described activities (V.E. Kim, E.E. Nasinovskaya). What all these approaches have in common is the consideration of altruism from the perspective of inclusion in joint activities and support of these activities. “Altruism refers to such an area of ​​manifestations of the human personality that acquire meaning only in a system of certain social activities. The question here rests on the content of moral categories, and it cannot be understood only from “nearby” manifestations of interaction... Whether this or that behavior is altruistic can be understood only by including it in a broad social context” ([] Andreeva, 1980). The second point characteristic of domestic psychologists is the consideration of altruism through a moral and moral prism. In a number of other aspects, the understanding of altruistic help among representatives of Ukrainian and Russian psychological science differs. For example, A.V. Petrovsky considered altruism from the point of view of collectivism - a group nome that regulates people’s behavior inteam and expressed in such components as a positive attitude towards the goals of the group, respect for the equal distribution of “goods” in it, greater openness in communication, willingness to put the group’s goals above one’s own, etc. []. Within another approach, altruism was associated with the social orientation of the individual ([] Bozhovich, 2008; Platonov, 1975). The level of this orientation, its “pro-social” character determines the moral degree of altruistic behavior. Another direction in the study of selfless help correlates it with the general emotional orientation of the individual ([] Dodonov, 1978). Within the framework of this approach, altruistic actions are considered as a way of obtaining specific altruistic emotions, which constitute a special type of emotional orientation. The following understanding of altruism links it with specific semantic altruistic attitudes, accompanied by altruistic experiences ([] Antilogova, 2004). A special approach to the study of altruistic motivation is the analysis of its components (V.E. Kim, E.E. Nasinovskaya). Within the framework of this approach, such meaning-forming motives of altruistic activity are identified as the actual altruistic motive and the motive of moral self-respect. Another look at the motivation of altruism is to consider it through the focus of empathy (L.P. Vygovskaya, T.P. Gavrilova, L.P. Zhuravleva) and from the position of special altruistic values ​​(Z.S. Karpenko, S.D. Maksimenko) . Selfless helping behavior, carried out in accordance with an altruistic motive, is one of the means of achieving moral self-respect, maintaining and enhancing self-esteem. At the same time, the person retains an egocentric orientation, receiving a kind of internal “moral reward” for his action ([] Antilogova, 2004).IV. The concept of altruism as a special personality trait or a systemic combination of these traits. For many years, psychologists have tried to find a personality trait that would be responsible for the tendency towards altruistic behavior and would make it possible to predict situations that contribute to the emergence of pro-altruistic feelings, for example, feelings of guilt or shame. As a result of this work, an almost complete absence of connection was discovered between the desire to provide help and a number of personal qualities []. Based on these data, social psychologists came to the conclusion that, in general, personality tests are not able to identify people inclined to provide help, and a strictly defined set of personality traits that are guaranteed to ensure an individual’s altruism simply does not exist (Darley, 1995; data from: [ ] Myers, 1998). However, it has been found, first, that individual differences in helping behavior exist and that these differences persist over time ([Hampson, 1984; Rushton et al., 1981). Second, information was collected on the characteristics of combinations of personality traits that make people predisposed to altruism. Extremely emotional, empathetic, and proactive people are more likely than others to care about others and provide help ([] Bierhoff et al., 1991; Romer et al., 1986; Wilson & Petruska, 1984). Third, certain personality traits influence how specific people respond to specific situations involving the need to provide selfless help (Dodonov, Antilogova, [] Carlo et al., 1991; Romer et al., 1986; Wilson & Petruska, 1984). Individuals with high levels of self-control, who are sensitive to the expectations of others, are especially likely to provide help if they believe that it will be socially rewarded ([] White & Gerstein, 1987). The opinions of others are much less interested in those who are self-oriented, that is, those who have an internal character ([] Myers, 1998). Thus, we examined four theories of the origin and maintenance of altruistic tendencies in society, and together with the one studied in the previous section of the evolutionary-ethological theory of them even becomesfive. Let us list them once again: − psychological concepts of altruism (the theory of mutual exchange; altruism as “disguised” egoism; altruistic behavior as a consequence of empathy); − social theories based on universal human norms of reciprocity and responsibility; − evolutionary theories, among which the central concepts are related, reciprocal, coalition and forced altruism; − an approach to altruism within the framework of the domestic theory of activity and communication, where altruism is understood in line with the problems of cooperation and collectivism, as well as in the light of the social orientation of the individual and its social attitudes; − the concept of altruism as an independent personal trait or their combination, which manifest themselves in a “selflessly helping” form of behavior. Each of the listed groups of theories has a number of factual foundations, has a varying depth of explanatory power, and to a greater or lesser extent covers various manifestations of altruistic behavior. At the same time, within the framework of social psychology, there are a number of other concepts with which altruism can be correlated. First of all, we mean conformism and in-group favoritism. The phenomenon of conformity lies in the area of ​​intragroup relationships, in-group favoritism belongs to the area of ​​intergroup interaction.A. Altruistic behavior and conformism. Most social psychologists associate the phenomenon of conformism with the degree of compliance and subordination of an individual to pressure from the group with which he is constantly or situationally associated. Here is what B.D. Parygin writes about conformism: “The mechanism of conformist behavior owes its existence to the effect of group pressure on the individual’s psyche, including through the sanctions of a negative emotional attitude” []. Andreeva suggests distinguishing between the concepts of conformism and conformity []. “The word “conformism” has a very specific content in ordinary language and means “adjustment.” At the same time, in order to get away from the negative connotations of this concept, in the scientific literature they talk about conformity or conformal behavior. By conformity they mean a purely psychological characteristic of an individual’s position relative to the group’s position, his acceptance or rejection of a certain standard, opinion characteristic of the group, the measure of the individual’s subordination to group pressure” ([Andreeva, 1980). The measure of conformity is the degree of subordination to the group in the case when the opposition of opinions is subjectively perceived by the individual as a conflict. In psychology, a distinction is made between external conformity, when the opinion of the group is accepted by the individual only externally, but in fact he continues to resist it, and internal (genuine conformism), when the individual actually introjects the opinion of the majority. “Internal conformity is the result of overcoming a conflict with a group in favor of the latter” ([] Andreeva, 1980). In contrast to conformity, the concept of “nonconformity” is used - when a person shows maximum independence from the group, demonstrates an independent position and is resistant to group pressure. Let’s now think about how conformity and altruism relate. In Section 1, we established the unity of altruistic and group-forming processes, within the framework of which it was revealed that the first processes act as a mechanism for the implementation of the second. As the main idea substantiating such a statement, we then cited the idea that, when joining a group, becoming its member, a person always reveals an altruistic position of varying degrees of expression in relation to the group. The group imposes on any of its members a number of social obligations, norms and rules, which very often run counter to internal needs, desires and drives and either suppress them completely or impose socially acceptable, often time-delayed forms for their implementation. Being in a group and accepting its rules is already a certain degree of altruism, but it is also conformingbehavior. Conformity, which by definition is characterized by a high degree of agreement with the group decision (whatever it may be), is, at the same time, altruistic behavior, since such a position of the individual is aimed at preserving and maximizing the integration of the group. At the same time, conformity, like altruism, are two elements of self-denial in favor of the social Other, that is, a conformist person “holds back and inhibits” his interests and needs, and begins to “implement” the interests of the group. Thus, we understand conformity as one of the types of altruistic behavior. Altruism is an evolutionary precursor to conformity; it manifests itself in situations of conflict between group and personal interests.B. Altruism and in-group favoritism. The concept of in-group favoritism was first introduced and studied by M. Sherif and A. Tajfel []. They understood this term as “a social mechanism consisting in a tendency to favor in behavior, perception and value judgments members of one’s own group as opposed to, and sometimes to the direct detriment of, members of some other group” ([data from: Andreeva, 1980; Ageev , 1990). In-group favoritism is based on the concept of social identity, which is formed in each member as a result of identifying himself with the group and its characteristics. Naturally, these characteristics are presented completely differently when the group looks at itself (self-stereotypes, which are often positive) and when this group is viewed from the outside (heterostereotypes, which can also be negative). All this has been well studied in works on social and ethnic psychology ([] Myers, 1998; Smith, 2004; Soldatova, 1998; Stonequist, 2006), and we will not dwell on this in detail. Let us only note that sometimes heterostereotypes of one of the social groups become dominant and determine the self-perception of representatives of other social formations. In the case when these heterostereotypes have a predominantly negative connotation, representatives of “suppressed” groups begin to have difficulties forming a social identity. No one wants to look at themselves through the “eyes” of negative social categories. Moreover, the idea that individuals strive to maintain or increase their self-esteem, that is, to have a positive image of themselves, was made by Sherif, Tajfel, and after them by J. Turner, one of the central tenets of the theory of social identity. That is why methods of group and individual coping with the “low status” of their own social group were especially interesting for them. Among such methods, Tajfel and Turner identified the mechanisms of social creativity, social competition and individual mobility [7] (data from: [] Ageev, 1990). At the same time, Tajfel and Turner, and after them V.S. Ageev discovered that when membership in a particular group is fixed and cannot be changed, when groups are compared with each other by an external expert commission, and when one of the groups constantly receives low marks, then such an outsider group literally “falls into a depressive state” []. This process was demonstrated especially clearly by the example of a number of social experiments by Ageev []. As part of his research, he studied the interaction of groups with a permanent composition (pioneer detachments of older teenagers). The groups performed tasks that were provided to them by the experimenter, and the results were assessed according to several implicit criteria that the groups themselves could not track. At the same time, the experimenter assessed some of the teams with exceptionally high ratings, other groups with average ratings, and the remaining part of the teams with extremely negative ratings. The most impressive results were obtained in the last group of teams. Members of these units exhibited: 1) increased aggressiveness within the group and self-aggression; 2) a low degree of cohesion against the background of significant interpersonal conflicts (the number of mutual negative choices significantly exceeded the number of mutualpositive); 3) loss of “motivation for victory” and any interest in continuing the competition; 4) depressed state of the participants and the entire group; 5) persistent desire “for other teams to win”, “getting pleasure from losing” ([] Ageev, 1990 ). If we summarize all the results obtained, we find that the “outsider” groups demonstrated social altruism in relation to more successful teams. This picture resembles the evolutionary scheme already familiar from Section 1, which at a higher structural level reflects the disposition of males based on the results of ranked fights. Thus, a male of any social species who loses in a ranking duel not only yields a female to the winner, but also falls into an apathetic state for some time, refuses most of the resources available to him, and shows signs of depression. A similar scheme works at the intergroup level. In the experiment, the units acted as group subjects of interaction (the concept of “group subject” can be found in []: Kalin, 1989; Keiselman, 2007; Lomov, 1984), and the “systematically losing” group subjects began to voluntarily give up victory and all the resources due to it more successful teams. Thus, thanks to the phenomenon of in-group favoritism and deviation from it among “outsider” groups, we can observe the existence of altruistic tendencies not only at the inter-individual level, but also at a higher level of trans-individual or inter-group interaction. Let us summarize. Analysis of theories of altruistic behavior as social phenomenon allowed us to establish the cultural essence of altruism, which is only based on the natural form of helping interaction, but cannot be reduced to it. Altruism, in the form of an inter- and trans-individual phenomenon, is acquired in the process of socialization and the individual’s entry into culture, and is always connected with this culture by the methods of its implementation, by the underlying conscious and preconscious motivation, as well as by the methods of semiotization of the altruistic act itself, etc. At the same time, a number of social and personal concepts of this phenomenon consider it as a representative adapted to the norms of society, representing a projection into the world of social relations of fairly simple behavioral patterns (such as genetic, reciprocal, coalition and other types of helping behavior). This group of concepts explores precisely the social manifestations of these schemes, their influence on the interaction of communicating individuals, as well as ways of semiotizing this interaction and its results. Another group of theories when analyzing altruism focuses on the normativity and social significance of altruistic behavior and addresses issues of its motivation. This block of concepts studies altruism from the point of view of the consequences of a particular act of selfless help. However, the latter approach is to some extent vulnerable to criticism, since it turns out that an altruistic orientation towards socially significant consequences cannot guarantee the absence of personal “egoistic” motivation. The latter aspects are insightfully explored in the depth psychological approach to human personality, the main representatives of which worked in line with psychoanalysis. What kind of unconscious motivation is this, what its nature is and how it affects interaction partners, we will consider in the next paragraph. 2.4. Neurotic aspects of the manifestation of altruismThe deep psychological understanding of altruism differs from others in two significant points. The first point is due to the fact that the psychoanalytic direction originated in the clinic, therefore, depth psychological research in most cases is associated with the study of extreme forms of certain phenomena, in particular those that entail the formation of neuroses and other psychopathologies. The second distinctive feature of psychoanalysis is the insight into behavior, its motivation, discourse and any other manifestations of the individual and collective psyche of some unconscious people.components that turn on by themselves, against the will, due to the own energy of the unconscious. Based on these two features, we will present all subsequent deep psychological views on altruism. Directly or indirectly, the phenomenon of altruistic behavior was addressed by A. Freud [] (“Ego and Defense Mechanisms,” 1999), Z. Freud [] (“Sadness and melancholy”, 1999; “On Narcissism” 1997), E. Fromm [] (“The Soul of Man”, 1992; “The Art of Loving: A Study of the Nature of Love”, 1990), K. Horney [] (“The Neurotic Personality of Our Time” , 2004) and others. The common thing that unites all of the listed authors in relation to altruism is the perception of a certain compensatory nature of this phenomenon, designed, according to leading psychoanalysts, to protect the weak ego of a neurotic personality. So, for example, S. Freud considers altruistic impulses as neurotic compensation for repressed impulses of the opposite, egoistic direction. His daughter A. Freud understands altruistic motivation as motivations censored and distorted by the action of a whole system of defense mechanisms. Moreover, as the initial motives of altruism, she identifies: a) the possibility of satisfying forbidden instinctual desires without the pressure of the Superego (namely, through the projection of these desires onto the social Other) and b) the possibility of defusing the aggressive impulses accompanying these drives. K. Horney and E. Fromm see the basis of altruism as a way for a person to cope with his neurotic anxiety, which arises as a result of the fundamental disunity and separation of people from each other. At the same time, altruism ensures receipt of public approval and is a socially safe way of behavior that, through empathy and identification, binds people together. Let us consider in more detail the various psychoanalytic approaches to altruism. Let us emphasize once again that within the framework of depth psychology, they study, first of all, neurotic manifestations of certain processes, therefore altruism is studied mainly from the position of its extreme, hypertrophied manifestations. Let's start with the views of A. Freud. According to the daughter of the founder of psychoanalysis, the formation of compensatory forms of altruistic behavior becomes possible due to the presence of a too rigid Superego. In extreme cases, it begins to dominate the Ego so much, it suppresses and frustrates it so much that the latter displaces all the basic instinctive drives coming from the Id. At the same time, naturally, the power of these drives tries to bring them back, encourages the Ego to satisfy them, but over and over again encounters the resistance of our consciousness. As a result of the action of two oppositely directed forces (the desire to satisfy desire and its total suppression), a resultant is formed, which, under the influence of the protective mechanism of projection, makes it possible to reduce the level of mental stress. The latter occurs due to the transfer of the desire itself to another person. At the same time, it is important that a special, empathically colored connection is formed with the person onto whom our own desires are projected, which allows us to live and experience satisfaction with that person of our own desires. We identify with him, empathize and sympathize with him and... indirectly, together with him and through him, we saturate our own drives. The systemic action of two defense mechanisms (projection and identification), leading to the described result, received a special name and is identified as a special mechanism of psychological defense - projective identification. The effect of this defense is to blur the boundaries between the Ego and the object (on which the projection is carried out) and preserve the empathic connection of the Ego with the projected content ([] Rozhdestvensky, 2001). In the context of the described mental process, due to projective identification, the Ego experiences much less anxiety and at the same time receives a certain release from mental tension. At a behavioral level, all this looks like altruism. We are experiencing somethingdesire, we project it onto the referent other, and then we help him satisfy this desire and actively create all the necessary conditions for this. Speaking metaphorically, we can say that participation in the preparation of a big holiday creates a special joyful atmosphere and a happy mood even among those who will not be at the holiday itself. Altruists also experience similar experiences, according to Freud. As an example, let us cite our own case of working with a young girl who built all her relationships with guys on the principle of total dissolution in their desires and interests. At the same time, her choice mainly fell on self-centered young people who occupy an extremely selfish position in life. Our client, suppressing her own egocentrism, at the same time experienced mixed feelings about the manifestation of extreme selfish freedom by her boyfriends. On the one hand, she was frustrated by their “narcissistic” behavior, but on the other, she experienced admiration and delight from contact with their “freedom from others” (including herself). The desire for independence, suppressed by the strict Superego, manifested itself in sympathy for the extreme selfishness of their partners. As a result, she suffered doubly - both from the ban on realizing her own desires and from the neglectful attitude of her suitors. Freud also cites a clinical case of working with a young girl who came to her for psychoanalysis being “unmarried and childless, devoid of all ambition and dressed in worn and discreet clothes"[]. As it turned out during the analysis, the patient practically did not take care of herself, did not strive to achieve her own goals, but spent all her energy on participating in the lives of other people. Not caring about her own appearance, she was keenly interested in fashion and watched the clothes of her friends. She was engaged in matchmaking of her friends, many of them trusted her with their love stories. And although she herself was childless, she developed devotion to other people’s children, about whom she cared in every possible way. At the same time, she sincerely worried about others, although she completely deprived herself of her own attention. Freud's many hours of work with this girl showed that as a result of her early rejection of instinctual drives, she had formed an extremely strict Superego, which made it impossible for her to satisfy her own desires. As a result, her libidinal drives and ambitious fantasies were placed in the outside world, in other people. “The girl had the most developed mechanism of projective identification. The patient identified with her substitutions. Her Superego, which condemned a particular instinctual impulse when it was associated with her own Ego, turned out to be unexpectedly tolerant of it in other people. She satisfied her instincts by participating in their satisfaction by others, using the mechanisms of projection and identification for this purpose. Thus, her renunciation of her own instinctive impulses in favor of other people has an egoistic meaning, but her behavior, striving to satisfy the impulses of others, cannot be called anything other than altruistic. Freud writes about the parallel existence in a number of people of egoistic motivation and altruistic behavior, which is prompted precisely by egocentric drives. That is, the external refusal of such subjects from their own instincts in favor of others actually has an egoistic meaning, and allows them to “work around” their delayed drives. Although, of course, it makes no sense to fully talk about the “satisfaction of instinctual desires” of Freud’s patient. In fact, the patient was “excessively modest, childless and unpretentiously dressed.” What kind of satisfaction are we talking about then? According to Freud, her client received pleasure from complicity in those areas that were desirable for her, but forbidden and to which she could not even approach without certain intermediaries. As Freud found out, in her own life the patient played minor roles, without even thinking about moving intocenter of action. Another case that Freud cites concerns a humble employee who does not allow his boss to ask for an increase in his salary, but actively fights for the rights of his colleague. The special zeal for pimping among “old maids” falls into this same category. There can be a great many examples. At the same time, what all these cases have in common is that they always mark the identification of the person himself with another (friend, sister, close acquaintance), and it persists until one’s own desire is indirectly satisfied through the referent other. According to Freud, projection, identification and projective identification can act as mechanisms that implement egoistic motivation in altruistic behavior. We consider it necessary to add many other psychological defense mechanisms to this list. Indeed, repression, reaction formation (reaction formation), introjection, regression, sexualization, rationalization, turning against oneself, omnipotent control and other mechanisms “can be seen” in the primary unconscious motivation of the altruistic act, or mask the coercive influence of altruistic motivation on behavior. Moreover, these mechanisms often operate in certain groups, that is, systematically. At the same time, they can either completely form an altruistic reaction, or maintain altruism at a constant level. Let us give examples of the relatively refined action of one or another psychological defense. Often, parents transfer the necessary resources (money, authority, power) to their grown child, even when these resources begin to harm him. For example, a young man spends money on alcohol, gambling, behaves antisocially, is attracted by law enforcement agencies, but his parents do not stop depriving him of a resource that is harmful to him. Moreover, they often deny themselves everything just to accumulate the required “material assistance.” They deny all objective facts, repress their emotions about incoming negative information and... continue to altruistically support their child at the same financial level. The mechanism of reactive education allows you to translate aggressive impulses into altruistic behavior. Remember the classic scenes in a large family, when one of its members, experiencing hidden or obvious resentment and experiencing hostility towards the rest, at the same time refuses his part of the money, gifts, his place on the trip, at the table, etc. On the one hand On the one hand, we see negative motivation, and on the other, an altruistic concession of a resource. There are also milder examples. At least such situations when, compensating for unconscious aggression towards her child, the mother showers him with gifts, feeds him, invests all her available resources in him, just to protect herself with a material shield from her own hostility towards her child. If we carefully consider introjection, how psychological defense mechanism, it becomes obvious that this is one of the most pronounced methods of altruistic behavior. Indeed, the very meaning of introjection is the uncritical assimilation of other people’s points of view, opinions, meanings, positions, without resisting them, without presenting one’s own views and values. Introjection adapts us to the existing reality; it suppresses conflict in us in relation to older people and dominant worldviews. We altruistically adapt to a given style and way of life, perceive it as a dogmatic norm, while suppressing that part of our personality that runs counter to the pro-social Ego. Regression gives us another way to protect ourselves from the world with the help of altruistic behavior. There are married couples in which, when dividing the budget, determining leisure time and plans for the future, one of the spouses, avoiding the complexities of our world and the responsibility associated with these complexities, regresses to the level of a small child. At this time the seconda spouse does not necessarily “involve parenting behavior.” He can remain at the level of an adult or parent and distribute everything in a way that will be beneficial to him. Thus, regression also allows for altruistic manifestations of personality, masking them even from the conscious control of the “altruist” himself. In fact, one of the spouses transfers all control over the resource to the other, and how he uses it depends on the goodwill of the latter. Sexualization of behavior occurs when a person is “spiritually empty,” when he cannot maintain a partnership, when it is difficult for him to meet the psychological level of his counterpart when he experiences a number of moral obligations to his partner or a feeling of guilt, but cannot resolve the situation in adequate ways, and when he escapes from this situation behind the screen of sex. Can sexualization of behavior be an altruistic act towards the Other? If we consider the human body as a resource, then the fact that a person provides his resource for any reason is, of course, an altruistic step. Another thing is that this defense can motivate altruistic behavior only when this behavior comes from a girl and not from a guy. In the latter case, sexual behavior begins to have the character of Don Juanism, is associated with personality inflation and has nothing to do with altruism. Rationalization deserves special attention. First, a person may rationalize his forced sacrifice as a pre-planned altruistic concession. Such cases occur, for example, when employees of an organization do not dare to apply for a higher vacancy; at the same time, they experience a strong desire for “growth” and a fear of publicity that restrains this desire. As a rule, all this lasts until a more persistent member of the team nominates himself, who is confirmed in this place. And after the approval of the new leader, individual employees begin to rationalize the act of their own altruistic indecision using the explanatory means available to them. Another manifestation of the rationalization of altruism is that the subject explains the natural gentleness of his character, when he sacrifices himself and helps everyone indiscriminately, by his conscious choice and by the fact that he will be rewarded for his services a little later (in the next life, after death, etc.) . This is also the concession of one’s own positions due to fear of conflict. The person again rationalizes his own behavior as sincerely altruistic. The third example of rationalization occurs in the case of forced altruism, which we talked about in paragraph 1.4 of Section 1. In this option, a person proactively manages to give away what would have been taken from him anyway, but at the same time explains to others and to himself that his behavior was dictated his own altruistic desire to share his resource. Freud also writes about the exploitation of the rationalization mechanism within the framework of altruistic behavior: “Rationalization is associated with the desire of the Superego to somehow control the current situation, giving it a respectable appearance. Therefore, a person, not realizing the real motives of his behavior, covers them up and explains them with fictitious, but morally acceptable motives. With projection, a person attributes to others the desires and feelings that he himself experiences. In the case when the subject to whom any feeling has been attributed confirms the projection made by his behavior, this protective mechanism (rationalization) operates quite successfully, since a person can recognize these feelings as real, valid, but external in relation to him and don't be scared of them. This protective mechanism allows a person, firstly, to show a friendly interest in others satisfying his instincts and, thus, satisfying his own, and secondly, to release inhibited activity, energy intended to satisfy repressed desires in the direction of “help” or “ participation" in the problem of anotherperson" []. A turn against oneself occurs when a person splits his own personality into two and begins to treat himself as an outsider. For example, he can redirect aggression from external objects to himself, blame and torment himself. It looks as if in a street fight one of the opponents suddenly began to beat himself up, causing maximum damage to himself and causing significant pain. Losing without a fight and going into depression are the consequences of this psychological defense mechanism. What, then, is the protective nature of turning against oneself, you ask? And the fact is that a person comes out of a fight with himself with fewer losses than from a real fight. Although there are also “heroes” who, in a fit of self-flagellation and self-criticism, really “do not spare their belly.” Finally, another defense, which is at the same time a conductor of altruism, is omnipotent control. This kind of mechanism occurs when there is complete denial of the negative nature of the current situation. A person in a fit of “omnipotent control,” despite “severe impoverishment and loss of resources,” for example, can “throw feasts” with his last money. At the same time, he sincerely believes that he has the situation under control, that he can easily correct it, and as proof to himself, he arranges a festive bluff with the remaining funds. It is interesting that the functions of defense mechanisms can also be performed by stereotypical roles, scripted patterns of interaction with the world and etc.: “...roles can act as protective mechanisms: a person “puts on a mask” in order to hide his real face behind it, trying to protect some painful aspects of his “I” ([] Ermine). In addition to the connection of altruism with the mechanisms of psychological protection, we note two more important points. The first of them is that in the indirect satisfaction of desire through projective identification, there is always a discharge of aggressive impulses accompanying this desire. The following picture emerges. When we experience an unsatisfied need, we also feel the tension associated with it. This tension gives rise to a certain aggressiveness that arises due to a delay in satisfying the desire itself. So, in the case when we do not allow ourselves to be in the position of a person satisfying a given need, and, moreover, we repress the very thought of having such desires, only two sensations remain in our consciousness - dissatisfaction and the irritability associated with it . When we begin to help the referent Other realize our desires, we not only experience satisfaction, but also easily react with aggression to any obstacle that arises on the path to the realization of projected drives. In this context, Freud gives the following example. Her patient, while at the funeral, renounced her share of the inheritance in favor of her cousin. Having done this, she felt the full power of the desire and was able to aggressively insist on its implementation, which she would never have done if it was about herself. Thanks to the second point, we can understand the connection between altruistic behavior and the death drive. In his reasoning, Freud dwells on two points. The first of these is that the subject, disillusioned with himself, shifts his desires to objects that he feels are better suited to satisfy them. And in the second it states that a person considers his own life worthy of preservation only if there is an opportunity to satisfy his own desires and instincts. By combining these two theses, it is easy to complete the whole picture of what is happening. If a person does not realize his own desires, then he stops caring about his life, since it becomes of little value to him. However, through projective identification, the altruist’s drive still receives release, albeit not direct, but indirect. It turns out that altruistic behavior is the only opportunity to co-constitute in the role of a subject satisfying one’s needs. In the light of what has been said, the super value of objects for whichdesires are displaced. Moreover, Freud even concludes about the “narcissistic humiliation” in which a person lives, compensating for the impossibility of direct discharge of desire through altruistic help to the Other. “Neurosis of altruism” reduces a person to a means of satisfying needs, destroying him as a Subject of desire. Compensatory altruism repeated over and over again greatly increases the gap between the Ego and the instinctive essence of a person, which leads to the formation of a depressive state, an imbalance between the drives towards eros and thanatos and increases the desire for death. Let us summarize Freud’s views on altruism. She understands altruistic behavior as the result of turning around initial egoistic aspirations. Such a wrapping occurs under the pressure of the hard SuperEgo on the Ego of the subject. Egocentric motivation is always masked by one or another defense mechanism, which makes it difficult to recognize. The very movement of a person within the vicious circle of “neurosis of altruism” leads him to depression and to direct or symbolic death. Another psychoanalyst, K. Horney, sees in the basis of altruism a way for a person to cope with his neurotic anxiety []. Such coping, according to the author, is achieved in several ways. Firstly, increased altruism can arouse in other people a feeling of guilt and unpaid debt, which secondarily justifies any demands, demands and expectations of the “altruist”. Secondly, compulsive altruistic behavior is a “neurotic dominance strategy” []. As Horney writes, in the desire to give advice, in the tendency to listen endlessly, in the obsessive attempts to be in the know and altruistically participate in all areas of life, there may be a compensatory need for dominance and control. In this case, the desire for power and hostility will be disguised in an altruistic act. People, as a rule, are very sensitive to such insincere altruism, react to it with protest and refuse to accept help. At the same time, the neurotic himself is very rarely aware of the hostility with which he accompanies his care, and considers himself to be quite “righteous” and “sincerely benevolent.” Thirdly, altruistic behavior is a special form of protection from any kind of disapproval by forming the image of oneself as a victim. The protective function of altruism serves the same purpose as self-blame, which eliminates the danger of being blamed by others through exaggerated assumption of blame, demonstrative repentance and self-flagellation. For the same reasons, preventive altruistic behavior is safer, since its pro-social orientation allows you to always be right, exemplary and impeccable, which leaves no chances or vulnerabilities for outside criticism. “The final and very important form of defense against disapproval of any kind is to think of yourself as a victim. Feeling insulted, the neurotic rejects any reproaches for his own tendencies to take advantage of other people. With the help of the feeling that he is being neglected, he is freed from reproaches for his possessive tendencies. With his confidence that others are not useful, he prevents them from understanding that he is trying to get the better of them. This strategy of “feeling like a victim” is so often used and so ingrained precisely because it is actually the most effective method of protection. It allows the neurotic not only to deflect blame from himself, but also to blame others at the same time.” [].In the last version of the “neurosis of altruism,” its aggressive and hostile nature is clearly visible. The “altruist” seeks to control the other participants by imposing on them a sense of guilt or duty. “For example, a woman with obsessive and hysterical symptoms insists on helping her sisters with housework, but after a few days she begins to resent their acceptance of her help. She gets sick andin the end, not only does it not become easier for the sisters, but rather it becomes more difficult, since they are forced to care for the patient” []. This is a clear example of how, using the technique of “altruism,” a neurotic achieves his more or less unconscious goals. Horney also notes another unconscious aspect inherent in altruistic behavior. Sometimes a neurotic, with the help of preventive altruism, conveys to others the attitude in behavior that he would like to receive himself. This protection is literally imbued with the ethical standard: “Treat others as you would have them treat you.” The only difference is that in the case of “compensatory altruism” we are talking about an unconscious motive. According to Horney, altruism for a neurotic personality is something like a compromising style of behavior. Analyzing the mental world of a person suffering from neurosis, she comes to the conclusion that there are two multidirectional aspirations at work in him, which are fundamentally incompatible: on the one hand, he is driven by an aggressive desire for dominance of the “nobody but me” type, and on the other, he experiences an exorbitant desire to be loved by everyone. The situation when a person is caught between ambition and a neurotic desire for love is one of the central conflicts in neuroses. “The main reason why the neurotic becomes afraid of his ambitious desires and claims, why he does not want to acknowledge them and why he restrains them or even feels disgust towards them, is his fear of losing love. In other words, the reason why the neurotic restrains his competitiveness is not because the demands of his superego are particularly cruel and interfere too much with his aggressiveness, but because he finds himself caught between two equally pressing needs. : ambition and the need for love" []. A behavioral solution that simultaneously combines both of these aspirations is provided by an altruistic pattern of relationships. It, as we had the opportunity to verify earlier (in paragraph 1.4 of Section 1) and have repeatedly encountered at this point, can contain an aggressive and friendly component in very different proportions. Additional confirmation of the hostility of neurotic altruism is provided by the fact that many of them have fear of success. “For many neurotics, the anxiety about the hostility of other people is so great that they experience a fear of success, even if they are convinced of its achievability ... This fear of success stems from the fear of arousing the envy of others and thus losing their favor” []. Such “fear of other people’s envy” is caused by nothing more than the projection of one’s own aggressiveness, which is processed, split into components, and then one component is projected onto other people, and the other, with the help of reactive formation, is transformed into altruistic behavior. Horney pays special attention in his work to the feeling inferiority of a person with “neurosis of altruism”. In her opinion, the meaning of this feeling is that by lowering oneself in one’s own mind and, as a result, placing oneself lower than other people, a person restrains his ambition, thereby weakening the anxiety associated with competition. True, leaving and avoiding competition does not solve all the problems of a person with “altruistic neurosis.” He experiences a whole dynamic of psycho-emotional states, which, according to Horney, is cyclical. “Leaving aside all the details, the main links of the “vicious circle” that arises from the neurotic desire for power, prestige and possession can be described approximately as follows: anxiety, hostility, decreased self-esteem; desire for power; increased hostility and anxiety; aversion to competition (with its accompanying tendencies to belittle oneself); failures and discrepancies between potential and achievement; increasing feelings of superiority (with malicious envy); gainideas about one’s own greatness (with fear of envy); increased sensitivity (and renewed tendency to avoid competition); the growth of hostility and anxiety, which again starts this cycle” []. But still, altruism allows us to utilize the cycle described by Horney. The fact is that people with increased altruistic motivation begin to compete in the degree of their altruism, and whoever is able to demonstrate more sacrificial behavior “wins.” Isn't it true that the situation is very reminiscent of the one described in the potlatch rituals, with the only difference that they were talking about leaders and prominent people of the tribe, and here we mean subjects with a neurotic character? Horney sees another reason excessive altruism of some neurotics. This is the fear of social disapproval and the desire to protect ourselves from this fear. Altruism in extreme forms, which entails complete maladaptation and helplessness of the neurotic, becomes for him a powerful means of receiving love and affection, but at the same time gives him the opportunity to avoid the demands placed on him by other people. Such altruism is akin to masochism. A neurotic strives to make himself weaker, not stronger, unhappy, not happier, and, ultimately, he strives for a masochistic renunciation of his “I” []. Here is how S. Freud writes about masochism: “If love to an object that cannot be abandoned, while the object itself is abandoned, has found its way out in narcissistic identification, then hatred is manifested towards this object, which serves as a substitute, as a result of which this new object is insulted, humiliated and suffering is caused to it, and thanks to this suffering, hatred receives sadistic satisfaction... Only this sadism solves the riddle of the suicidal tendency, which makes melancholy so interesting and so dangerous. Now the analysis of melancholia shows us that the "I" can kill itself only if, by turning affection from the object to itself, it treats itself as an object, if it can direct against itself the hostility related to the object and replacing the original reaction " “I” to objects of the external world” []. Within the framework of a masochistic attitude towards himself, a person transforms intersubjective interaction into intrasubjective interaction and makes some part of himself the object of his own hatred. The behavior of an altruist, on the contrary, becomes a consequence of the unfolding of intrapsychic processes in the external plane. At the same time, the neurotic structure of these processes is preserved: a person transfers the resource to himself, but in another person - an object onto which his forbidden desires are projected. Altruism was also studied within the framework of a depth psychological approach by E. Fromm ([] 1990; 1992). The author most thoroughly addresses the issue of altruistic behavior in the context of studying the nature of love. According to Fromm, altruism in love and love in altruism are ways of overcoming the fundamental disunity and separation of people from each other. Among other methods, he identifies: orgiastic trance, exaltation, alcoholism and drug addiction, fusion (symbiotic union), suppression and submission (sadism-masochism). Fromm believes that the fundamental alienation of people causes them powerful anxiety, which they somehow try to cope with. Basically, methods of overcoming disunity are aimed at dissolving and diffusion of the Ego. The same thing, only on a larger scale, is happening now. The scientist believes that the modern idea of ​​total equality, which is the central political thought of Western countries, neutralizes both individuality and gender in principle. According to Fromm, this idea is aimed more at identity rather than unity. “This is the identity of people who work in the same enterprises, have the same entertainment, read the same newspapers, have identical feelings, ideas, etc. In this sense, one has to evaluate with skepticismsome “achievements” of our progress, for example women's emancipation. ... I stand for equality, but against so-called equality, when a woman is no longer different from a man. The Enlightenment philosophy that the soul has no gender became common practice. The polar opposite of the sexes disappears, and with it erotic love based on this polarity. Man and woman became similar, equal, but not equal as opposite poles. Modern society preaches the ideal of non-individualized love because it needs human details of social life that are similar to each other, functioning properly, without friction; so that everyone obeys the same orders, and at the same time everyone is convinced that he is following his own desires." More fruitful and constructive behavior, from Fromm’s point of view, is love, which combines care, responsibility, respect, interest in others, understanding and freedom. Such love can only be built on self-love. According to the scientist, love for others and love for oneself have never constituted and do not constitute alternatives. These are two sides of the same feeling, which is impossible without each of these components. In the context of this understanding of love, Fromm analyzes extreme forms of the phenomena of egoism and altruism. He comes to the conclusion that both of these phenomena in their marginal, neurotic manifestations indicate a lack of self-love and are filled with aggression, self-alienation and auto-aggression. A similar idea, only considered from the opposite end, from the side of aggressiveness, is expressed by Yatsenko: “... aggression can take the form of overcompensation in excessive care, guardianship, goodwill, which can develop into self-accusation, self-punishment and self-destruction” []. Fromm himself speaks about the extreme degrees of altruism-egoism as follows: “A selfish person loves himself not too much, but too little, moreover, in fact, he hates himself. Due to the lack of creativity, which leaves him empty and frustrated, he is inevitably unhappy and therefore frantically tries to snatch pleasures from life, the receipt of which he himself prevents. It seems that he is too fussy about himself, but in reality these are only unsuccessful attempts to hide and compensate for his failure in caring for his “I”. Z. Freud was of the opinion that a selfish person is in love with himself, he is a narcissist, since he denied others his love and directed it towards himself. Of course, selfish people are not capable of loving others, but in the same way they are not capable of loving themselves.”[]. Just like A. Freud and K. Horney, Fromm emphasizes the hostile nature of extreme forms of altruistic behavior. Studying it on the example of a number of patients, he discovers in such behavior a desire for power and dominance over others. According to Fromm, it forms especially severe forms of dependence and impedes the growth and separation of the individual. “Analysis shows that the complete absence of egoism is one of its signs, and often the most important one. A person's ability to love or enjoy something is paralyzed, he is imbued with hostility towards life; behind the façade of unselfishness is hidden a subtle, but no less powerful egocentrism. Such a person can be cured only if his unselfishness is recognized as a painful symptom and its cause, the lack of creativity, is eliminated... The nature of unselfishness becomes especially obvious in its effect on others, and in our society most often in the effect of an “unselfish” mother on her child. She is convinced that thanks to this property of hers, the child will learn what it means to be loved and see what it means to love. The result of her unselfishness, however, is not at all what she expected. The child does not discover the happiness of a person who is convinced that he is loved,on the contrary, he is anxious, tense, afraid of parental disapproval and fears that he will not be able to live up to his mother’s expectations. He is usually under the influence of the mother's latent hostility to life, which he feels rather than is clearly aware of, and in the end he himself becomes infected with this hostility. On the whole, the effect of an unselfish mother is not very different from that of a selfish mother; but in fact, it is often even worse, because maternal unselfishness keeps children from being critical of their mother. They have a responsibility not to deceive her hopes; under the guise of virtue they are taught dislike for life. If one were to study the effect of a mother who truly loves herself, he would be able to see that there is nothing more conducive to instilling in a child the experience of love, joy and happiness than the love of a mother who loves herself. other, “non-egoistic” types of altruistic behavior? Fromm answers this question in the affirmative and argues his own point of view by analyzing the process of “giving.” He says that the modern understanding of the act of “giving”, as deprivation of something or sacrifice, is set by the current paradigm of pragmatism and consumption. If in response to our giving we do not receive anything in return, then we begin to perceive ourselves as deceived and deprived. “That is why donations and patronage of the arts by individuals have been elevated to the rank of virtue, since, in our understanding, the very act of selfless giving is associated with only losses.” []. Another paradigm of “giving” is based, according to Fromm, on the highest manifestations of vitality. “Giving is more natural and joyful than taking” []. In the act of giving there is no deprivation of something; on the contrary, there is an acquisition of strength and spiritual wealth through the creation of a more powerful circulation of processes within the “give-take” system. Isn't it true that Fromm's above ideas are very reminiscent of the conceptual meaning for traditional cultures of the potlatch (section 2.1 of Section 2)? After all, the potlatch, as a ritual of exchange, was necessary, first of all, to demonstrate one’s own strength, well-being, the ability not to become attached to things, etc. It was the potlatch that differentiated people according to the degree of spiritual and material development, helped to determine the balance of power and enter into alliances of equals with equal. Likewise, true altruism contributes to the development of a person, makes him spiritually richer and stronger. To paraphrase Fromm, we can say that true altruism, like true love, must be learned. You need to develop your ability to give, and they are associated not only with cognitive, conscious choice, but also with a strong-willed attitude. Genuine altruism needs to be cultivated in oneself. Finally, in the psychoanalytic direction there is another group of depth-oriented psychologists who, like Fromm, see in altruistic motivation, along with the neurotic component, another healthy form of altruism. To some extent, this group includes D.V. Winnicott ([] “Little Children and Their Mothers”, 1998) and K.G. Jung ([] “Answer to Job”, 1995), and its main representative is M. Klein ([] “Envy and Gratitude”, 1997). In the works of C. G. Jung, the ideas of “real” altruism received a rather specific development. On the one hand, he defends the priority of individual motives and motivations of a person, calling mana-personality a frequently encountered phenomenon of personal growth that occurs through the use of resources of the social environment. On the other hand, Jung emphasizes that the highest levels of spiritual and mental organization are meaningless only within the framework of meaningful relationships with society ([] Jung, 1995). According to Jung, altruism as a preference to give rather than take is associated with the Self, more precisely, with a system of psychological mechanisms that regulate the Self-Ego relationship. Drawing psychic energy from the collective unconscious, the Self cathects it to the Ego - including in the form of the ability to give and return. This is precisely the task of the transcendental function - complex mental formation,carrying out total mediation of all aspects of personality and psyche. A well-integrated Self with a developed transcendental function is generous and stable, while a non-individuated Self can easily collapse in a situation where one’s own interests should or must be preferred to someone else’s ([] Jung, 1995). Quite differently, not like in the classical psychoanalytic tradition , the phenomenon of altruism is considered within the framework of the theory of object relations. The views of M. Klein ([] 1997), W.R. Bion ([] 2009) and others interpret the psyche as consisting of elements borrowed from external, primary aspects of the functioning of other people. The main role in individual mental development is played by the process of internalization, leading to the formation of a system of relations between external and internal objects, and the personality itself turns out to be composed of such objects and associated with them. In this sense, altruistic relationships between the environment that is significant for the subject are also internalized, creating an immanent scheme of altruistic interaction, a special disposition between the Ego and internal representatives of external objects. The problem of altruism, which has not been studied in the object approach as a separate special subject, is nevertheless one of it from the central ones. The main considerations on this matter are set out in Klein’s work “Envy and Gratitude” [], where the mental life of an individual and her relationships with people are considered in the context of the situation of breastfeeding, which is fundamental for the development of the psyche. The rudiments of an altruistic position in an infant are formed in connection with the mother’s ability to contain (that is, neutralize and explain) his destructive impulses and fantasies. Subsequently, altruistic motivation develops within the framework of the depressive stage, at which the child solves the problem of his own stability in the situation of losing a love object []. Developing Klein’s theory, we can assume that “meaningful” altruistic behavior of a person is possible only if he has a stable good internal object, formed from the internalized “good breast”. The latter, as an “eternal source of milk and love,” ensures the functioning of the entire spectrum of prosocial mental activity. An alternative to friendship, altruism and affection is envy - a primitive destructive reaction to non-internalized (belonging to another) goods and objects. According to Klein, destructive experiences associated with envy and anger block the possibility of internal representation of good objects and thereby deprive the subject of opportunities for social adaptation and constructive relationships with others. Altruism is the natural position of a normally developing individual who has successfully resolved the problems of successive stages of his development. Having formed effective strategies for coping with anger, envy, jealousy, fear and anxiety, the subject can freely express healthy altruism, which is not fundamentally compensatory and not neurotic ([] Klein, 1997). The formation of a stable good internal object occurs due to the presence of a good enough mother ( the concept was introduced by D.W. Winnicott [] (1998)), the figure of which is understood as an Object capable of giving and taking, loving and being loved, caring and rejoicing without obsessively neurotic reciprocal (“you to me - I to you”) framework. It is this figure that is extremely important for understanding the deep unconscious basis of healthy altruism. In contrast to the “good enough mother,” A. Green describes the phenomenon of a “dead mother,” who is capable of psychologically deadening her own child: “A mother, incapable of expressing emotions, is internally dead, so the child is in search of a compensatory object. The mother “absorbs” the child, blocks his emotions, which causes psychological death and causes the appearance in the child’s psyche of a “black hole,” “emotional emptiness” ([Gri]). Klein’s ideas, as well as Fromm’s reasoning cited just above, allow us to assert ,that in addition to the obligatory, hard-earned, forced form of altruism necessary for survival, there is also its natural variety, conditioned by good holding (supportive caring parent-child relationships) and based on the continuous positive experience of a positive internal object. In conclusion of this paragraph, let us summarize the depth psychological views on altruism and its motivation. Firstly, the overwhelming majority of psychoanalysts share the dominant point of view in psychoanalysis on altruism as one of the options for psychological defense against suppressed egoistic or aggressive motivation. Moreover, altruistic motivation can not only have a protective nature, but can often itself be masked by a whole system of defense mechanisms. Since altruism is one of the basic behavioral programs that, like all other instinctive behavior patterns, requires release and satisfaction, then in a number of cultures or family systems with a “competitive and aggressive” ideology, it itself can be suppressed and neurotically disguised with the help of more “ pro-social" motivations. In connection with both aspects of the above, we consider it appropriate to introduce the term “neurosis of altruism” or “neurotic altruism” and use it always when talking about the unconscious psychopathologizing influence of natural or personal altruism on the human psyche. Secondly, in psychoanalysis, as well as in the case of ethnographic and social research, a connection was found between extreme forms of neurotic altruism and aggressive motivation and the desire for dominance. Indeed, as has been shown in examples, often excessive altruism, which disrupts the “give-take” balance, suppresses one of the parties and at the same time leads the other to dominance within the existing system. Thirdly, within the framework of depth psychology, its individual representatives ( Klein, Fromm, Jung) also suggest the existence of “genuine altruism.” Such altruism is possible if the following conditions are met: 1) the presence of a particularly favorable system of parent-child relationships, which will allow the formation of a “stable good internal object” that contributes to the predominance of giving processes in the field of social connections of a particular person; 2) the integration of a “good internal object” into the structure Superego, which ensures the caring/protective nature of the latter; 3) the presence of good contact between the Ego and the Id, the Ego and the SuperEgo, which fills the “I” instance with energy and love; 4) the development in the Ego of a special attitude, consisting of the desire for balance and equilibrium, leading it to a balanced exchange of internal energies and to the redirection of excess mental resources to internal representatives of external objects; 5) a change in the cultural paradigm of thinking or an individual reassessment of one’s own worldview (including through the processes of individuation). The fulfillment of the listed conditions leads to the formation of genuine altruism of the subject, development of prerequisites for transfinite altruism. At the same time, altruism itself begins to represent an immanent scheme of altruistic relationships, a special disposition between the mature Ego and internal representatives of external objects, in which excess love for oneself is redirected to love for others. Both of these conditions are tied to a certain system of educational and developmental measures for the human psyche. We will return to what these measures should be and what personal qualities can ensure the ability for genuine altruism in the next paragraph. 2.5. Personal and transfinite altruism As we wrote above, domestic psychological science has not left the phenomenon of altruism without its theoretical and methodological attention. Moreover, both direct and indirect attempts have been made to study this phenomenon. Domestic scientists considered altruistic behavior from the standpoint of cooperation and collectivism (Andreeva, [] 1980; Bobneva, 1976; Leontyev, 1975; Petrovsky, 1979; Lomov, 1984), withfrom the point of view of group norms of behavior (Bobneva, 1976; Obozov, 1990), through the prism of personality orientation (Bozhovich, 2008; Maksimenko, 2007, 2006; Platonov, 1975), in the light of the study of specific altruistic attitudes (Antilogova, 2004; Sarzhveladze, 1989) , in the context of the axiological approach to personality (Karpenko, 2009; Maksimenko, 2007), as well as from the position of the general emotional orientation of the personality (Dodonov, 1978). Also in Russian psychology, altruistic emotions were explicated and described (B.I. Dodonov, L.P. Vygovskaya, T.P. Gavrilova, L.P. Zhuravleva), altruistic motives of activity (V.E. Kim, E.E. Nasinovskaya) and those moral aspects of personality that underlie altruistic behavior (I.D. Bekh, M.I. Borishevsky, S.D. Maksimenko, S.L. Rubinshtein, M.V. Savchin, V.A. Tatenko , T.M. Titarenko). A distinctive feature that unites all of these approaches is the consideration of altruistic behavior as a phenomenon that accompanies joint activities and communication, and receives its development in them. The second essential point for Russian psychology is the understanding of altruism from a moral and ethical position. At the same time, it is always emphasized that assessing the “degree of altruism” of an action is possible only when “including it in a broad social context” ([] Andreeva, 1980). An emphasis on the morality of altruism and its highly moral motivation is characteristic of all domestic psychologists without exception. “A moral attitude towards a person is a loving attitude towards him” ([] S.L. Rubinstein). The general trend in Russian and Ukrainian psychology reduces altruism to pro-social behavior, which is oriented, first of all, to the primacy of the needs of society, then the group, and only then a specific individual. “Spirituality is expressed in the ability to put the Other (even the world) in one’s place - not because he will ever repay the debt or repay the debt, but because the life of the Other is respected and is a value in itself. The ability to show selfless care and kindness is one of the options for freedom from the instinct of natural goodness, life pragmatism” ([] Savchin). Thus, Ukrainian and Russian scientists in their studies of altruism dissociate themselves from understanding it only as a natural, inherited form of behavior, and consider its personal and social components. The latter often oppose simple but imperative schemes of natural altruism, are an indirect consequence of its cultural and moral processing, and are associated with mature subjectivity and internal freedom of choice. “The path to mature subjectivity has a single direction in a single and universal dimension. This path consists of consistent liberation from purely external, random determinants of development for the individual, from inhibitory or coercive influences, in achieving true autonomy and freedom ([] Titarenko, p. 153). Let's move on to a more detailed discussion of the views of individual representatives of Russian science. First in the above list, the approach links altruism with cooperative and collectivistic behavior. This approach is based on the theory of the cultural and historical origin of higher mental functions, developed by L.S. Vygotsky ([] 1984), as well as the theory of activity developed in the works of A.N. Leontiev ([] 1975) and S.L. Rubinstein ([] 2002). Back in the first half of the twentieth century, Vygotsky formulated the main provisions of his theory, which consisted in the fact that the development of all internal mental processes is culturally determined, the psyche itself has a social nature, and mastery of specific forms of human activity forms higher mental functions, including further development of those that are based on archaic behavioral programs. From these provisions it follows that altruism, which is a social phenomenon and develops in the process of interpersonal communication and joint activities, itself changes in the process of life and significantlydiffers from the instinctive program that we inherited from animals. That is, altruism, as the highest mental phenomenon, is only based on the “altruistic instinct,” but to a large extent it is mediated by the “active nature” of the formation of the psyche. In other words, altruism of a person is always personal, and the ability for it already indicates the subject’s inclusion in the field of responsible social interaction: “... I become a person when I turn from a person in myself into a person for myself: through what I am for others, I find yourself as a person for others” ([] Vygotsk). L.S. Vygotsky’s approach allows us to understand the highest forms of altruistic behavior from the point of view of their cultural pre-set. By the way, this is why in Russian psychology it is customary to consider altruism as a social form of behavior that has a pro-social orientation. One of the main types of activity in the process of which the human psyche is formed is joint activity. A.N. Leontiev considers cooperation processes to be an important, even necessary element of this activity []. During joint activities, it is extremely important for participants not only to exchange information, but also to organize a cooperative “exchange of actions” and plan common activities. With this planning, it is possible to regulate the actions of one individual “by plans matured in the head of another” ([] Lomov, 1975), which makes the activity truly joint, when its bearer will no longer be an individual, but a group, a group subject. With this group nature of activity, cooperation processes play a central role. Moreover, it is important to emphasize here that participants in joint activities are required to coordinate plans and efforts, coordinate actions, “feel” for the position of interaction partners, and mutually help each other - that is, joint activity requires various manifestations of altruistic behavior. Cooperation, consent, adaptation and any other altruistic interaction ultimately contribute to the organization of joint activities. “Cooperation, or cooperative interaction, means the coordination of individual forces of participants (ordering, combining, summing up these forces). Cooperation is a necessary element of joint activity, generated by its special nature” ([] Andreeva, 1980). In contrast to the listed processes are the phenomena of competition, conflict, opposition and selfish behavior - “negative” interactions, one way or another weakening joint activity, representing a certain kind of obstacle to it. Thus, altruistic processes look from the perspective of joint activity as cooperative behavior; they, among others, provide its integral fabric. Another manifestation of altruism from the position of group interaction is collectivism. A significant number of domestic psychologists point out the connection between altruistic motivation and collectivism. Thus, M.I. Bobneva ([] 1976), speaking about the process of formation of the moral qualities of an individual and his social motives, among the latter names the motives of collectivism and altruism, that is, he considers them side by side. L.N. Antilogova ([] 2004) notes that “the connection between the concepts of “altruism” and “collectivism” made by domestic psychologists has quite good grounds.” A.V. Petrovsky ([] 1979) goes even further and reveals the concept of altruism from the point of view of collectivism, as a group nome that regulates the behavior of people in a group. According to Petrovsky, collectivism is expressed in such components as a positive attitude towards the goals of the group, respect for the equal distribution of “goods” in it, greater openness in communication, willingness to put the group’s goals above one’s own, etc. In addition, if we take the very definition of collectivism, as “relative uniformity of behavior as a result of the individual’s conscious solidarity with assessments and taskscollective" ([] Petrovsky, 1979), we will see that it directly refers us to one of the characteristics of altruism discussed earlier, which is the primacy of the needs of the group over the needs of the individual. Moreover, from the point of view of manifested behavior, it practically does not matter whether the individual agrees with this state of affairs or conformally submits to the situation, while experiencing internal discomfort and coercion. Petrovsky also uses altruistic processes in defining some phenomena of group psychology, in particular, the phenomenon of the formation of interpersonal connections. As a concept for this phenomenon, the scientist proposes the term “effective group emotional identification” (EGI). By DGEI, Petrovsky understands behavior in which “the subject... effectively treats others as himself, and himself as all others in his collective” ([] Psychological Theory of the Collective, 1979). This definition also has a connection with altruistic behavior and actually describes one of its sides in relation to the sphere of joint interaction. A more general case than the approach just given, in which altruism is understood through collectivism, is the view of altruistic behavior as the result of the subject’s internal acceptance of social moral norms. Moral standards mean certain rules that have been developed in society, accepted by it, and to which the behavior of members of this society must obey in order for their coexistence and joint interaction to be possible. Norms perform a regulatory function and are always associated with the values ​​and social attitudes accepted in society ([] Obozov, 1990). In the process of socialization and education, social norms are internalized, become internal, personal norms of behavior, pass into the attitudes of the individual and begin to determine his readiness for certain, socially significant behavior. This understanding of altruism refers us to the theory of social norms already given in paragraph 2.3 of Section 2, with the only difference that in this case the emphasis is on the mandatory acceptance and processing of social rules by the subject, since otherwise they may simply not be embodied in real behavior, but they will simply be presented in consciousness in the form of “known” motives. The study of altruism within the framework of personal axiogenesis deserves special attention ([] Karpenko, 2009; [] Maksimenko, 2007, 2006). Within the framework of this direction, the development of life-meaning orientations in the process of formation of individual subjectivity is studied. At the same time, an important criterion for the genesis of individuality is the degree of assimilation and acceptance of various altruistic values. One of the authors considers the basing of the altruistic way of a person’s relationship with the world on love as an essential point of his concept: “Personality begins with love... Love unites and creates a personality due to the fact that it does not allow a person to focus on his own “I”, but concentrates and embodies it in another “I”, thereby only ensuring the existence and development of oneself as an integrity” ([] Maksimenk). Another approach to altruism within the framework of domestic psychology connects this phenomenon with the social orientation of the individual ([] Bozhovich, 2008; [] Maksimenko , 2007, 2006; [] Platonov, 1975). Personality orientation is a set of stable motives, views, beliefs, needs and aspirations that orient a person toward certain behavior and activities, and the achievement of relatively complex life goals ([] Bozovic, 2008). The direction of a person determines a person’s life plans, the degree of his vital activity; it underlies the unity, integrity and strength of character of the person. The level of orientation of the individual, his “pro-social” character, determines the moral degree of altruistic behavior. In this case, they talk about the altruistic orientation of the individual. From the point of view of this approach, under the altruistic orientationunderstand the subject’s focus on protecting the interests of society as a whole or its individual groups. The next direction of studying selfless help defines it through the general emotional orientation of the individual ([] Dodonov, 1978). Within the framework of this approach, altruistic actions are considered as a way of obtaining specific altruistic emotions that constitute a special type of general emotional orientation of the individual (GEN). Other types of OEN B.I. Dodonov includes communicative, gnostic, romantic, aesthetic, hedonistic, gloric and other varieties of OEN (ten types in total). The very concept of OEN, introduced by Dodonov, has heuristic and potential scientific significance. The scientist says that in many ways, a person’s behavior is determined not only by his moral and ideological orientation, but also by his tendency to experience emotions of a certain kind. Emotion, according to Dodonov, can act as an independent value. For the sake of experiencing one or another significant emotion, a person can perform certain actions, choose appropriate types of activities and behavior. Developing his concept, Dodonov builds his own classification of emotions, combines them into groups and, based on these groups, creates certain types of OEN. According to Dodonov, a general emotional orientation begins to develop in a person from early childhood and with age it becomes a stable characteristic of the individual ([] Dodonov, 1978). A person with a certain type of OEN also develops a special, psychologically determined attraction to certain experiences. This gravitation, the need for significant emotions, has a number of specific characteristics: 1) a person feels the need not just for any random “set” of emotions sufficient to make “all the strings” of his emotional centers “sound,” but only for one that forms one or another an “emotional melody” that he loves, which has a known structure and unity of its constituent elements; 2) each of these “melodies” is recorded in a person’s emotional memory and, as it were, pre-programmed “for execution”; it does not arise by chance, but as a result of the deliberate recreation of the corresponding emotional situation; 3) the emotional images of this “melody” are closely fused with a certain ideological content of activity and behavior; 4) the individual is assigned special ways or forms of satisfying his need for emotional saturation ([] Dodonov, 1978). Thus, the scientist says that the initially purely functional human need for emotional saturation is transformed into the subject’s desire for certain experiences of his relationship with reality and becomes an important factor determining the direction of his personality. According to Dodonov, among all types of OEN, altruistic emotions occupy a special group. The scientist says that experiences of this kind arise based on the need for assistance, co-help, and patronage of other people. He also compiles a special inventory of altruistic emotions, which include: a) the desire to bring joy and happiness to others; b) a feeling of concern for the fate of someone, care; c) empathy for the luck and joy of another; d) a feeling of tenderness or tenderness; e) feeling of devotion; f) a feeling of participation, pity, etc. Dodonov believes that with an altruistic orientation, the main personal qualities are arranged in the following order: responsiveness, hard work, intelligence. “This does not mean that a person with altruistic aspirations does not work and does not learn. It’s just that he most often finds a business in which he realizes precisely his altruistic inclinations” ([] Dodonov, 1978). Moreover, Dodonov argues that a person with an altruistic OEN has such a pronounced need to experience altruistic emotions that if this need is not satisfied, then he begins to experience a painful state. However, the scientist does not consider the altruistic orientation as homogeneous, but identifies subtypes of thisdirection. “The altruistic type of OEN in some people may be associated with the desire to serve all of humanity, while in others - only their own family. It is clear that these will be very different “altruists”. However, the difference between people with this type of OEN turns out to be even more striking if we consider the “emotional altruist”, who does not recognize any other duty than the “duty” to himself. An extreme case in this regard is the woman described by the French psychologist P. Janet in his work “Love and Hate.” This “altruist,” in pursuit of touching experiences, deliberately brought her daughter to tears, rushing after this to her with consolations. Let us add that such a combination of an altruistic emotional orientation with an extremely egoistic moral orientation is by no means as rare as it might seem. Thus, depending on a person’s ideological and moral programs, the same attraction to altruistic experiences can produce both a true humanist and a child-loving tradesman who is closed in the family circle (and sometimes an egoist who delights himself with “altruistic sentiments”). In this case, there is a dependence of the manifestation of OEN on the moral and ideological orientation" ([] Dodonov, 1978). Dodonov also considers the communicative orientation, associated with the need of an extroverted personality for communication, to be close to altruistic. Among the communicative emotions, the scientist identifies: a) the desire to communicate, share thoughts and experiences, and find a response to them; b) a feeling of sympathy, location; c) feeling of respect; d) feeling of appreciation, gratitude; e) a feeling of adoration for someone; f) the desire to earn approval from loved ones and respected people. It is also very interesting that the altruistic and communicative types of OEN even influence the age of marriage. Thus, in a study conducted by Dodonov, it turned out that among people with the named types of OEN, the average age of starting a family is significantly lower than among people with other types of emotional orientation [1978]. In other words, boys and girls with altruistic or communicative OEN are prone to early marriages. Another approach to understanding altruism connects it with specific semantic altruistic attitudes, accompanied by special altruistic experiences ([] Antilogova, 2004). L.N. Antilogova uses the term “attitude” in the sense that this term was defined in the Georgian school of psychology by D.N. Uznadze. Back in 1901, Uznadze introduced the concept of attitude as “a holistic dynamic state of the subject, expressed in readiness for a certain activity” and as “a state that is determined by two factors: the need of the subject and the corresponding objective situation” (cited from: [] Antilogova, 2004 ). N.I.Sarzhveladze, having analyzed the works of D.I.Uznadze and his follower and student Sh.A.Nadirashvili, offers, based on the results of this analysis, the following understanding of attitude: “Attitude is a special state of unity of the internal (the needs of the subject) and the external (the situation) need satisfaction) factors that act as a predisposition to specific behavior. From the point of view of the conditions or mechanisms of occurrence and its internal structure, an attitude is not reducible to either a need factor or a situation factor. It is presented as a mode of their connection. Therefore, the attitude itself is not substantial, but relational in nature; it functions as a way of relating the internal and external, the needs of the subject and the situation of its satisfaction. An attitude is a readiness, direction, preorientation towards a certain behavior" ([] Sarzhveladze, 1989). Antilogova believes that altruistic behavior itself can be adequately understood only in the light of a combination of theoretical ideas about attitude (D.I. Uznadze), an understanding of the hierarchical nature of attitude (A.G. Asmolov) and activity theory (A.N. Leontiev). Considering the connection between the concepts of “personal norms” and “attitude,” Antilogova says that only those norms turn into attitudeswhich are internalized, internally accepted by the subject and which regulate his operational behavior. It is precisely such norms that can be interpreted as personal attitudes. This interpretation, according to the scientist, is fully consistent with the traditional idea of ​​attitude as a readiness to act in a certain way. Antilogova considers the main motive of any altruistic behavior to be specific altruistic attitudes based on moral standards and accompanied by special altruistic experiences. “According to our ideas, the implementation of altruistic behavior is carried out through semantic altruistic attitudes, which are revealed most clearly in uncertain situations given to a person, where he is given the opportunity to choose the most specific ways of responding to him. “It is logical to assume that since an uncertain situation is relevant to the projection of various attitudes, then under these conditions there will be an actualization of attitudes corresponding to the altruistic motive, that is, an altruistic semantic attitude realized in the corresponding altruistic activity, by which we mean the humanistically oriented activity of the subject in providing assistance to a person in need of it, prompted by selfless motivation, consistent with the interests of other people (the group, the whole society) and accompanied by specific altruistic experiences" ([] Antilogova). Moreover, the very idea of ​​​​taking uncertain life situations as differentiating the “degree of truth” of altruistic behavior was borrowed by Antilogova in Asmolov ([] 2002). “It is in uncertain situations that personal meaning is activated, prompting the subject to be ready to act in a certain way, in accordance with his value orientations, prevailing tendencies, etc., that is, in accordance with what is most adequately expressed in the concept of “attitude”, which is a stabilizer of activity, without which activity could not exist as an independent system capable of maintaining stability and direction of movement" ([] Asmolov, 2002). As we mentioned earlier, Antilogova considers altruistic behavior not only from the point of view of specific facts of its manifestation, but also from the standpoint of the motives underlying it. Uncertain life situations, like no other, make it possible to identify the internal motivational plan of altruism (in fact, like any other ongoing actions and deeds). Naturally, behind the unambiguous external manifestations of altruistic behavior, a wide variety of motives can be hidden (as we have repeatedly seen in the previous paragraph). “In the complex sphere of moral relations, we are always talking not only about real actions aimed at another person or group of people. Semi-conscious intentions, secret thoughts and impulses that a person never realizes are also taken into account” ([] Titar). Antilogova identifies, first of all, two types of motives: specific altruistic and motives of moral self-respect. By the way, V.E. Kim and E.E. Nasinovskaya also speak about the existence of similar meaning-forming motives for altruistic activity []. “A “pure” altruistic motive is formed under the conditions of a special method of education, when the development of the subject’s empathic abilities is encouraged in every possible way while simultaneously organizing real acts of help towards those in need. The condition for the action of the actual altruistic motive is an orientation towards the state of the object of help and a sympathetic attitude towards it. In this case, there is a coincidence of the motive and purpose of the activity... The motive of moral self-respect is a derivative of normative education and is associated with self-esteem and personal ideals. Altruistic behavior carried out in accordance with this motive is one of the means of achieving moral self-respect, maintaining self-esteem, andthe subject either seeks to avoid a possible violation of moral self-esteem in the event of failure to carry out an altruistic action (this manifests the preventive function of the motive), or seeks to eliminate the moral dissonance that has already arisen (the compensatory function of the motive). At the same time, the person retains an egocentric orientation, striving to receive a kind of internal “moral reward” for his action.”[]. Another important emphasis in this understanding of altruism is the departure from its “sacrificial” nature towards the absence of practical benefit or reward for the acting subject. “Firstly, truly altruistic behavior is not always characterized by sacrifice for the benefit of another. Altruistic behavior, as a rule, is characterized by the fact that the subject experiences his act as dictated by internal necessity and not contrary to his interests. Secondly, behavior that requires a subject to clearly observe from the outside and clearly express sacrifice for the needs of another is carried out relatively rarely, while behavior that does not coincide with a person’s personal needs and does not promise him reward is implemented quite often” ([] Antilogova, 2004) . Antilogova identifies a number of personal qualities and individual-typological properties that promote or hinder the tendency to altruistic behavior. For example, a high level of manifestation of altruism is ensured by the emotional stability of the individual, the expression of volitional properties and volitional control, balanced actions, courage, flexibility in judgment, and the ability to respond emotionally to external influences. On the contrary, if increased anxiety, excessive suspicion, tension, low control over the affective sphere, greater stability of negative emotions, and self-directed interests are manifested, then this significantly reduces the manifestation of altruism, and is a typical personality profile of persons with a low level of altruistic behavior. The latter are also characterized by the fact that their altruistic attitudes are not sufficiently stable, and this reduces the motivating power of this mechanism and its impact on the development of the moral consciousness of the individual. On the contrary, the formation of altruistic attitudes in a subject indicates a high level of development of his moral consciousness ([] Antilogova, 2004). Another approach to understanding altruism was proposed by a representative of the Georgian school in psychology N.I. Sarzhveladze []. In his approach to altruism, Sarjveladze is based on the concept of attitude. The scientist expressed his understanding of the phenomenon of altruistic behavior in one of the varieties of social attitudes - a subject-subject attitude towards people, in which the person is in the mode of such relations with the social environment, which can be defined as “being for others.” Sarjveladze very carefully dwells on the analysis of subject-object and subject-subject attitudes in relation to people and gives place to truly altruistic behavior precisely within the framework of the intersubjective approach, in which others are represented before the “gaze” of the subject not as objects of consideration, but as similar beings. – people equally endowed with living subjectivity. “Within the framework of the subject-subject approach to people, the attitude towards another person is personalized. The other person here acts as an end goal, rather than a means to achieve a specific personal goal. Instrumentalism and utilitarianism in this case are replaced by a certain unselfishness and altruism. The manipulative approach to another, characteristic of the subject-object type of relationship, gives way to concern for increasing the level of personalization of the other by stimulating in him the tendency for growth, independence, self-realization, self-development, etc. If in the subject-object type of relationship the main goal of the subject is to influence another person, “assimilation” and “adjustment” of his actions and views into the framework of his own intentions and picture of the world, then whenIn the intersubjective type of relationship, the individuality of the other, his autonomy and the right to his own voice are recognized. A participant in the subject-subject type of communication faces two tasks: on the one hand, to understand the partner, delve into his inner world and see him “as he really is”; on the other hand, he strives to be adequately understood by his communication partner. Authenticity of communication is the most important condition (as well as the result) of subject-subject interpersonal interaction” []. According to the scientist, within the framework of the subject-subject attitude towards another person, its emotional component is of particular importance. It is she who determines the main emotional processes accompanying intersubjective interpersonal communication, among which there are empathy, compassion, compassion, emotional resonance, compassion, etc. Sarjveladze studies three modes of relationships with others within the framework of the subject-subject approach. Among them, he considers the following social attitudes: “to be like others,” “to be with others,” and “to be for others.” The first social attitude is fully characterized by the process of identification, when the subject decides his relationship with society according to the principle of assimilation and deindividuation. The second attitude transfers the problem of interaction with others to the plane of “coexistence with others,” when there is a desire for inclusion in various social groups, a pro-social orientation of the individual and its extroverted orientation. As for the mode of attitude “to be for others,” then, according to Sarzhveladze, this mode underlies altruistic behavior. Along with the three named social attitudes, the scientist identifies three additional modes of relations: “to be oneself,” “to own others,” and "to control oneself." By “being yourself” Sarzhveladze understands the subject’s intentional focus on “selfhood”. “The search for personal autonomy and identity, the desire for self-determination, testing one’s own capabilities and self-realization, the phenomenon of individuation, a sense of originality and individual uniqueness - this is an incomplete list of individual aspects of the individual’s desire to “be himself” []. The attitude of “owning others” most clearly manifests the desire for power over others, dominance, control or over-control over the behavior of an interaction partner, assimilating influence, the desire to “absorb” a social other, weakening a partner and taking the initiative or advantage in communication into one’s own hands. Finally, by “controlling oneself,” the scientist understands self-control, the ability to compose oneself, to “pull oneself together,” the skill of surviving critical situations, the ability to hide, suppress emotions, the ability to motivate oneself in a situation of fatigue to be active, and all other situations that are included in the sphere of “self-subjective” relationships. As a result, Sarjveladze builds a typology of social and personal interaction, within the framework of which he studies specific patterns of relationships between people. Since our interest is tied only to altruistic behavior, from the entire range of possible motivational interaction strategies we will select those that, according to Sarzhveladze, are directly related to altruism: To be oneself - to be for others This strategy of interaction with the world combines two attitudes : on the one hand, there is a focus on oneself, one’s own self, the search for autonomy and identity, the desire for self-determination; on the other hand, the altruistic orientation of the individual towards other people is clearly expressed. In combination, these two strategies give rise to one of the most harmonious forms of altruism, which is realized through the careful cultivation of one’s own “self.” Not to be oneself is to be for others. This way of relating to the world is inherent in a person with blurred personal boundaries, who does not have clear ideas about himself , who is in a “pathological fusion” with a world that is deindividualized and has a “diffuse self.” In such a situation, the manifestedaltruism is rather neurotic, protective in nature and is most fully described by such a nosological unit as “neurosis of altruism” (the concept was introduced by us in the previous paragraph). To own others is to be for others. Externally demonstrated altruistic behavior is accompanied by dominance and power over others. Altruism of this type is of an aggressive nature; it suppresses the initiative of the partner. Examples of such altruistic strategies were described in paragraphs 2.1 and 2.4 of Section 2. The rule of exchange implemented in the potlatch, altruism as the manipulation of others and other manifestations of “aggressive” altruism are all private versions of this strategy of interaction with the world. Not to own others - to be for others Similar the combination of social attitudes is not described by Sarzhveladze, but it is quite appropriate to assume such a combination. The “not owning others” mode is possible when an individual feels powerless when trying to control the behavior of a partner, when he has lost power over others and lacks initiative in interaction, when the subject feels fear and experiences his “lower status” position. In this case, “being for others” will mean entering into a relationship with a natural form of “forced altruism”, when a person, with the help of altruistic behavior, seeks to relieve tension in a communication situation and wants to “pacify” the other. To control oneself is to be for others. This situation is such an attitude towards the world in which a person “pull himself together”, fights his own egoistic aspirations, tries to join social stereotypes, norms and rules of behavior and act as a “true altruist”. In its extreme manifestations, such a method of self-realization is another type of manifestation of altruistic neurosis, and was also described by us in paragraph 2.4 of Section 2. Not to control oneself - to be for others The last combination of social attitudes is also not in Sarzhveladze’s typology, but it is this combination that allows you to see most clearly the coercive power of natural altruism. Indeed, what does it mean to “not control oneself”? This is the experience of powerlessness in controlling one’s behavior, when the subject “cannot pull himself together, pull himself together, make volitional efforts and make a volitional decision, be the master of his own destiny” ([] Sarjveladze); This is also the disorganization of a person when he experiences increased anxiety and inner turmoil. Such states entail in the subject a feeling of temporary or permanent loss of identity, one’s own status, the actualization of a depressive state, the experience of powerlessness, uselessness, etc. The launching of the social attitude “to be for others” at such moments is an exclusively instinctive desire to give up one’s place, one’s resources and oneself. themselves in favor of more fit, adapted and socially successful individuals. This method of behavior is dictated by the oppressive effect of natural selection on a temporarily or permanently unadapted or maladapted subject and is another example of “forced altruism” that triggers in him an attraction to... death. According to Sarzhveladze, the listed possible combinations of social attitudes and modes of relationships to the world are not sustainable for a specific person, but can change dynamically depending on the state of the subject-situation system. At the same time, these combinations of attitudes at one time or another are quite stable. They form the dispositional core of personality. “The dispositional core, as a relatively stable system, is constantly in the process of its formation. It is structured and differentiated in the process of interaction of the individual with the environment and in this regard goes through a number of stages, reflected in life cycles or stages. The time “horizon” of this formation is presented to consciousness in the form of images of the current, retrospective and prospective “I”. Individual personality dispositions as virtual states are concretized and updated inreal behavior through the installation mechanism" []. It is important for us to extract from this thought the understanding that altruistic behavior strategies of the same person can change throughout life. Moreover, even in relatively short periods of time, a subject tends to combine different types of altruistic behavior depending on the situation in which he finds himself. In this case, we can talk about a typical method of altruistic interaction at a certain stage of life, which is ensured by the constancy of a combination of relatively stable personal attitudes. Along with Sardveladze, L.P. Zhuravleva speaks about the importance of attitudes in altruistic behavior []. It reveals altruism from the position of empathy and introduces into consideration a specific empathic attitude of the individual. “In phylogenesis and, accordingly, in ontogenesis, an attitude towards the emotional perception of another subject and his emotional state must be formed. An attitude that expresses readiness for emotional perception of an empathogenic situation, in particular its main element - the emotional state of the object of empathy - will be called empathic" []. When empathy receives a prosocial orientation, the personality reaches the highest levels of development and, as a result, becomes capable of the fullest mutual understanding with other subjects and altruistic behavior towards them. The works of P.P. Gornostay deserve special attention in the entire spectrum of altruism research []. Based on his role approach to personality, it can be assumed that some manifestations of altruism are nothing more than role behavior within the framework of a specific repertoire, or scripted behavior learned by the subject from his own childhood. In this sense, it becomes clear why in some cases it is so difficult for an individual to interrupt the altruistic interaction that is maladaptive. The thing is that any role has a certain inertia, and the script has a significant coercive influence on a person’s motivation. Another researcher, M.V. Savchin, considers altruism as a manifestation of the spiritual potential of an individual. The very concept of spiritual potential, which he understands as “the totality of spiritual, mental (mental) and physical forces and properties of a person that determine her relationship with God, people and the world of her life” [], is heuristic and allows us to explore moral potential in a new way person. In particular, the main sign of a spiritual personality, according to Savchin, is “sincere gratitude as a wonderful benefactor, since it inclines people not only to repay equals for equals; it encourages one to give more than to receive” []. Moreover, the very possibility of an individual to be happy is associated by this psychologist with the need to do good and make the world around him and the people around him happy: “... a person, in order to be truly happy, must see happiness around him” []. Finally, there is a view of altruism, which allows us to understand and explain the presence of its highest, transfinite form, built on “free causality” (causa sui). Developing the concept of free causality, V.A. Petrovsky comes to the idea of ​​the existence of four selves in a person: 1) the immanent/hidden self, which is filled with impulses, intuitions, thoughts and premonitions; 2) the ideal Self, as a person’s ideas about himself; 3) the transcendental Self, which is the essence of thought, thinking itself; 4) transfinite Self, consisting of experiences of the fullness of a person’s presence in the world, a feeling of belonging to the eternal “always-being” and experiences of the infinity of love and truth []. In the context of our study, we consider natural altruism as filling the immanent Self; personal altruism as a component of the ideal self; conceptualization of ideas about one’s own altruism and its results as forming the transcendental Self; transfinite altruism - as one of the experiences of the transfinite self. We thinktransfinite altruism, as the highest, spiritual level of altruism, based on the free causality of internal choice, on responsibility, on love for the whole world and on the selfless giving of an internally filled with happiness personality. “...only an internally rich person, with a versatile and complex inner world, can give” ([] Maksimenko). This is a creation of good in its purest form, when a person, aware of his temporality, at the same time experiences himself and the world as parts of a single whole, when he transcends himself into the world and transfers love, energy and any resource available to him, as to himself. Transfinite altruism is based on transfinite love and empathy: “Transfinite empathy can manifest itself in the form of selfless assistance, altruism, self-sacrifice” ([] Zhuravlyova). An idea similar to the existence of transfinite altruism is also expressed by Savchin, speaking about a moral person with high spiritual potential : “A moral person is characterized by high empathy, the experience of unity with humanity, the ability for constructive positive relationships, and dialogue with the world” ([] Savchin M). Similar thoughts are present in the works of other psychologists: “A spiritually mature personality has formed internal freedom and responsibility, which together form a single mechanism of meaningful activity, which is mediated by value guidelines and “makes it possible to build alternative models of the future and thereby choose and create the future, rather than just predict it” ([] D.A. Leontyev). Thus, transfinite altruism, as the highest manifestation of altruism, also has an active, co-creative nature. Let us summarize some of the approaches to altruism in Russian psychology. The phenomenon of altruism has been carefully studied in our psychological science by a number of scientists (G.M. Andreeva , L.N. Antilogova, A.G. Asmolov, I.D. Bekh, L.I. Bozhovich, M.I. Borishevsky, L.P. Vygovskaya, T.P. Gavrilova, P.P. Ermine, B O.G. Dodonov, L.P. Zhuravleva, Z.S. Karpenko, V.E. Kim, S.D. Maksimenko, E.E. Nasinovskaya, A.V. Petrovsky, V.A. Petrovsky, S.L Rubinshtein, M.V. Savchin, N.I. Sarzhveladze, V.A. Tatenko, T.M. Titarenko) contributed their understanding to the study of this social process. The main emphasis in the study of altruistic behavior was placed on its moral side, therefore the motivational component of altruism was subjected to the most thorough analysis. The study of altruistic behavior from the position of “ethics of society” has identified a number of features of understanding this phenomenon within the framework of our science, which include: determining the degree of “altruistic” action from the position of the holistic situation (social context) in which the subject of behavior is located; correlating altruism with a number of social norms that have a moral and cooperative nature (collectivism, etc.); understanding altruism as an independent phenomenon, but formed in the process of ontogenesis in line with more general psychological phenomena - activity, orientation and attitudes of the individual; identification of specific altruistic emotions, motives and attitudes, which accompany altruistic behavior; attributing to altruism only its highest, morally and ethically colored forms; explicating the value foundations of the moral sphere of an altruistic personality; identifying the spiritual level of altruistic behavior of a personality, when the latter, being internally filled, experiences itself and the world as parts of a single whole, transcends himself into the world and conveys inner love to it. Thus, the object of research in Russian psychological science has become such types of altruistic behavior that can be classified as “personal” and “transfinite” forms of altruism. It is this type of altruism that has been studied in line with various domestic approaches, and the emphasis in its understanding was placed on the primacy of social and humanistic needs in relation to natural needs. 2.6. Conclusions Analysis of ethnographic, psychological, psychoanalytic and social psychologicalresearch allows us to formulate several general conclusions of this section: 1. In modern culture, one can trace a number of social phenomena and processes that are equivalent to various natural altruistic programs. These social phenomena represent cultural-normative superstructures over projections into the world of intersubjective and intergroup interaction of fairly simple natural behavioral patterns. Among these schemes, the central place belongs to kinship, reciprocal, coalitional and coercive altruism.2. Specific personal, culturally determined forms of altruism can be divided into three large groups: a) neurotic altruistic behavior, which is the result of the reversal of initially egoistic aspirations, which occurs under the pressure of a hard SuperEgo on the Ego of the subject; b) genuine personal altruistic behavior, which is based on a more conscious motivation of helping others while maintaining contact with one’s own needs; personal altruism, like neurotic altruism, is characterized by the presence of the influence of the Superego on the Ego, however, there is more internal freedom with this type of behavior, it is more conscious and does not have such a psychopathologizing character; as a rule, personal altruistic behavior is the socio-cultural equivalent of natural forms of altruism, semiotized in the process of socialization of the individual; c) transfinite altruistic behavior, which is the highest, spiritual level of development of altruism and consists of self-transcendence of oneself into the world, in which the person experiences himself and the world as parts of a single whole, and transmits inner love and fullness to the world.3. Neurotic altruistic behavior or “altruism neurosis” is a variant of psychological defense that masks the subject’s own aggressive or egocentric motivation from the subject’s weak ego. Moreover, altruistic motivation can not only have a protective nature, but is often itself camouflaged by a whole system of defense mechanisms. The last option arises in the case of the forced destructive influence of archaic forms of altruism on the weakened ego of the subject.4. “True (genuine) altruistic behavior” is possible only with a mature ego of the individual, maintaining contact with all internal impulses of the id, as well as with the directives of the superego. It comes not from a lack, but from an excess of internal strength and positive self-attitude. Forming an ego of a person capable of genuine altruism is possible only in the presence of a particularly favorable system of parent-child relationships, which will allow the introjection of a “stable good internal object” that contributes to the predominance of giving processes in the field of social connections of a particular person. The peculiarity of genuine altruistic behavior also lies in the fact that its implementation must be considered from the perspective of a holistic situation (immerse it in the social context where this behavior was carried out). Only an understanding of the context allows us to judge the “authenticity” of altruism.5. The highest type of altruism is transfinite altruistic behavior. This type of behavior always has a humanistic orientation and a high degree of morality. It is possible to characterize altruistic behavior as transfinite if a number of conditions are met, which include: a) correlation of altruism with universal human norms of humanism; b) detection of specific altruistic emotions that give spiritual pleasure to the subject of altruistic behavior. SECTION 3. STRUCTURAL BIOSOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL OF ALTRUISM 3.1. Structural model of altruism In previous sections of the work, we presented various approaches to understanding altruistic behavior. In particular, we have revealed, analyzed and generalized the psychological, ethological, socio-psychological, psychoanalytic and philosophical views on altruism. Here we want to sum upsome line in the definition of the term under study and systematize the main types and types of altruistic behavior into groups. Let us begin this paragraph with a definition of the structure of altruistic behavior. In our work, we adhere to the concept of a biosociopsychological model of altruism, which has a level structure. To the first, lowest level of this model, we include natural altruism, composed of kinship/parental, reciprocal/rank/coalition, sexual and coercive types. A distinctive feature of this level is that all of the listed types have a significant coercive nature and contain an aggressive component associated with control and dominance over the object of the altruistic act. The second, middle level of the altruism model consists of genuine/moral and neurotic types of altruistic behavior. This level is based on the lower stratum and is largely a product of its cultural and semiotic processing, through which altruism receives new forms of embodiment. However, this level is also not free from an aggressive component, which can be hidden in the unconscious interaction of the intrapsychic instances of the Id, Ego and Superego, in the dynamic correlation of which the altruistic motivation of the individual is born. Finally, the third, highest level of the model of altruistic behavior is crowned by transfinite altruism. The last type of altruism is free from any manifestations of aggression, dominance and control and consists of a truly spiritual self-transcendence of oneself into the world, in which the subject experiences himself and the world as parts of a single whole, and transmits inner love and fullness to the world as to oneself. In this case, by altruistic behavior itself we understand such social or spiritual behavior of an individual, which is associated with a significant concession of a resource in favor of a more valuable object. At the level of natural altruism, a signature[8] external object (child, relative, representative) acts as a “more valuable object.” reference group, a certain group, society as a whole, etc.). The level of personal altruism is characterized by the fact that the “more valuable object” in favor of which the resource is ceded is an internal object (an autonomous part of the Ego-identity; a certain standard of behavior, the Ego-Ideal, an external object internalized and included in the structure of the SuperEgo - the referent Other, object of idealization, etc.). At the level of transfinite altruism, the “more valuable object” is the transcended parts of the fulfilled personality, exteriorized into the world. At the same time, the psychological boundaries between the subject and the world become permeable, and he begins to perceive the world as a part of himself, and himself as a part of the world. Another area of ​​difference between the three levels of altruism is related to the specifics of the motivational component of these types of behavior. Since natural altruism has the Id as its main source of motivation, it is always associated with receiving pleasure as a result of the realization and discharge of an instinctive type of reaction. The personal type of altruism occurs as a result of the dynamic interaction of the Ego and Superego. Moreover, the motivation for such behavior comes primarily from the Superego, while the pleasure experienced is of a moral nature and is associated with the release of dynamic mental tension when the Ego meets the demands of a higher mental authority. The latter situation is also characterized by the fact that the “altruistic Ego” receives support from the SuperEgo, and the altruist himself experiences feelings of confidence and personal strength, experiences internal moral encouragement, a sense of pride in himself, his sense of guilt decreases, etc. With transfinite altruism of motivation The ID and Superego merge into the love-filled Ego, while the pleasure experienced from this type of behavior is spiritual in nature and associated with an increase in one’s own subjectivity. Finally, the differences between the levels of altruism consistand the degree of his awareness. Natural altruistic behavior is largely instinctive, signature and imperative, which indicates its low awareness. Personal altruism is much more conscious, but still contains unconscious components that allow its neurotic offshoot to exist, as well as hiding much of the inner work of developing altruistic motivation itself. Transfinite altruism is exclusively conscious, moreover, always meaningful. The structural biosociopsychological model of altruism that we have constructed needs additional explanation. As we have repeatedly said, personal altruism is largely based on the evolutionary prototypes of natural altruistic behavior. That is, all types related to natural altruism can be personal. At the same time, they are accomplished using cultural ways of realizing them and occur more consciously. On the other hand, since evolutionary prototypes are largely filled with new social and cultural meaning acquired in the process of socialization and education, adjusted by the social superstructure of the human psyche and in a number of their manifestations acquire new, purely human meaning, they become specific embodiments of personal altruism. Moreover, such socio-cultural modifications of altruism often lead to such types of helping behavior, the analogues of which simply do not exist in the evolutionary series of social systems. And here we are faced with specifically human, culturally acquired types of altruistic behavior, which include various varieties of neurotic and genuine altruism. It is interesting that these types of personal altruism are largely formed due to the opposition to imperative natural altruistic motives, but at the same time they do not lose the degree of their altruism. In other words, in some cases, the inhibition of natural altruistic intentions is also personal altruistic behavior. As we have already seen in paragraph 2.4 of Section 2, neurotic altruistic behavior is the result of the reversal of initially egoistic aspirations, which occurs under the pressure of a too rigid Superego on the weak Ego of the subject; genuine altruistic behavior is carried out from an excess of internal forces, it is associated with receiving moral pleasure from an act of altruism and is always characterized by maintaining contact of the Ego with the impulses of the Id and the directives of the SuperEgo. On the contrary, one of the characteristics of “neurosis of altruism” is self-denial and loss of contact with the inner essence. A little higher (clause 2.4 of Section 2) we also noted that neurotic altruism is one of the options for psychological defense that masks the subject’s own aggressive ego from the weak Ego. or egocentric motivation. On the other hand, altruistic motivation not only can have a protective nature, but is often itself masked by a whole system of defense mechanisms. The last option arises in the case of the forced destructive influence of archaic forms of altruism on the weakened ego of the subject. On the other hand, genuine personal altruism is possible only with a mature ego, abundantly filled with internal forces, mental resources and a positive self-attitude. Moreover, the implementation of genuine altruism entails the experience of moral pleasure from the act. If genuine altruistic behavior has a pro-social orientation, then it can be characterized as moral. That is why, in order to assess the “authenticity” of an altruistic act, it must be considered from the perspective of a holistic situation (immerse it in the social context where this behavior was carried out). In the case when a person capable of genuine altruistic behavior grows spiritually so much that he self-transcends himself into the world, his altruism begins to be transfinite in nature. At the same time sheexperiences herself and the world as parts of a single whole, and transfers love, energy and any resource available to her to the world, as to herself. Let us make a number of additional comments to the biosociopsychological model of altruism that we have proposed. In defining almost all types of altruistic help (except for transfinite altruism), we deliberately avoided considering the underlying motivation, much less focused on its selfless nature. We think that the entire course of the theoretical positions, examples and illustrations we present justifies the departure from the motivational component underlying this or that altruistic act. Moreover, we also believe that the consistency of our reasoning allows us to consider as altruistic actions, including exclusively selfless behavior patterns triggered by unconscious or weakly conscious motives. Another point that is also not included in the proposed definitions (again, except for transfinite altruism) is the assertion of the obligatory voluntariness of an altruistic act. Indeed, a number of previously cited examples and conclusions make it possible to understand various types of coercive behavior as altruistic. Moreover, we believe that forced altruistic behavior is one of the central types of altruism and belongs to its historically earliest natural forms. We also note that we consider the essential points of our definitions to be: Altruism is always a social behavior of an individual; it is associated with a significant concession of a resource in favor of a more valuable object. Altruistic behavior of an individual is only based on the instinctive ancestral forms of altruism, but is not exhausted by them; Moreover, it is built on top of them with the help of social and cultural forms, and often opposes natural programs of altruistic help. The motivation of altruism can be very diverse (from genuine, to selfish and aggressive), comes from different instances of the psyche (both from the id and and from the SuperEgo) and, often, has varying degrees of awareness. If altruistic motivation serves the intrapsychic interaction of the Ego with the SuperEgo, if it is aimed at defusing the tension that has developed between these two instances and if it carries moral or ideological coercion, and does not come “from within” personality itself, then such altruism always has a neurotic connotation. Genuine altruism is possible only with a mature ego of the individual, maintaining contact with all the internal impulses of the Id, as well as with the directives of the Superego; genuine altruism is characterized by an excess of internal strength, mental resource and positive self-attitude, and the implementation of true altruism entails the experience of moral pleasure from the act. The very moral feelings that the altruist experiences (moral satisfaction, self-encouragement, pride in oneself, reduction of guilt, etc.) are not innate, but are culturally acquired and developed in the process of socialization. If a person grows spiritually so much that he self-transcends himself into the world, then his altruistic behavior begins to be transfinite in nature. At the same time, such a person perceives himself as part of the world, and transfers to it all his love and all the resources available to him. The permanent process of giving entails an increase in subjectivity and an increase in the awareness of such a person. Understanding the fundamental connection between altruism and aggression, which we have established throughout our work, allows us to penetrate deeper into the nature of these two phenomena and take a fresh look at the behavioral continuum proposed by F. Perz : altruism - sexual activity - sadism - aggression - destruction []. The ambivalent nature of the two main behavioral strategies makes it possible to loop the above scheme and consider extreme forms of altruism to carry a destructive charge, and in some types of destruction to see an exclusively altruistic orientation. In the following text, one of the emphasis isLet’s focus on the correlation of altruism with aggression and pay attention to the intersections of these two behavioral forms by function and by the objects to which they are directed. 3.2. Types and types of altruistic behavior Let us now move on to the analysis of the types of altruistic behavior. Let us remind you once again that the natural level of altruism includes: a) related/parental; b) sexual; c) reciprocal/rank/coalition; d) forced. Personal altruism consists of its genuine and neurotic types. The transfinite level of altruism forms a type with the same name. Let us dwell in detail on each of the named types and give comments on the characteristics of their manifestation and some subtypes of these types. I. RELATIVE/PARENTAL ALTRUISM This type of altruism is one of the most understandable and natural manifestations of altruistic behavior. If we examine the phenomenology of the average parent, then it is easy to detect specific parental feelings, positive emotions associated with the performance of parental duty, caring for children, etc. Such experiences are available to everyone. It is enough to remember how the faces of mothers and fathers of newborns glow to be convinced of the unconditional emergence of parental love. “Probably no one will dispute that the willingness of a mother or father to risk their life in protecting their cub is not caused by upbringing, is not acquired, but is natural, inherent in the nature of the mother and father” ([] Efroimson, 1971). In fairness, it should be noted that that throughout the development of mankind there were other times. For example, a number of historical periods are known (antiquity or the early Middle Ages, for example), when infanticide was a widespread and widespread phenomenon, which, strictly speaking, was equated to homicide only in 374 AD. ([] Aries). At the same time, the low value of children was the fruit of culture and social relations, and not a consequence of the lack of specific parental feelings. Moreover, parents in every possible way resisted the torture of their own children, which can be seen, among other things, from the analysis of specific plots of folk tales that convey some of the features of the powerless situation of children of that time ([] Propp). The main goal of parental altruism is to increase the overall fitness of oneself and their offspring. Within the framework of this goal, we have two objects of care at once: on the one hand, these are parents for themselves, and, on the other hand, their children. In extreme forms, parental altruism acts so imperatively that the feeling of “caring for children” suppresses the desire for one’s own adaptation, and then parental sacrifice begins to exceed all reasonable limits. This way of life is reflected in the thesis “all the best goes to the children.” It is interesting that the parental feeling in animals lasts exactly the period during which the cub really needs the help and protection of the parents, and then the parents stop paying attention to it. Moreover, in many species of mammals, adults expel their grown-up children from their own families, and the latter are forced to unite, form “teenage gangs” in which they feed and exist until adulthood ([] Dolnik, 2007). In humans, many natural processes are taken to extremes, and parental care in many families lasts throughout life, right up to the death of the parents themselves. So in our society, it is almost the norm that people in full bloom of vitality receive help and resources from their frail, elderly ancestors (which include not only father and mother, but also grandparents). The latter facts in living nature are unthinkable and in some way unnatural. Another important point of parental altruism is that resource and help are passed down from generation to generation, from parents to children, then from the latter to their offspring, etc. There is no such movement in the opposite direction. That is, parental altruism is a natural phenomenon, inherent in logicevolution itself, while the opposite concept of “children's altruism” does not exist in nature. Again, among us people the situation is often the opposite. In psychotherapeutic groups, it is not uncommon for clients to live for their parents, realize their desires and aspirations in their lives, respond to their requests and embody their life scenarios. Moreover, in some cases of this kind, clients choose between implementing their life program (creating a family, having children) and living with their parents in which the latter become the object of their “childish” altruism. At the same time, altruistic behavior begins to be neurotic and obsessive in nature and completely maladjusts such “children” who have already become adults. A frequent reason for this state of affairs is the immature Ego of the parents themselves, in which through their upbringing they form not separated, autonomous individuals, but a second set of symbolic parents for themselves. And children unwittingly become involved in this program, redirecting their parental altruism towards their own parents. N. Tinbergen noted regarding parental altruism that “instead of being indignant when abnormal parents abandon their children, one should be surprised that most parents do not do, but try to bring their difficult and hard work to the end”[9][]. In addition to the evolutionary prerequisites for such behavior (which were repeatedly discussed in the previously cited text), attention is also drawn to the imperative, coercive nature of parental altruism. Indeed, sometimes parental care is associated with such powerful maladjustment and loss of resources from the parent himself that one involuntarily wonders whether it is possible to somehow control the dominant influence of this type of altruism. The answer to this question connects parental feelings with increased awareness, the development of reflection and strengthened volitional regulation. It is these three higher mental functions that transform parental altruism into truly personal altruism, and allow them to increase the fitness of their children without going into extreme pathological processes of their own maladaptation. II. SEXUAL ALTRUISM This type of altruistic behavior consists of helping and transferring resources from men to women. Sexual altruism is manifested in such gentlemanly qualities as courtesy, gallantry, compliance, restraint and tolerance in relation to women. Men give their best and most useful, and even experience sincere joy when women accept their gifts and offerings. From research within the framework of social psychology, it is known that women are much more likely to seek help and receive it [Myers]. In many situations, similar behavior of men is stopped not only by internal attitudes and prohibitions, but also by cultural stereotypes [Myers]. These differences can be observed already in childhood, comparing the behavior of boys and girls with each other. In particular, it turned out that boys aged 3-4 years are more than four times more likely to display altruistic behavior towards girls than vice versa [Pavlova]. This is also confirmed by data from ethnographic studies [Mead]. According to a number of scientists [], sexual altruism, like parental altruism, has a certain imperativeness and forcibly influences the behavior of men, adjusting this behavior towards more altruistic behavior in relation to women. A variety of reasons are proposed as explanatory principles: from A.D. Bateman’s principle of “the indispensability and higher value of a woman” [], to cultural stereotypes that reflect the view of the male sex as a consumable material [Geodak]. Another common point between sexual and parental altruism is the asymmetrical nature of both of these types of behavior. Just as a child can never return to his parents everything that they gave him, and thus he is unable to restore balance in the system of “give and take” processes (if only becausethe fact that his parents “gave” him life itself as a gift), so women do not need to compensate for all resource concessions and turn all their altruistic processes towards men. Women have other priority and more valuable objects and they have somewhere to redirect the reserves of their altruism. Developing this idea, we can say that male sexual altruism serves to fill the reservoir of maternal altruism and create an excess of emotional well-being in women. In such a situation, the woman will be happy, and her children will be more looked after. In this sense, altruistic behavior, even the sacrifice of women towards men, is a specific acquisition of humanity. Such relationships do not occur in nature; they are rather unnatural than immanent to it. In his study of the sacrifice of Russian women, O.V. Ryabov directly connects it with their maternal position, which among the Slavs is redirected to men: “... physical, psychological, moral strength allows a woman to act as a guardian angel for a man, to take care of him. Such relationships are largely due to the fact that her essence corresponds to “love-pity” rather than “love-desire”: “to love” in Russia means “to pity.” The beauty of a Russian woman is not so much sexual attractiveness as “the beauty of compassion.” In her attitude towards a man, a maternal feeling prevails: to warm up the unfortunate, the unlucky ... " []. The above allows us to understand why the idea of ​​sexual altruism, when the main donor is a man, meets with some misunderstanding among our Slavic audience (more precisely, it meets with understanding from the series: “where can we get this?”). This disposition contrasts with the ethnic-mental component of relationships that has developed in our society. It is possible to explain the roots of such sacrifice from the feeling of guilt before one’s own mother (which was done earlier by Horney []), which is inherited in Slavic culture from mother to daughter and manifests itself in various kinds of sacrifices, self-abasement and self-destruction. The second factor that ensures a significant deformation of sexual altruism in our society is the internalization into the structure of the Superego of specific parental relationships, which are also stereotypically built with the primacy of the male and the sacrifice of the female. In addition, the very national identity of a Slavic woman significantly determines her position as a sacrificer: “So, the traits of a Russian woman are ... moral strength, care, pity, sacrifice, asexuality. It is easy to see that all of the listed qualities relate to the maternal archetype. A Russian woman is, first of all, a woman-mother” []. However, despite some resistance from the culture and mentality of individual nations and ethnic groups, natural sexual altruism finds direct and collateral ways of its manifestation. Education regarding its true role will contribute to the humanization of society in general and will make individual families in particular happy.III. RECIPROAL, RANKING, COALITIONAL ALTRUISMThe above types of altruism represent a form in which altruistic behavior is more “unselfish” than in its two previous types. With reciprocal, ranking and coalition altruism: 1) you can clearly see the immediate benefits of this behavior; 2) the receipt of these benefits, for the most part, is not delayed in time; 3) the listed types of altruism are committed between subjects of relatively equal status; 4) altruistic processes are symmetrical and reciprocal in nature. To what has been said, we can add that the equality of statuses of subjects of altruism specified in the third paragraph does not have a literal meaning, but is considered from the point of view of an obstacle or threat, in opposition to which the altruistic alliance itself arises. Reciprocal and rank altruism is mutual supporting behavior between two, or several subjects; coalitional altruism describeshelping behavior between whole groups. Rank altruism is a more special case of reciprocal behavior, when individuals of approximately the same status unite in alliances opposing a stronger rival. As was shown earlier (see paragraph 2.1 of Section 2), reciprocal altruism has a significant coercive nature. It comes down to the duties of giving and receiving help, as well as responding to it with reciprocal services. It is reciprocal/rank and coalition altruism that underlie the formation and maintenance of hierarchies (the latter aspect will be discussed in detail in paragraph 3.4 of Section 3). The ability of individuals to form stable reciprocal connections provides them with greater adaptation to existing social relations. In particular, the tendency towards reciprocal helping behavior is one of the conditions for the development of social intelligence [Kalina]. The basis of mutual altruism may be a strategy of social dominance (see paragraph 2.1 of Section 2). As K. Hawkes found in his observations of hunter-gatherers (the Hadza and Bushmen tribes), many of the successful warriors participate in the voluntary distribution of the food they have obtained not so much for the purpose of maintaining reciprocal relationships, but in order to demonstrate their own superiority over and over again. opportunities, increase their influence and dominance in the tribe, expand their sexual expansion and impose on other men of the tribe a feeling of “unpayable debt”, and through it their will (data from: [] Butovskaya, 2007). The condition of reciprocity of reciprocal altruism provides such “lucky hunters” with space for social dominance and ultimately leads to the establishment of hierarchical relationships. On the other hand, the same reciprocal (rank) altruism provides protection to the less successful, since it is through it that they create coalitions, thereby increasing their own statuses. Thus, mutual altruistic behavior serves two processes at once: social differentiation and social protection (the latter is ensured through the monolithic cohesion of individuals of the same status). Additionally, we note that processes of social protection occur not only in human societies, but also in the animal world. “Already the Anubis baboons have “discovered” that a more aggressive and stronger male can be demoted in rank if one finds an ally for this matter... A union of several males can encroach on a higher individual” ([Dol). In comparison with related and sexual, reciprocal altruism is a much newer social formation ([] Triverse). The relative “novelty” of this form of mutual support also causes greater variability in the behavior of those who enter into such relationships. Firstly, a reciprocal relationship is much less strong and stable than, for example, a family union, which means that it can be renegotiated many times. Secondly, mutual relationships are characterized by selectivity (in contrast to the same family, where, as is known, “relatives are not chosen”). The latter point also provides greater freedom in the formation of reciprocal altruistic alliances. Finally, an important point in understanding mutual assistance is the analysis of its symmetry. Unlike parental and sexual altruism, which are predominantly one-way relational orders, reciprocal altruistic behavior provides a two-way circulation of helping that maintains a dynamic balance between give and take processes and gives tone to many social interactions. Along with this, reciprocity is one of the essential characteristics of sibling relationships that are formed between people of equal status. The consequence of this is a greater cooperativeness of reciprocal interaction, which is reflected, for example, in politics. “A political organization based on brother-sister relationships is less hierarchical and more cooperative” ([]Samuels). All of the above points consist ofthe special significance of reciprocal altruism, and its influence on the development of sociality in human society is difficult to overestimate.IV. FORCED ALTRUISM The question of whether a “relatively voluntary” renunciation of part or all of one’s own resource can be considered a manifestation of altruism has already been repeatedly discussed in the literature and a positive answer has been given []. Our position on this issue is also very clear: voluntary resource concessions aimed at appeasing people of higher status are a consequence of forced altruism. It is well known in ethology that the evolutionary significance of forced altruism for any population is enormous []. It is thanks to him that weakened individuals who have lost a ranking duel give way to stronger, more successful and adapted individuals, due to it, “loser individuals” fall into an apathetic, depressive state and not only cease to claim the resource that is rightfully due to them, but also “voluntarily” sacrifice yourself. Coercive altruism has a significant impact on people as well. One of its consequences is the death drive, the thanatos instinct, which arises in everyone who finds themselves in a “difficult period”, experiences subjectively significant failures, experiences an asthenic lack of resources to overcome them and is in a situation of actual or subjective change (for the worse). ) own status [Case]. Another consequence of forced altruism is the pacifying behavior of people in a crisis situation, who subjectively experience their own low psychosocial status. As we will show later (see paragraph 3.4 of Section 3), such people are inclined to show humility and are ready to “be patient” and withstand all the difficulties that “fall on their heads.” That is, processes of inhibition and suppression of activity are noticeable in their behavior, critical aggression is blocked in them and a conversion of the energy of aggression into yielding-pacifying altruistic behavior is observed. By the way, let’s say that thanks to these processes, human society stably passes through most periods of crisis; on the contrary, their absence or blocking is fraught with the collapse of social order and revolutions. In a hierarchically organized society, forced altruism performs an important pacifying function. It blocks the aggression of higher-ranking subjects due to the preventive behavior of low-status members of the hierarchical pyramid. Thus, it reduces tension, restrains hierarchical struggle and allows the energy of the hierarchical structure to come out and be embodied in external effective behavior. Otherwise, most of the activity would be spent on redistribution and maintaining statuses through endless hierarchical clashes and struggles for power. Similar situations are easy to observe in all newly formed groups in which “nothing will happen” until people solve the problem of the distribution of hierarchical and role statuses. Of particular importance to forced altruism is the understanding of its imperative nature. This type of altruism, like all its other natural forms, has a powerful dominant influence on people’s behavior. And since in the case of forced altruism we are talking about people weakened by a depressed subjective state and circumstances, this influence is especially great. Therefore, in a situation where a person’s behavior is motivated by an unconscious strategy of forced altruism, he needs the most attentive and supportive attitude and therapeutic assistance. If a person finds himself in such circumstances that there is no one to take care of him, then understanding the peculiarities of the influence of forced altruism can give him the strength to self-motivate, increase vitality, be included in his own existence, increase success and care about himself and his place in life.Additionally to Having said that, we note that recently the influence of forced altruism on humanity as a whole has noticeably increased. This is due to the fact that modern society, thanks toprocesses of overpopulation and globalization has turned into a “collapsing cluster”: “In collapsing clusters, some individuals lose interest in the struggle for territory, hierarchical rank and aggressiveness. They gather together, crowd together and stop reproducing. The main activity in such groups is communication (grooming, etc.). For example, urbanization leads to the fact that already in the second generation fertility does not ensure reproduction. Cities act as demographic “black holes” (sucking young people from the surrounding area and suppressing their reproduction)” ([] Dolnik). The “face” of forced altruism from the position of any individual person is negative. On the other hand, if this process exists and is an evolutionarily stable strategy of behavior (ESSB), then it is necessary. Recently, humanity has not only been unable to regulate its numbers, but has also not been humane and rational in its use of natural resources. We (people) are exhausting the Earth's resources beyond consumption, and at the same time there are more and more of us. It is not surprising, therefore, that nature has “prudently” prepared processes for controlling the numbers of such a dangerous species as humanity. Moreover, these processes were formed and tested on evolutionarily much earlier models. And there their action is natural and humane in its own way. Humanity is intentional in destruction and succeeds in it more and more. Therefore, we still have to face the reverse side of all biological strategies of life, which will be directed against ourselves, and the meeting with them will begin with forced altruism. The listed four types of altruistic behavior (related/parental, sexual, reciprocal/rank/coalition and forced) include to a natural, natural type of altruism. What these types have in common is their reliance on instinctive ancestors and evolutionarily early behavioral patterns, the imperative nature of the listed types, as well as an orientation toward an object external to the subject of altruism itself. At the same time, despite all the “naturalness” of the described types of behavior, they are manifestations of a specific personality and are carried out using cultural methods of their implementation. Moreover, the described species are largely filled with social, cultural and personal meaning acquired in the process of socialization and education. In each of their manifestations, these types of natural altruism acquire a new, purely personal meaning. That is why we can talk about their personal character. Despite this, more personality-specific types of altruism are genuine and neurotic altruism. It is these two types that belong to the purely personal type of altruistic behavior. Let's consider them.V. GENUINE ALTRUISM A little higher, we have already characterized genuine altruistic behavior as one that is carried out from an excess of internal strength, mental resource and positive self-attitude, as well as one that is associated with receiving moral pleasure from the act of altruism and is always characterized by an awareness of one’s own needs. At the same time, we consider the necessary condition for committing genuine altruistic acts to be the presence of a mature ego of the individual, who can maintain contact with all the internal impulses of the id, as well as with the directives of the superego. Let us consider a more specific type of genuine altruism - moral altruistic behavior. Moral altruism is a subtype of true altruism that has a pro-social orientation. This type of altruistic assistance is characterized by a more private nature and is tied to the values ​​of the specific historical era in which it is carried out. A look at altruism from the position of morality and culture of a particular society has actually usurped its understanding as the only possible one. Indeed, moral altruism is characterized by several distinctive aspects. Firstly, the degree of altruism of an act is always assessedbased on the understanding of good that is present in a particular culture. In other words, a relational attitude towards altruism arises. What may be an altruistic act from the moral point of view of one society will be unacceptable behavior from the point of view of another culture. For example, the “Pavlik Morozov syndrome” certainly reflects altruistic behavior within the framework of the ideology of the Soviet state, but from the standpoint of modern morality, this act is a consequence of the moral underdevelopment of the individual. Although in the act of the pioneer “hero” the transfer of his own and parental property in favor of the “people” really took place (the last point, in fact, allows us to classify this act as altruistic). The already mentioned infanticide against weakened children, which was an attribute of many militarized city-states (for example, Sparta), was also a necessary altruistic strategy for that time. In the current period, the same behavior has become a criminal offense and is prosecuted by law. However, even if one does not use such extreme examples, one can find significant cultural differences in the assessment of different cases of altruism. As an illustration, let us again recall the Soviet era. If a Soviet person acted based on the interests of his own family, then from the position of state ideology it was considered that he was narrowly selfish. The country offered to sacrifice personal interests in favor of the party and the state. In the 1920s, the USSR even had a policy of class regulation of sexual relations[10], within which it was proposed to choose a partner based on the principle of ideological conformity. The state forcibly imposed an “altruistic” position on individual citizens, within the framework of which they had to renounce their “narrow-minded” desires in favor of the state monopoly on the class distribution of partners. Secondly, the cultural predestination of moral altruism entails rejection of a number of natural manifestations of altruistic behavior . Particularly “getting” is forced altruism, which, let us remind you once again, is understood as “a voluntary concession of a resource, carried out as a warning against actual or subjectively experienced pressure from a third party or a certain group of persons” [Case]. As we found out in our study, forced altruism is not considered an altruistic form of activity by 100% of the respondents we surveyed. At the same time, a number of researchers have found (see []) that this type of altruism plays a significant role in the formation of general readiness for altruistic behavior. Moreover, conditions that can lead to manifestations of forced altruism (apathy, melancholy, non-medical/psychological depression) are recognized as painful and are actively combated with the help of antidepressants (although in small quantities these conditions are very useful and creative in relation to new personal meanings). Moreover, they try to distract from thoughts about the “death drive” by any available means, etc. What in traditional cultures were natural altruistic practices (for example, the voluntary death of elderly people among the peoples of the Far North and the inhabitants of the Japanese islands), in ours culture is ethically taboo (euthanasia, for example). And so on. However, the most interesting point is that altruism is denied even to such a natural type of altruism as reciprocal. The majority of psychology students we surveyed (35 out of 38 people - 92.1%) considered this type of behavior to be selfish, and therefore “non-altruistic.” Indeed, in our culture the dominant view is of altruism as completely unselfish, sacrificial behavior. That is, only its ideal, “hard” version is recognized as altruism. In this case, no compromises are allowed in redefining the concept. Thirdly, in contrast to natural types of altruistic behavior,moral altruism does not appear in a person on its own. It is acquired in the process of socialization and education, built on top of natural types of altruism and, often, opposes them. If the previously described types of natural altruistic strategy imperatively influence human behavior, have the Id as their main source of motivation and are always associated with pleasure due to the implementation and discharge of an instinctive type of response, then moral altruism is accomplished as a result of the dynamic interaction of the Ego and Superego. At the same time, the motivation for such behavior comes from the SuperEgo, while the pleasure experienced is of a moral nature and is associated with the release of dynamic mental tension when the Ego meets the requirements of a higher mental authority. In other words, the motivating force of moral altruism is more indirect and acts not only due to the expectation of positive self-motivation (moral self-encouragement, a sense of pride), but also through motivating mechanisms: a sense of duty, a sense of guilt, willpower, etc. It should also be noted that altruistic actions do not exist on their own; they are not divorced from reality. They are always committed in the context of some holistic situation, and their true moral meaning can be understood only when this situation is analyzed as a whole, considered from the position of the broadest possible social context, from the position of universal human values. Thus, the moral approach to altruism sets it understanding through the prism of the underlying motivation, which, by definition, must have a humanistic orientation. True moral altruism must be learned, it must be self-educated. Unlike natural forms of helping behavior, which have an independent motivating force, the implementation of true altruism often requires volitional regulation, which can either encourage a person to provide selfless help, or will inhibit personal egoism. However, there are situations when altruism begins to have an impact on the human psyche psychopathologizing influence. In such a case we are faced with neurotic altruism.VI. NEUROTIC ALTRUISMThe peculiarity of this type of behavior is that it corresponds to altruism only in form, but pursues completely different “non-altruistic” goals. Most often, this behavior is based on repressed egoistic, aggressive or sexual motivation, which is disguised in the socially acceptable clothes of normative helping interaction. The specificity of neurotic altruism also lies in the fact that the primary, underlying egoistic strategy of behavior is not realized, and at the same time the subject of behavior is sincerely confident in his own altruistic intentions. As has been shown by a number of leading psychoanalysts (D. Winnicott, M. Klein, K Menninger, A. Freud, Z. Freud, E. Fromm, K. Horney, K. Jung), a similar situation arises due to the weak Ego of the Subject, which is unable to accept and constructively process its own aggressive or sexual impulses, suppresses them , and the place of these impulses is assigned to normatively acceptable pro-social motivation in the form of altruism. Such behavior with disguised motivation significantly maladapts both the subject himself and the close people around him. On the one hand, the environment is faced with the “unfriendly” face of excessive altruism, reinforced by an aggressive or sexual attitude, on the other hand, the “altruist” himself is in neurotic contact with the world, within the framework of which he tries to satisfy repressed impulses by inadequate means. In such cases, altruism becomes one of the options for psychological protection of a person from the world and from himself. At the same time, the personality closes itself with altruism as a shield from external environmental influences and from its own instinctive impulses. This situation leads to the fact that a person is divorced from reality,he rationalizes his behavior with its pro-social orientation and moves away from his own essence, since he exists in a mode of self-sacrifice. In other words, he is doubly maladapted and reliably camouflages his neurosis into an altruistic form of behavior. Altruistic neurosis serves as a kind of protection against the conflict between the demands of culture and unconscious egoistic aggressive or sexual motivation. Neurotic altruism is a way to achieve social approval through selflessness and at the same time enter into despotic-controlling relationships with everyone towards whom such altruistic behavior is directed. Naturally, neurotic altruism is not natural. It arises as a result of an individual specific reaction to socialization and upbringing and, in extreme forms, requires psychotherapeutic correction. Thus, among the types of personal altruism considered, true and neurotic altruism can be distinguished. The realization of true altruism is possible only with a mature ego of the individual, maintaining contact with all the internal impulses of the id, as well as with the directives of the superego; true altruism is always characterized by an excess of internal strength, mental resource and positive self-attitude, and the implementation of true altruism entails the experience of moral pleasure from the act. Neurotic altruism manifests itself and unfolds on its own, using the energy of suppressed unconscious desires and impulses. What these two types of altruism have in common is that they occur as a result of the dynamic interaction between the Ego and the SuperEgo, and the motivation for both behavior comes from the SuperEgo and from the Ego-Ideals. Now let us examine the transfinite level of altruism and the type that represents it helping behavior.VII. TRANSFINITE ALTRUISM As we said earlier, transfinite altruism is the highest, spiritual type of altruistic behavior; it is truly humane and environmentally friendly. This type of altruism is not directly related to the cultural and value norms of a particular time, it has enduring value, its guidelines are basic universal norms, and it is characterized by the highest degree of love in each of its acts. Transfinite altruism is based on the freedom of internal choice and the responsibility associated with it; and it itself consists of selflessly giving love and goodness to the world. At the same time, the subject of altruistic behavior is an internally filled with happiness person who transcends himself into the world and becomes one with the world, merging with it in conscious contact. At the same time, the peculiarity of a personality capable of transfinite altruism also lies in the fact that its own Ego is to some extent dissolved, the psychological boundaries with the world are permeable, and the most intense parts of the personality are exteriorized into the world. Such a person is free from any manifestations of egoism, since the external world is at the same time herself, and she herself is the whole world. In other words, the transsubjective becomes largely intrasubjective and vice versa. As examples of people of this kind, we can cite Jesus Christ, Buddha, various spiritual prophets, enlightened ones, etc. Transfinite altruism is the creation of good in its purest form, when a person, realizing his temporality, at the same time experiences unity with the eternal world, takes takes responsibility for him, transfers energy and any resource available to him, as if she were herself. The peculiarity of this type of altruistic behavior is also that it is free from any manifestations of aggression, dominance and control and consists of truly spiritual self-manifestation. With transfinite altruism, the motivations of the ID and Superego merge into a love-filled Ego, and the pleasure experienced from this type of behavior is spiritual in nature. The permanent process of transfinite giving entails at the same time an increase in subjectivity, which increases the degree of awareness of such a person. In order for the subjectbecame capable of acts of transfinite altruism, he must form a readiness for genuine altruistic behavior, moreover, he must be in permanent spiritual growth. Only then will he be able to carry out the function of self-transcending and psychic integration with the world. Readiness for genuine altruistic behavior must be formed in a child from childhood, and in adulthood, it must be self-educated. It is also necessary to increase one’s own awareness, sensitivity to various manifestations of the Id, and develop the ability to withstand the pressure of the Superego. In this case, the subject’s ego becomes more mature and permeable to the impulses of the unconscious and the directives of the normative authority. Such a process of spiritual growth will ensure readiness for the formation of mature altruism, without any neurotic manifestations and without extreme degrees of coercion. Table 6 The differences and similarities between all of the listed types of altruism can be illustrated in comparative Table 6. Type of altruism Origin Object towards which altruistic behavior is directed Symmetry ( requirement of reciprocity) The purpose of this type of behavior Kinship / parental Inherited Children / relatives Does not provide for obligatory mutual behavior Adaptation of offspring, increasing one’s own final fitness Sexual Inherited Women Does not provide for obligatory reciprocal behavior Establishing contact with Objects of the opposite sex Reciprocal / rank / coalition Inherited Objects of the same rank / status Involves obligatory mutual behavior Mutual exchange of assistance, creation of alliances for confrontation external Objects and increase due to this own rank/status Forced Inherited Objects of a higher rank/status Does not provide for mandatory mutual behavior Pacification of superior Objects, prevention of their aggression, defusing one’s own tension Genuine (including moral) Acquired in the process of education and socialization; then becoming a consequence of personal growthAutonomous parts of the ego identity; introjected objects Super-Ego, Ego-ideals, basic human values ​​Does not provide for obligatory mutual behavior Receiving emotions of self-approval, experiencing pride in oneself, discharging feelings of guilt, feelings of duty, experiencing moral pleasure from the implementation of this behavior Neurotic, compensatory Acquired in the process of education and socialization Own Ego Provides for obligatory mutual behavior Relieving tension between unconscious egoistic instinctive motivation and normative requirements of the Superego Transfinite Acquired in the process of self-education and spiritual growth Transcended, exteriorized parts of one’s own personality into the world; the world as a whole Does not provide for mutual behavior Improving and enriching the world as a whole, transferring love, one’s own energy and any available resource to it; experiencing spiritual pleasure from implementing this behavior; increase in subjectivity, spiritual growth Analysis of the data in Table 6 allows us to draw the following conclusions: 1. Objects of altruistic behavior can be both external and internal.2. Altruism is not always unidirectional; some of its types provide for mandatory reciprocity in behavior.3. Altruistic behavior can pursue a variety of goals and have different motivations. The only thing in common is that the ultimate meaning of any altruistic act is to relieve tension in an external or internal dynamic system.4. Different types of altruistic behavior relate differently to the evolutionary ancestors of altruism. Certain types of such behavior have a closer connection with such ancestral forms and are largely based on them, others have a significant socio-cultural component and, often, oppose instinctivealtruistic schemes. In addition to these conclusions, we emphasize that different types of altruism are activated in the process of ontogenesis in different life periods. This allows us to talk about heterogeneity and heterochronicity in the development of human altruism. The “non-simultaneous” emergence of various types of altruistic behavior in a subject allows us to affirm the complex nature of this life phenomenon, talk about its systemic development in ontogenesis and the increase in altruism due to the emergence of new types of altruism. At the same time, during the life of the subject, a qualitative restructuring of the structure of altruistic motivation occurs, and a person can achieve true altruism only in adulthood. Now let’s summarize some results: The constructed classification of altruistic behavior includes seven types of altruism, four of which belong to the natural type, two to personal, another - to transfinite. The described types of altruism differ in the object to which help is directed (can be external or internal), in the degree of innateness/acquisition of the three types of altruistic behavior, in the symmetry of relationships arising as a result of an altruistic act and in the final goals . It is these four parameters that provide us with the opportunity to classify the listed types of altruism. Different types of altruistic interaction with the world are activated during the process of ontogenesis in different life periods. This allows us to speak about the heterogeneity and heterochronicity of the development of human altruism, which indicates the complex nature of this phenomenon and its systemic development in ontogenesis. The ability to genuine and its highest manifestation - transfinite altruism, testifies to the spiritual maturity of the individual, his spiritual wealth and significant humanism. It is possible to talk about transfinite altruism only when it is established in relation to helping behavior not only, and not so much its situational “pro-social” orientation, but its compliance with basic spiritual ethics, if humanism of the highest order is present in this behavior, if it is imbued with love for humanity and the world as a whole. 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